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Cited by 136Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsPsychology of Social Influence

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Increasing altruistic and cooperative behaviour with simple moral nudges

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Capraro, Valerio, Jagfeld, Glorianna, Klein, Rana, Mul, Mathijs, de Pol, Iris van·2019·Scientific Reports
DOI 10.1038/s41598-019-48094-4PMC PMC6695418
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Abstract

The conflict between pro-self and pro-social behaviour is at the core of many key problems of our time, as, for example, the reduction of air pollution and the redistribution of scarce resources. For the well-being of our societies, it is thus crucial to find mechanisms to promote pro-social choices over egoistic ones. Particularly important, because cheap and easy to implement, are those mechanisms that can change people’s behaviour without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives, the so-called “nudges”. Previous research has found that moral nudges (e.g., making norms salient) can promote pro-social behaviour. However, little is known about whether their effect persists over time and spills across context. This question is key in light of research showing that pro-social actions are often followed by selfish actions, thus suggesting that some moral manipulations may backfire. Here we present a class of simple moral nudges that have a great positive impact on pro-sociality. In Studies 1–4 (total N = 1,400), we use economic games to demonstrate that asking subjects to self-report “what they think is the morally right thing to do” does not only increase pro-sociality in the choice immediately after, but also in subsequent choices, and even when the social context changes. In Study 5, we explore whether moral nudges promote charity donations to humanitarian organisations in a large (N = 1,800) crowdfunding campaign. We find that, in this context, moral nudges increase donations by about 44 percent.

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Figure 1 Moral nudges increase altruistic behaviour in Dictator games. Results of Study 1 (N = 282). Subjects who are asked what they personally think is the morally right thing to do or what they think their society considers to be the morally right thing to do before playing a DG (i.e., subjects in the “DG nudged” condition), donate significantly more than subjects in the baseline DG (p = 0.005). The y-axis represents the average percentage of the endowment donated by subjects in the corresponding condition. Error bars represent +/− Standard Error of the Mean (SEM). We refer to the Supplementary Material, Table SM1, for regression details.
Figure 1 Moral nudges increase altruistic behaviour in Dictator games. Results of Study 1 (N = 282). Subjects who are asked what they personally think is the morally right thing to do or what they think their society considers to be the morally right thing to do before playing a DG (i.e., subjects in the “DG nudged” condition), donate significantly more than subjects in the baseline DG (p = 0.005). The y-axis represents the average percentage of the endowment donated by subjects in the corresponding condition. Error bars represent +/− Standard Error of the Mean (SEM). We refer to the Supplementary Material, Table SM1, for regression details.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 2 Moral nudges increase cooperative behaviour in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Results of Study 2 (N = 257). Subjects who are asked what they personally think is the morally right thing to do or what they think their society considers to be the morally right thing to do before playing a PD (i.e., subjects in the “PD nudged” condition), give significantly more than subjects in the baseline PD (p = 0.023). The y-axis represents the average percentage of the endowment given by subjects in the corresponding condition. Error bars represent +/− SEM. We refer to the Supplementary Material, Table SM2, for regression details.
Figure 2 Moral nudges increase cooperative behaviour in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Results of Study 2 (N = 257). Subjects who are asked what they personally think is the morally right thing to do or what they think their society considers to be the morally right thing to do before playing a PD (i.e., subjects in the “PD nudged” condition), give significantly more than subjects in the baseline PD (p = 0.023). The y-axis represents the average percentage of the endowment given by subjects in the corresponding condition. Error bars represent +/− SEM. We refer to the Supplementary Material, Table SM2, for regression details.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 3 Moral nudges increase altruistic behaviour in a subsequent Dictator Game. Results of Study 3 (N = 172). The positive effect of moral nudges on altruistic behaviour in the DG is not limited to the choice immediately after the nudge, but persists to a second-stage DG, such that subjects who are nudged in Stage 1 DG donate, in a second stage DG, more than those who are not nudged (p = 0.019). The y-axis represents the average percentage of the endowment donated by subjects in the corresponding condition. Error bars represent +/− SEM. We refer to the Supplementary Material, Table SM3, for regression details.
Figure 3 Moral nudges increase altruistic behaviour in a subsequent Dictator Game. Results of Study 3 (N = 172). The positive effect of moral nudges on altruistic behaviour in the DG is not limited to the choice immediately after the nudge, but persists to a second-stage DG, such that subjects who are nudged in Stage 1 DG donate, in a second stage DG, more than those who are not nudged (p = 0.019). The y-axis represents the average percentage of the endowment donated by subjects in the corresponding condition. Error bars represent +/− SEM. We refer to the Supplementary Material, Table SM3, for regression details.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 4 Moral nudges spill across contexts. Results of Study 4, second stage game (N = 537). Subjects who are nudged in a first-stage DG (resp. PD) tend to be more pro-social in a subsequent non-nudged PD (resp. DG) than those who are not nudged. A meta-analysis of the four conditions yields a significant positive spillover effect whose size is also relatively large (overall effect size = 0.633, 95% CI [0.047,1.219], Z = 2.12, p = 0.034), providing evidence that a significant proportion of the effect of moral nudges on first-stage behaviour spills across contexts. The y-axis represents the average percentage of the endowment given by subjects in second-stage game in the corresponding first-stage condition. Error bars represent +/− SEM. We refer to the Supplementary Material, Table SM5, for regression details, and Fig. A1, for the forest plot of the meta-analysis.
Figure 4 Moral nudges spill across contexts. Results of Study 4, second stage game (N = 537). Subjects who are nudged in a first-stage DG (resp. PD) tend to be more pro-social in a subsequent non-nudged PD (resp. DG) than those who are not nudged. A meta-analysis of the four conditions yields a significant positive spillover effect whose size is also relatively large (overall effect size = 0.633, 95% CI [0.047,1.219], Z = 2.12, p = 0.034), providing evidence that a significant proportion of the effect of moral nudges on first-stage behaviour spills across contexts. The y-axis represents the average percentage of the endowment given by subjects in second-stage game in the corresponding first-stage condition. Error bars represent +/− SEM. We refer to the Supplementary Material, Table SM5, for regression details, and Fig. A1, for the forest plot of the meta-analysis.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 5 Moral nudges increase charity donations to real non-profit organisations. Results of Study 5 (N = 1,662). Morally nudged subjects donate significantly more to humanitarian organisations than those who are not morally nudged. This holds both when the target organisation is Emergency (in which case average donations increase from 5.85c to 8.29c; coeff = 2.28, p = 0.029) and Give for France (in which case average donations increase from 8.93c to 13.04c; coeff = 4.20, p = 0.001). The coefficients are, respectively, 39% and 47% of the baseline donation. Merging the two conditions (Emergency and Give for France) reveals that, overall, nudging subjects increase donations by 44%. The y-axis represents the average percentage of charity donation by subjects in the corresponding condition. Error bars represent +/− SEM.
Figure 5 Moral nudges increase charity donations to real non-profit organisations. Results of Study 5 (N = 1,662). Morally nudged subjects donate significantly more to humanitarian organisations than those who are not morally nudged. This holds both when the target organisation is Emergency (in which case average donations increase from 5.85c to 8.29c; coeff = 2.28, p = 0.029) and Give for France (in which case average donations increase from 8.93c to 13.04c; coeff = 4.20, p = 0.001). The coefficients are, respectively, 39% and 47% of the baseline donation. Merging the two conditions (Emergency and Give for France) reveals that, overall, nudging subjects increase donations by 44%. The y-axis represents the average percentage of charity donation by subjects in the corresponding condition. Error bars represent +/− SEM.CC BY · PubMed Central

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  1. Dennis, S. A., Goodson, B. M., & Pearson, C. Virtual private servers and the limitations of IP-based screening procedures: Lessons from the MTurk Quality Crisis of 2018. Available at SSRN, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233954 (2019) (Date of last access: 28/05/2019).

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Metadata

Authors
Capraro, V., Jagfeld, G., Klein, R., Mul, M., & de Pol, I. V.
Affiliations
  • Middlesex University London (GB)
  • University of Stuttgart (DE)
  • University of Amsterdam (NL)
Corresponding author
Capraro, Valerio
ORCID
Venue
Scientific Reports
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2019-08-15
Volume
9
Issue
1
Pages
11880-11880
ISSN
2045-2322 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1038/s41598-019-48094-4
PMC
PMC6695418
OpenAlex
W2968470688
Cited by
135
References
106
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 27 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 21 · 2019: 2
FWCI
27.12
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Scientific Reports (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Middlesex University Research Repository (Middlesex University Of London) (acceptedVersion)
  • BOA (University of Milano-Bicocca) (submittedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Psychology of Social Influence
Keywords
prosocial behavior, altruism, cooperation, spillover effects, backfire effect, charitable giving, crowdfunding, humanitarian organizations, economic games
MeSH terms
Altruism, Choice Behavior, Cooperative Behavior, Decision Making, Games, Experimental, Humans, Morals, Social Behavior, Social Environment

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