The illusion of argument justification.
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Argumentation is an important way to reach a new understanding. Strongly caring about an issue, which is often evident when dealing with controversial issues, has been shown to lead to biases in argumentation. We suggest that people are not well calibrated in assessing their ability to justify a position through argumentation, an effect we call the illusion of argument justification. Furthermore, we find that caring about the issue further clouds this introspection. We first show this illusion by measuring the difference between ratings before and after producing an argument for one's own position. The strength of the illusion is predicted by the strength of care for a given issue (Study 1). The tacit influences of framing and priming do not override the effects of emotional investment in a topic (Study 2). However, explicitly considering counterarguments removes the effect of care when initially assessing the ability to justify a position (Study 3). Finally, we consider our findings in light of other recent research and discuss the potential benefits of group reasoning.
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Cites
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BackgroundThe misunderstood limits of folk science: An illusion of explanatory depth
Rozenblit, L., & Keil, F. (2002) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1207/s15516709cog2605_1 · Cited by 1,032
Self-citationA disconfirmation bias in the evaluation of arguments.
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Divine intuition: Cognitive style influences belief in God.
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Subjective Construal, Social Inference, and Human Misunderstanding
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BackgroundPolitical Extremism Is Supported by an Illusion of Understanding
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Cited by
Searching for explanations: How the Internet inflates estimates of internal knowledge.
Fisher, M., Goddu, M. K., & Keil, F. C. (2015) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0000070 · Cited by 330
Self-citationSloman, S. A., & Lagnado, D. (2015) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-015135 · Cited by 210
The Bias That Divides Us: The Science and Politics of Myside Thinking
Stanovich, K. E. (2021) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/13367.001.0001 · Cited by 152
The illusion of explanatory depth and endorsement of conspiracy beliefs
Vitriol, J. A., & Marsh, J. K. (2018) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2504 · Cited by 118
Reflecting on explanatory ability: A mechanism for detecting gaps in causal knowledge.
Johnson, D. R., Murphy, M. P., & Messer, R. M. (2016) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0000161 · Cited by 30
Harder Than You Think: How Outside Assistance Leads to Overconfidence
Fisher, M., & Oppenheimer, D. M. (2021) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797620975779 · Cited by 31
“They exhibit an illusion of explanatory depth, overestimating how much detail they can provide about how everyday objects work (Rozenblit & Keil, 2002), arguments on controversial topics (Fernbach et al., 2013; Fisher & Keil, 2014), and topics within their area of expertise (Fisher & Keil, 2016).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fisher, M., & Keil, F. C.
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Published
- 2014-02
- Volume
- 143
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 425-433
- ISSN
- 0096-3445 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-2222
- OpenAlex
- W2314287364
- Cited by
- 41
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 8.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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