Cited by 8Municipal Solid Waste ManagementWaste Management and RecyclingPublic Policy and Administration Research

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 71 of the 71 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 6 of the 63 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Characterizing the polycentricity in waste governance: a comparative study on Shanghai, Tokyo, and Hong Kong

Open access

Published version of a preprint

Abstract

Abstract The ongoing increase in waste and its mismanagement is jeopardizing urban sustainability. Although a polycentric approach has been introduced in the waste governance practice, measuring the polycentricity of urban waste governance remains challenging. This paper, therefore, adopts game theory to analyze urban waste governance from the perspective of governance agents, characterizing the polycentricity of waste governance by investigating the state of equilibrium of each agent's strategy. Shanghai, Tokyo, and Hong Kong are selected as target cities for comparative analysis. It is found that the active participation of formal recyclers, informal recyclers, and householders characterizes polycentric waste governance in Shanghai. However, in Tokyo, there is the active participation of only formal recyclers and householders and not informal recyclers. In Hong Kong, by comparison, householders and informal recyclers show active participation, but formal recyclers only provide a limited contribution to polycentric waste governance. Further discussion highlights that different governance patterns, socioeconomic factors, and policy formulation shape the distinctive polycentric governance characteristics of these cities. This paper provides a model basis for measuring and comparing the features of polycentric waste governance across different cities, thereby contributing to the knowledge aggregation regarding waste governance, as well as enlightening the pathways of waste governance practice.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

This paper uses a tripartite evolutionary game among households, formal recyclers, and informal recyclers to characterize polycentric waste governance in Shanghai, Tokyo, and Hong Kong. It finds heterogeneous equilibrium modes: collaboration among all three in Shanghai, exclusion of informal recyclers in Tokyo, and limited formal-recycler contribution in Hong Kong.

Key findings

  • The evolutionary stable strategy combinations differ by city: Shanghai reaches (1, 1, 1), meaning all three stakeholders adopt positive strategies; Tokyo reaches (1, 0.1, 1), (1, 0.3, 1), (1, 0.5, 1), (1, 0.7, 1), and (1, 0.9, 1), with informal recyclers’ participation determined by initial conditions; Hong Kong reaches (1, 1, 0), with households and informal recyclers active but formal recyclers providing limited contributions.
  • Shanghai’s mandatory waste separation policy in 2019 is linked to 99.5% accuracy for sorting food waste and a 114.5% increase in recyclables.
  • Tokyo’s circular economy output has reached 50 trillion Yen, while Hong Kong’s urban environmental industry accounted for only 0.4% of total GDP in 2018.
  • The paper attributes divergent polycentric waste governance to different governance modes, socioeconomic factors, and policy designs; Tokyo and Shanghai are described as contributing to circular economy expansion, while Hong Kong’s potential is undervalued.

Methods

  • The study builds a tripartite evolutionary game model with households, formal recyclers, and informal recyclers as bounded-rational agents, using payoff matrices, replicator dynamic equations, Jacobian matrix analysis, and ESS identification; simulations were run in MATLAB 2018a.
  • Three megacities—Shanghai, Tokyo, and Hong Kong—were selected for comparative case analysis. Data came from official government and research documents plus onsite investigations and surveys at informal recycling stations: 7 recycling points covering five districts in Shanghai and 7 recycling points covering six districts in Hong Kong, using participatory observation and interviews.
  • The analysis compares evolutionary trajectories to equilibrium strategy combinations, with parameter values and data sources explained in Supplementary information B and interview details in Supplementary information C.

Limitations

  • The paper states that it has not extensively examined how different municipal solid waste fractions affect polycentric waste governance patterns, though MSW components may directly affect economic attributes and governance outcomes.
  • The paper states that the community-level model could be expanded by including more governance agents, such as the government, and by considering feedback from the community level to government policy formulation and adjustment.
  • The paper states that the model is expected to be developed and verified by involving more actual scenarios, and future work could consider strategy sets shaped by digitalization, environmental awareness, and social inclusion.
  • Evident from the text: the study covers only three megacities, treats government as an external intervention rather than a principal player, and relies on supplementary data and onsite work concentrated in Shanghai and Hong Kong for informal-sector parameters.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1038/s42949-024-00179-4

Cites

71 of 71 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

26 Own interpretation · 17 No full text of the sources · 13 No basis given · 9 Not checked yet · 3 Sources not found · 3 Own result · 2 Partly supported · 1 Supported · 1 Supported so far · accuracy not yet measured

Verify all 10 references — free account
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 14
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 23
32 of 32
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The three main stakeholders (households, formal recyclers, informal recyclers) operate in line with bounded rationality.

    “The three main stakeholders are assumed to operate in line with bounded rationality.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Each governance agent makes decisions based on economic rationality, selecting the strategy with higher economic benefits.

    “each governance agent will make a decision based on the premise of economic rationality due to the economic attributes of waste, which means that the strategy with higher economic bene fi ts will be selected.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Driven by economic interests, there is potential competition among various governance actors, such as between formal and informal recyclers.

    “driven by economic interests, there is potential competition among various governance actors, such as the competition between formal recyclers and informal recyclers.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The decision-making of each agent in the polycentric waste governance system will exhibit a dynamic equilibrium.

    “the decision-making of each agent in the polycentric waste governance system will exhibit a dynamic equilibrium”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The equilibrium strategies chosen by stakeholders denote the operational modes of waste governance in different cities.

    “The equilibrium strategies chosen by these stakeholders denote the operational modes of waste governance in different cities”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The equilibrium state characterizes the polycentric waste governance.

    “the equilibrium state characterizes the polycentric waste governance”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Negative spillover effects from informal disposal jeopardize the health of workers.

    “the negative spillover effects entailed by the informal disposal will jeopardize the workers ' health.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The supervision sector penalizes the potential environmental negative externalities from the informal sector's negative participation.

    “The potential environmental negative externalities from the informal sector ' s ' NP ' will also be penalized by the supervision sector.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The government subsidizes formal recyclers to encourage their positive participation in recycling waste.

    “the government would subsidize the formal recyclers to encourage their positive participation in recycling the waste”
9 of 9

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

2 of 2

Citations

Cites

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Metadata

Authors
Hao, X., Dong, L., Qian, X., Benjamin, S., Wang, H., Chen, P., Wang, X., Ma, W., Li, J., Tong, X., & Zhang, X.
Affiliations
  • Shanghai University of International Business and Economics (CN)
  • City University of Hong Kong (HK)
  • Sophia University (JP)
  • Macau University of Science and Technology (MO)
  • Tongji University (CN)
  • Harbin Institute of Technology (CN)
  • Peking University (CN)
Corresponding author
  • Dong, Liang
  • Zhang, Xiaoling
Venue
npj Urban Sustainability
Published
2024-08-06
Volume
4
Issue
1
ISSN
2661-8001 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4402028557
Cited by
8
References
68
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 4
FWCI
1.69
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • npj Urban Sustainability (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • Research Square (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • The HKU Scholars Hub (University of Hong Kong) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • CityU Scholars (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • Rare & Special e-Zone (The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation of China | National Natural Science Foundation of China-Yunnan Joint Fund (72061137071)
  • Environment and Conservation Fund (88/2022)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Environmental Science › Waste Management and Disposal › Municipal Solid Waste Management
  • Physical Sciences › Environmental Science › Waste Management and Disposal › Waste Management and Recycling
  • Social Sciences › Public Administration › Public Policy and Administration Research
Keywords
polycentric governance, game theory, equilibrium strategies, waste pickers, Shanghai, Tokyo, Hong Kong, waste management policy, urban sustainability

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