Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Learning in finitely repeated games of cooperation remains poorly understood in part because their dynamics play out over a timescale exceeding that of traditional lab experiments. Here, we report results of a virtual lab experiment in which 94 subjects play up to 400 ten-round games of Prisoner’s Dilemma over the course of twenty consecutive weekdays. Consistent with previous work, the typical round of first defection moves earlier for several days; however, this unravelling process stabilizes after roughly one week. Analysing individual strategies, we find that approximately 40% of players behave as resilient cooperators who avoid unravelling even at significant cost to themselves. Finally, using a standard learning model we predict that a sufficiently large minority of resilient cooperators can permanently stabilize unravelling among a majority of rational players. These results shed hopeful light on the long-term dynamics of cooperation, and demonstrate the importance of long-run experiments.
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Cited by
Donovan, A., Ryan, E., & Wood, R. I. (2020) · Psychoneuroendocrinology · doi:10.1016/j.psyneuen.2020.104803 · Cited by 10
Metadata
- Authors
- Mao, A., Dworkin, L., Suri, S., & Watts, D. J.
- Venue
- Nature Communications
- Published
- 2017-01-13
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 13800-13800
- ISSN
- 2041-1723 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123833839
- Cited by
- 51
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 12.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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