Evolutionary dynamics on any population structure
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 76 of the 76 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. The structure of a population can affect which traits evolve. Understanding evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations remains difficult. Mathematical results are known for special structures in which all individuals have the same number of neighbours. The general case, in which the number of neighbours can vary, has remained open. For arbitrary selection intensity, the problem is in a computational complexity class that suggests there is no efficient algorithm. Whether a simple solution for weak selection exists has remained unanswered. Here we provide a solution for weak selection that applies to any graph or network. Our method relies on calculating the coalescence times of random walks. We evaluate large numbers of diverse population structures for their propensity to favour cooperation. We study how small changes in population structure-graph surgery-affect evolutionary outcomes. We find that cooperation flourishes most in societies that are based on strong pairwise ties.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Allen, B., Lippner, G., Chen, Y.-T., Fotouhi, B., Momeni, N., Yau, S.-T., & Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Allen, Benjamin
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2017-03-29
- Volume
- 544
- Issue
- 7649
- Pages
- 227-230
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W2401891657
- Cited by
- 534
- References
- 76
- Citations by year
- 2026: 62 · 2025: 69 · 2024: 68 · 2023: 63 · 2022: 51 · 2021: 54 · 2020: 49 · 2019: 51 · 2018: 52 · 2017: 15
- FWCI
- 116.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- arxiv.org
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Applied Mathematics › Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models
- Keywords
- evolutionary game theory, structured populations, weak selection, cooperation, graph topology, coalescence time, random walks, evolutionary dynamics, selection intensity
- MeSH terms
- Algorithms, Animals, Computer Graphics, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Genetics, Population, Humans, Models, Biological, Selection, Genetic, Sociology, Ecosystem
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