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Cited by 15Psychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentEmotions and Moral BehaviorExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Perceived Shared Condemnation Intensifies Punitive Moral Emotions

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Konishi, Naoki, Oe, Tomoko, Shimizu, Hiroshi, Tanaka, Kanako, Ohtsubo, Yohsuke·2017·Scientific Reports
DOI 10.1038/s41598-017-07916-zPMC PMC5544740
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Abstract

Punishment facilitates large-scale cooperation among humans, but how punishers, who incur an extra cost of punishment, can successfully compete with non-punishers, who free-ride on the punisher’s policing, poses an evolutionary puzzle. One answer is by coordinating punishment to minimise its cost. Notice, however, that in order to effectively coordinate their punishment, potential punishers must know in advance whether others would also be willing to punish a particular norm violator. Such knowledge might hinder coordination by tempting potential punishers to free-ride on other punishers. Previous research suggests that moral emotions, such as moral outrage and moral disgust, serve as a commitment device and drive people to carry out the costly act of punishment. Accordingly, we tested whether the perception of socially shared condemnation (i.e., knowledge that others also condemn a particular violator) would amplify moral outrage and moral disgust, and diminish empathy for the violator. Study 1 (scenario-based study) revealed that perceived shared condemnation was correlated positively with moral outrage and moral disgust, and negatively with empathy. Study 2 experimentally demonstrated that information indicating that others also condemn a particular norm violation amplified moral outrage. Lastly, Study 3 (autobiographical recall study) confirmed the external validity of the finding.

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  • Moral concern predicts harsh moral judgments and punishment intentions toward those who commit moral violations.

    “Moral concern and punitiveness are positively related: Moral concern predicts harsh moral judgments and punishment intentions toward those who commit moral violations70–73.”

    From Nostalgia increases punitiveness by intensifying moral concern (2024) · cites this paper as [73]

    In Results > Study 1 (page unavailable), moral emotions predicted some punitive intentions, although only moral outrage predicted willingness to impose a fine. Results > Study 3 (page unavailable) also links outrage and disgust to punitive motivation. The paper does not establish that moral concern, as distinct from these emotions, predicts harsh moral judgments; that part of the claim is unsupported. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Endorsement of each moral foundation predicts stronger attitudes toward both utilitarian punishment and retributive punishment.

    “For example, endorsement of each moral foundation predicts stronger attitudes toward both utilitarian punishment (aimed at avoiding repetition of violations) and retributive punishment (aimed at retribution of violators).”

    From Nostalgia increases punitiveness by intensifying moral concern (2024) · cites this paper as [73]

    The Results (Studies 1 and 3; page numbers unavailable) link moral emotions with some punitive intentions and motivations, but do not assess endorsement of each moral foundation. Searches for moral foundations and for utilitarian and retributive punishment found no passage testing whether those endorsements predict attitudes toward both types of punishment. (LLM, conf=0.76)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Cited by

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Authors
Konishi, N., Oe, T., Shimizu, H., Tanaka, K., & Ohtsubo, Y.
Affiliations
  • Kobe University (JP)
  • Teikyo University (JP)
  • Kwansei Gakuin University (JP)
Corresponding author
Ohtsubo, Yohsuke
ORCID
Venue
Scientific Reports
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2017-08-04
Volume
7
Issue
1
Pages
7289-7289
ISSN
2045-2322 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1038/s41598-017-07916-z
PMC
PMC5544740
OpenAlex
W2739981290
Cited by
15
References
7
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 4 · 2017: 1
FWCI
0.94
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Scientific Reports (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Institutional Repositories DataBase (IRDB) (acceptedVersion, cc-by)
  • Kobe University Repository Kernel (Kobe University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • Institutional Repositories DataBase (IRDB) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • John Templeton Foundation
  • Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (15KT0131, 15K17250, 26590132)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Emotions and Moral Behavior
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Keywords
punishment, moral outrage, moral disgust, empathy, costly punishment, free-riding, commitment devices, norm violation, cooperation, moral emotions
MeSH terms
Adolescent, Adult, Emotions, Female, Humans, Male, Models, Theoretical, Morals, Perception, Punishment, Students, Young Adult

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