False Equivalence: Are Liberals and Conservatives in the United States Equally Biased?
Abstract
On the basis of a meta-analysis of 51 studies, Ditto et al. (this issue, p. 273) conclude that ideological bias is equivalent on the left and right of U.S. politics. In this commentary, we contend that this conclusion does not follow from the review and that Ditto and his colleagues are too quick to embrace a false equivalence between the liberal left and the conservative right. For one thing, the issues, procedures, and materials used in the studies reviewed by Ditto and his colleagues were selected for purposes other than the inspection of ideological asymmetries. Consequently, methodological choices made by researchers were systematically biased to avoid producing differences between liberals and conservatives. We also consider the broader implications of a normative analysis of judgment and decision making and demonstrate that the bias examined by Ditto and his colleagues is not, in fact, an irrational bias, and that it is incoherent to discuss bias in the absence of standards for assessing accuracy and consistency. Other conclusions about domain-general asymmetries in motivated social cognition have suggested that epistemic virtues are more prevalent among liberals than conservatives, and these conclusions are closer to the truth of the matter when it comes to current American politics. Finally, we question the notion that the research literature in psychology is necessarily characterized by liberal bias, as several authors have claimed.
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Once groups are ideologically polarized, their members may engage in 'normal' or 'cold' cognitive processes, possibly including Bayesian updating, to maintain or exacerbate motivated differences in beliefs, opinions and values.
“Once groups are ideologically polarized (that is, extreme), their members may engage in ‘normal’ or ‘cold’ cognitive processes, possibly including Bayesian updating, to maintain or exacerbate motivated differences in beliefs, opinions and values61,102–105.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [103]
People may evaluate the same information more favourably when it supports (versus contradicts) the beliefs, opinions and values of one's political in-group.
“For example, people may evaluate the same information more favourably when it supports (versus contradicts) the beliefs, opinions and values of one’s political in-group103,115,120.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [103]
Few (if any) studies actually connect the dots between psychological speculations about partisan communication activating group-justifying motives or conservative communication activating system-justifying motives and the mechanisms that mediate message reception.
“However, few (if any) studies actually connect the dots (see, for example, critiques of existing research on motivated political reasoning103,300,301).”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [103]
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Vosoughi, S., Roy, D., & Aral, S. (2018) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aap9559 · Cited by 8,847 · cited 1× · see citing works
“A close inspection of the results of a recent study by Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral (2018) reveals that four of the U.S. news/opinion sources that contained the highest proportion of false statements (the Rush Limbaugh Show, Glenn Beck Program, Fox News, and the Sean Hannity Show) were highly trusted by…”
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“We believe, in any case, that the conclusions from Jost (2017) about ideological asymmetry in processes of motivated social cognition are closer to the truth of the matter, at least when it comes to American (and some cases of European) politics (see also Jost et al., 2003, 2018).”
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- Authors
- Baron, J., & Jost, J. T.
- Affiliations
- University of Pennsylvania (US)
- New York University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Baron, Jonathan
- Venue
- Perspectives on Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2019-03
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 292-303
- ISSN
- 1745-6916 (ISSN-L)
- 1745-6924
- OpenAlex
- W2921849455
- Cited by
- 213
- References
- 7
- Citations by year
- 2026: 9 · 2025: 19 · 2024: 27 · 2023: 42 · 2022: 34 · 2021: 34 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 15 · 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 122.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Perspectives on Psychological Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Academic Freedom and Politics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- ideological bias, liberals and conservatives, false equivalence, motivated social cognition, intellectual virtues, political ideology, epistemic asymmetry
- MeSH terms
- Humans, Judgment, Politics, United States, Bias
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