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Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Figure 1 shows that believing climate change is important had the strongest effect size across all action measures for student samples (n = 4,049).”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > LETTERS
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesA result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.”
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesA result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender.”
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesA result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.”
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passes- Rests on an assumption: Students typically occupy similar socio-economic positions across countries.
- Rests on an assumption: Climate change requires a global solution.
- Rests on an assumption: Researchers have focused on some co-benefits, such as reduced pollution or economic development, without an integrated approach to understand how co-benefits are related and comparing their importance for motivating public action.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender.”
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesA result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Unconvinced participants seemed particularly motivated by Development co-benefits.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > LETTERS
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedCausal:correlational· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesNone of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Commonly cited co-benefits addressing Dysfunction (for example, pollution, disease 11,12,15,16 ) were actually the weakest motivators of action overall.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > LETTERS
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites [11] Nemet, G. F., Holloway, T. & Meier, P. Implications of incorporating air-quality co-benefits into climate change policymaking. Environ. Res. Lett. 5, 014007 (2010). source
- Not checked yetcites [12] West, J. J. et al. Co-benefits of mitigating global greenhouse gas emissions for future air quality and human health. Nature Clim. Change 3, 885–889 (2013). source
- Not checked yetcites [15] Thurston, G. D. Mitigation policy: Health co-benefits. Nature Clim. Change 3, 863–864 (2013). source
- Not checked yetcites [16] Maibach, E. W., Nisbet, M., Baldwin, P., Akerlof, K. & Diao, G. Reframing climate change as a public health issue: An exploratory study of public reactions. BMC Public Health 10, 299 (2010); http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/10/299 source
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesA result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Motivations to act on climate change were clearly related to beliefs about co-benefits, especially for economic and scientific development (Development) and for building a more caring and moral community (Benevolence).”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > LETTERS
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesA result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, this effect varied significantly across countries.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > LETTERS
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedn = 4,049Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesA result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Effect sizes for co-benefits were slightly stronger in community samples (ten countries; n = 1,239), suggesting that results for student samples may be underestimates.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > LETTERS
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passes
- It may state two separate claims as one. 10
- Probably not a substantial claim. 29
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Effect sizes for Benevolence were also relatively strong but were less variable across countries.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > LETTERS
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Unconvinced participants showed similar effects to those convinced, and were especially motivated by Development co-benefits.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > LETTERS
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The 'not applicable' choice was selected less than a third of the time for every item in every country”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Motivations to act on climate change.
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In Norway and Sweden, the item 'Use car-sharing or car-pooling schemes' was rated as 'not applicable' by more than one-third of participants”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Motivations to act on climate change.
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“the scenario where climate change was prevented (used for convinced participants) was deemed unsuitable for those unconvinced”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Co-benefits scenarios.
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Compared to convinced participants, unconvinced participants showed similar or stronger effects for co-benefits related to societal conditions, and similar or weaker effects for character co-benefits.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > LETTERS
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“However, scales created to reflect each quadrant showed low reliabilities across many countries and were excluded from analyses.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Societal values.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites [31] Schwartz, S. H. in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology Vol. 25 (ed. Zanna, M. P.) 1–65 (Academic Press, 1992).
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“For those convinced that climate change is real, co-benefit effects were independent of believing climate change is important, yet were of comparable strength in motivating action.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > LETTERS
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Development showed the strongest effect sizes for citizenship and personal actions and a weaker effect for donations, with effect sizes also varying across countries.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > LETTERS
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:correlational· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, these predictors did not account for the variation in Development and Dysfunction effect sizes, nor did other predictors testing alternative explanations”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > LETTERS
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“but the vast majority of people viewed the behaviours as possible across the remaining items and countries.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Motivations to act on climate change.
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“mitigation efforts can reduce pollution 11,12”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Communicating co-benefits could motivate action on climate change where traditional approaches have stalled.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites [11] Nemet, G. F., Holloway, T. & Meier, P. Implications of incorporating air-quality co-benefits into climate change policymaking. Environ. Res. Lett. 5, 014007 (2010). source
- Not checked yetcites [12] West, J. J. et al. Co-benefits of mitigating global greenhouse gas emissions for future air quality and human health. Nature Clim. Change 3, 885–889 (2013). source
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“support economic development through green industries 13,14”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Communicating co-benefits could motivate action on climate change where traditional approaches have stalled.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites [13] UNEP Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication—A Synthesis for Policy Makers (2011); http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy
- Not checked yetcites [14] Fabian, N. Economics: Support low-carbon investment. Nature 519, 27–29 (2015). source
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
In the paper
“These issues are strongly linked to political ideology [1][2][3][4]”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Communicating co-benefits could motivate action on climate change where traditional approaches have stalled.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites [1][2][3][4]
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
In the paper
“Communicating climate science is now failing to persuade those who remain unconvinced climate change is real ('unconvinced' , or climate sceptics) 10”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Communicating co-benefits could motivate action on climate change where traditional approaches have stalled.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites [10] Whitmarsh, L. Scepticism and uncertainty about climate change: Dimensions, determinants and change over time. Glob. Environ. Change 21, 690–700 (2011). source
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Scale scores were created where participants provided responses (excluding 'not applicable') for at least six items.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Motivations to act on climate change.
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“It is worth noting that the number of unconvinced participants was relatively small”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > LETTERS
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“scale scores were created where participants provided answers (excluding 'not applicable') for at least six items.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Motivations to act on climate change.
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“meaning that explanations of the variation in correlations for these dimensions remain to be established.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > LETTERS
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“indicating that overall participants believed these behaviours were possible in their country.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Motivations to act on climate change.
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Participants completed a survey developed with feedback from country contributors for applicability and relevance.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Methods
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Communicating the co-benefits of addressing climate change could provide a way to foster public action, and thereby influence government action, even among those unconvinced or unconcerned about climate change.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > LETTERS
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Environmental citizenship intentions items were taken from an existing measure 32”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Motivations to act on climate change.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites [32] Stern, P. C., Dietz, T., Abel, T., Guagnano, G. A. & Kalof, L. A value-belief-norm theory of support for social movements: The case of environmentalism. Hum. Ecol. Rev. 6, 81–97 (1999).
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“the final 12-item scale was developed with feedback from contributors about local pro-environmental behaviours.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Motivations to act on climate change.
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
In the paper
“research suggesting that importance and co-benefit messages may counteract each other when used together, at least for conservatives in the United States 29”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > LETTERS
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites [29] Gromet, D. M., Kunreuther, H. & Larrick, R. P. Political ideology affects energy-efficiency attitudes and choices. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 110, 9314–9319 (2013). source
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedCausal:conditional· not yet calibratedTests✗ Asserted: fails✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The authors may not put it forward as true. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, the strong and consistent findings across student and community samples, and across those convinced and unconvinced, gives a firm basis for further research on these co-benefits”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > LETTERS
Load-bearingStrength:boosted· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✗ Checkable: fails✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Communicating Benevolence co-benefits is likely to have the most consistent effects for a worldwide audience, but in some countries emphasizing Development may have greater impact.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > LETTERS
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Translations were obtained using translation-back-translation by competent bilingual speakers, or using parallel translation where multiple bilingual speakers independently translated the survey.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Methods
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The paper version of the survey adhered strictly to a template developed by the project coordinators to ensure consistency and to match the online surveys.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Methods
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“and adapted and extended based on feedback from contributors in the different countries.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Motivations to act on climate change.
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
In the paper
“they then rated their country in 2050 on scales from the validated collective futures model 17”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Co-benefits scenarios.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites [17] Bain, P. G., Hornsey, M. J., Bongiorno, R. & Jeffries, C. Promoting pro-environmental action in climate change deniers. Nature Clim. Change 2, 600–603 (2012). source
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
In the paper
“Participants then completed a screening item asking them to choose from the following three options used in previous research 17”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Climate change beliefs.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites [17] Bain, P. G., Hornsey, M. J., Bongiorno, R. & Jeffries, C. Promoting pro-environmental action in climate change deniers. Nature Clim. Change 2, 600–603 (2012). source
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In both approaches, discussion of discrepancies between the translators and the project coordinators continued until an acceptable translation was agreed on.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Methods
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“This scale was drawn from several sources [32][33][34]”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Motivations to act on climate change.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites [32] Stern, P. C., Dietz, T., Abel, T., Guagnano, G. A. & Kalof, L. A value-belief-norm theory of support for social movements: The case of environmentalism. Hum. Ecol. Rev. 6, 81–97 (1999).
- Not checked yetcites [33] McDonald, R. I., Fielding, K. S. & Louis, W. R. Energizing and de-motivating effects of norm conflict. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 39, 57–72 (2012). source
- Not checked yetcites [34] Whitmarsh, L. & O’Neill, S. Green identity, green living? The role of pro-environmental self-identity in determining consistency across diverse pro-environmental behaviours. J. Environ. Psychol. 30, 305–314 (2010). source
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“All data meeting these criteria were included in analyses, except for a single extreme outlier in the Swedish 'unconvinced' sample.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Political ideology.
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
In the paper
“Political ideology was measured using a single item from previous research 35”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Political ideology.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites [35] Schwartz, S. et al. Basic personal values underlie and give coherence to political values: A cross national study in 15 countries. Polit. Behav. 36, 899–930 (2014). source
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Analyses were conducted on participants who identified themselves as citizens of the country of data collection, and who identified as students (student samples) or non-students (community samples).”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > Political ideology.
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Communicating climate change importance may continue to be effective in promoting action in those convinced climate change is real, but less so in poorer countries.”
§ Co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action around the world Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.However, convincing the public that climate change is real faces powerful ideological obstacles [1][2][3][4] , and climate change is slipping in public importance in many countries 5,6 .Here we investigate a different approach, identifying whether potential co-benefits of addressing climate change 7 could motivate pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real.We describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about co-benefits 8 , distinguishing social conditions (for example, economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and community character (for example, benevolence, competence).Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196 participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), motivated public, private and financial actions to address climate change to a similar degree as believing climate change is important.Critically, relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action across ideological divides.These relationships were also independent of perceived climate change importance, and could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender. > LETTERS
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
The paper relies on this without support.
Students typically occupy similar socio-economic positions across countries.
“University student samples were selected to facilitate comparisons, as students typically occupy similar socio-economic positions across countries.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Climate change requires a global solution.
“Second, climate change requires a global solution, but most co-benefits research has been conducted in Western countries”
The paper relies on this without support.
Researchers have focused on some co-benefits, such as reduced pollution or economic development, without an integrated approach to understand how co-benefits are related and comparing their importance for motivating public action.
“First, researchers have focused on some co-benefits, such as reduced pollution or economic development, without an integrated approach to understand how co-benefits are related and comparing their importance for motivating public action.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“First, highlighting the co-benefits of common practices and expanding them creates an opportunity to tangibly reduce embodied carbon (Bain et al. 2016;Karlsson et al. 2020).”
From Making embodied carbon mainstream: a framework for cities to leverage waste, equity, and preservation policy to reduce embodied emissions in buildings (2023) · cites this paper as Bain et al. 2016
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bain, P. G., Milfont, T. L., Kashima, Y., Bilewicz, M., Doron, G., Garðarsdóttir, R. B., Gouveia, V. V., Guan, Y., Johansson, L.-O., Pasquali, C., Corral-Verdugo, V., Aragones, J. I., Utsugi, A., Demarque, C., Otto, S., Park, J., Soland, M., Steg, L., González, R., Lebedeva, N., Madsen, O. J., Wagner, C., Akotia, C. S., Kurz, T., Saiz, J. L., Schultz, P. W., Einarsdóttir, G., & Saviolidis, N. M.
- Affiliations
- Queensland University of Technology (AU)
- Victoria University of Wellington (NZ)
- The University of Melbourne (AU)
- University of Warsaw (PL)
- Reichman University (IL)
- University of Iceland (IS)
- Universidade Federal da Paraíba (BR)
- University of Surrey (GB)
- University of Gothenburg (SE)
- Universidad Simón Bolívar (VE)
- Universidad Complutense de Madrid (ES)
- Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès (FR)
- Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg (DE)
- Nagoya University of Commerce and Business (JP)
- University of Zurich (CH)
- University of Groningen (NL)
- Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile (CL)
- National Research University Higher School of Economics (RU)
- University of Oslo (NO)
- University of Pretoria (ZA)
- University of Ghana (GH)
- University of Exeter (GB)
- California State University, San Marcos (US)
- Corresponding author
- Bain, Paul G.
- ORCID
- Bain, Paul G.
- Milfont, Taciano L.
- Kashima, Yoshihisa
- Bilewicz, Michał
- Doron, Guy
- Garðarsdóttir, Ragna B.
- Gouveia, Valdiney V.
- Guan, Yanjun
- Johansson, Lars-Olof
- Utsugi, Akira
- Demarque, Christophe
- Otto, Siegmar
- Park, Joonha
- Soland, Martin
- Steg, Linda
- González, Roberto
- Lebedeva, Nadezhda
- Madsen, Ole Jacob
- Akotia, Charity S.
- Kurz, Tim
- Schultz, P. Wesley
- Einarsdóttir, Gró
- Venue
- Nature Climate Change
- Published
- 2015-09-28
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 154-157
- ISSN
- 1758-678X (ISSN-L)
- 1758-6798
- OpenAlex
- W2259778813
- Semantic Scholar
- e1a0851783048eb2d7dcb3003ed4c5f6cac87dec
- Cited by
- 447
- References
- 32
- Citations by year
- 2026: 31 · 2025: 43 · 2024: 48 · 2023: 45 · 2022: 40 · 2021: 57 · 2020: 47 · 2019: 59 · 2018: 23 · 2017: 31 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 5
- FWCI
- 85.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Update notices
- erratum (2016-04-27)
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Nature Climate Change (publishedVersion)
- Pure (University of Bath) (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- Durham Research Online (Durham University) (acceptedVersion)
- Durham Research Online (Durham University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- University of Groningen research database (University of Groningen / Centre for Information Technology) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- HAL AMU (submittedVersion)
- Americanae (AECID Library) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- John Spoor Broome Library Institutional Repository (California State University) (submittedVersion)
- LA Referencia (Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- Omeka S (Universidad de La Frontera) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- UpSpace Institutional Repository (University of Pretoria) (submittedVersion)
- California State University ScholarWorks (system-wide DSpace) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Royal Society
- Royal Society Te Apārangi (E1908)
- Ministerstwo Edukacji i Nauki (IP2014 002273)
- National Research University Higher School of Economics (5‐100)
- Centro de Estudios de Conflicto y Cohesión Social (15130009)
- Australian Research Council (DP130102229, DP0984678)
- Fondo de Financiamiento de Centros de Investigación en Áreas Prioritarias (# 15130009)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Climate Change Communication and Perception
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Climate Change Policy and Economics
- Physical Sciences › Environmental Science › Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law › Pro-Environmental Behavior and Attitudes
- Keywords
- pro-environmental behavior, political ideology, economic development, climate change communication, gender and age differences
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-11, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-11 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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