The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Belief polarization is not always irrational.
Open accessAbstract
Belief polarization occurs when 2 people with opposing prior beliefs both strengthen their beliefs after observing the same data. Many authors have cited belief polarization as evidence of irrational behavior. We show, however, that some instances of polarization are consistent with a normative account of belief revision. Our analysis uses Bayesian networks to characterize different kinds of relationships between hypotheses and data, and distinguishes between cases in which normative reasoners with opposing beliefs should both strengthen their beliefs, cases in which both should weaken their beliefs, and cases in which one should strengthen and the other should weaken his or her belief. We apply our analysis to several previous studies of belief polarization and present a new experiment that suggests that people tend to update their beliefs in the directions predicted by our normative account.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Computer Simulation of Liquids
Allen, M. P., & Tildesley, D. J. (2017) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198803195.001.0001 · Cited by 20,945
Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00122574 · Cited by 15,467
Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference
Pearl, J. (2009) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511803161 · Cited by 11,653
The case for motivated reasoning.
Kunda, Z. (1990) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480 · Cited by 9,022
Lord, C. G., Ross, L., & Lepper, M. R. (1979) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.37.11.2098 · Cited by 4,583
Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs
Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M. (2006) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00214.x · Cited by 4,344
The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory
Duhem, P. M. M. (1954) · doi:10.1515/9780691233857 · Cited by 2,128
Causal Models: How People Think about the World and Its Alternatives
Sloman, S. (2005) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183115.001.0001 · Cited by 677
The dilution effect: Nondiagnostic information weakens the implications of diagnostic information
Nisbett, R. E., Zukier, H., & Lemley, R. E. (1981) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(81)90010-4 · Cited by 605
Rational approximations to rational models: alternative algorithms for category learning
Sanborn, A. N., Griffiths, T. L., & Navarro, D. J. (2010) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0020511 · Cited by 369
Cited by
The evidence for motivated reasoning in climate change preference formation
Druckman, J. N., & McGrath, M. C. (2019) · Nature Climate Change · doi:10.1038/s41558-018-0360-1 · Cited by 733
Rational irrationality: modeling climate change belief polarization using Bayesian networks
Cook, J., & Lewandowsky, S. (2016) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/tops.12186 · Cited by 332
False Equivalence: Are Liberals and Conservatives in the United States Equally Biased?
Baron, J., & Jost, J. T. (2019) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691618788876 · Cited by 213
The Bias That Divides Us: The Science and Politics of Myside Thinking
Stanovich, K. E. (2021) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/13367.001.0001 · Cited by 152
O’Connor, C., & Weatherall, J. O. (2018) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-018-0213-9 · Cited by 136
Metadata
- Authors
- Jern, A., Chang, K.-M. K., & Kemp, C.
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2014
- Volume
- 121
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 206-224
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W2008090445
- Cited by
- 202
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 4.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.