Stochastic evolutionary voluntary public goods game with punishment in a Quasi-birth-and-death process
Open accessAbstract
Traditional replication dynamic model and the corresponding concept of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) only takes into account whether the system can return to the equilibrium after being subjected to a small disturbance. In the real world, due to continuous noise, the ESS of the system may not be stochastically stable. In this paper, a model of voluntary public goods game with punishment is studied in a stochastic situation. Unlike the existing model, we describe the evolutionary process of strategies in the population as a generalized quasi-birth-and-death process. And we investigate the stochastic stable equilibrium (SSE) instead. By numerical experiments, we get all possible SSEs of the system for any combination of parameters, and investigate the influence of parameters on the probabilities of the system to select different equilibriums. It is found that in the stochastic situation, the introduction of the punishment and non-participation strategies can change the evolutionary dynamics of the system and equilibrium of the game. There is a large range of parameters that the system selects the cooperative states as its SSE with a high probability. This result provides us an insight and control method for the evolution of cooperation in the public goods game in stochastic situations.
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- Authors
- Quan, J., Liu, W., Chu, Y., & Wang, X.
- Affiliations
- Wuhan University of Technology (CN)
- Wuhan University (CN)
- Corresponding author
- Quan, Ji
- Venue
- Scientific Reports
- Published
- 2017-11-23
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 16110-16110
- ISSN
- 2045-2322 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC5700967
- OpenAlex
- W2769366072
- Cited by
- 45
- References
- 63
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 4
- FWCI
- 10.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- Scientific Reports (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (71501149, 71231007)
- Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (71231007, 71501149, WUT: 2017VI070)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- punishment, stochastic stability, stochastic evolutionary game, quasi-birth-and-death processes, evolution of cooperation, evolutionarily stable strategy, cooperative equilibrium
- MeSH terms
- Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Models, Theoretical, Punishment
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