Synergy between intention recognition and commitments in cooperation dilemmas
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 56 of the 56 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Commitments have been shown to promote cooperation if, on the one hand, they can be sufficiently enforced and on the other hand, the cost of arranging them is justified with respect to the benefits of cooperation. When either of these constraints is not met it leads to the prevalence of commitment free-riders, such as those who commit only when someone else pays to arrange the commitments. Here, we show how intention recognition may circumvent such weakness of costly commitments. We describe an evolutionary model, in the context of the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma, showing that if players first predict the intentions of their co-player and propose a commitment only when they are not confident enough about their prediction, the chances of reaching mutual cooperation are largely enhanced. We find that an advantageous synergy between intention recognition and costly commitments depends strongly on the confidence and accuracy of intention recognition. In general, we observe an intermediate level of confidence threshold leading to the highest evolutionary advantage, showing that neither unconditional use of commitment nor intention recognition can perform optimally. Rather, our results show that arranging commitments is not always desirable, but that they may be also unavoidable depending on the strength of the dilemma.
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“populations that combine the use of direct punishment with commitment achieve higher proportions of cooperation than if commitment was used alone [35, 47].”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [47]
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“However, there is also evidence that unjust punishment can be restrained by commitment mechanisms [35, 47].”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [47]
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Citations
Cites
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Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x05000129 · Cited by 4,882
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Evolutionary dynamics: exploring the equations of life
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Nowak, M. A., Sasaki, A., Taylor, C., & Fudenberg, D. (2004) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02414 · Cited by 1,399
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Perc, M., Gómez-Gardeñes, J., Szolnoki, A., Floría, L. M., & Moreno, Y. (2013) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2012.0997 · Cited by 1,340
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Goodenough O. R. Law and the biology of commitment. In: Nesse, R. M. (ed.) Evolution and the capacity for commitment, 262– 291 (New York: Russell Sage, 2001).
- Han T. A. Intention Recognition, Commitments and Their Roles in the Evolution of Cooperation: From Artificial Intelligence Techniques to Evolutionary Game Theory Models, vol. 9 (Springer SAPERE series, 2013).
Cited by
A World Unto Itself: Human Communication as Active Inference
Vasil, J., Badcock, P. B., Constant, A., Friston, K., & Ramstead, M. J. D. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00417 · Cited by 94
Local and global stimuli in reinforcement learning
Jia, D., Guo, H., Song, Z., Ши, Л., Deng, X., Perc, M., & Wang, Z. (2021) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/ac170a · Cited by 109
“On the other hand, humans and many species are capable of complex cognition, many of the cognitive skills have been considered as mechanisms for promoting the evolution of cooperation, such as learning [42], theory of mind [43], intent recognition [44, 45], intelligence [46], emotion [47, 48], etc.”
BackgroundInteractive diversity promotes the evolution of cooperation in structured populations
Su, Q., Li, A., Zhou, L., & Wang, L. (2016) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/18/10/103007 · Cited by 94
Evolution of commitment and level of participation in public goods games
Han, T. A., Pereira, L. M., & Lenaerts, T. (2017) · Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems · doi:10.1007/s10458-016-9338-4 · Cited by 82
“In the two-player setting (namely, the Prisoner’s Dilemma) the behavior of proposing prior commitments has been shown to promote the evolution of cooperation if the cost of arranging commitment is sufficiently small compared to the cost of cooperation [19,23,25].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationHan, T. A. (2022) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2022.0036 · Cited by 78
“On the other hand, existing models of commitment formation assume that a compensation 4 from a commitment violating player is transferred internally to a commitment compliant coplayer, via institutional enforcement (Han and Lenaerts, 2016, Han et al., 2015a, 2013, MartinezVaquero et al., 2015).”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Han, T. A., Santos, F. C., Lenaerts, T., & Pereira, L. M.
- Affiliations
- Teesside University (GB)
- Instituto de Engenharia de Sistemas e Computadores Investigação e Desenvolvimento (PT)
- Université Libre de Bruxelles (BE)
- Corresponding author
- Han, The Anh
- Venue
- Scientific Reports
- Published
- 2015-03-20
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 9312-9312
- ISSN
- 2045-2322 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC4366807
- OpenAlex
- W2019593420
- Cited by
- 54
- References
- 55
- Citations by year
- 2025: 4 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 9 · 2015: 2
- FWCI
- 20.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Scientific Reports (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Teesside University Research Portal (Teesside University) (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- Dépôt institutionnel de l'Université libre de Bruxelles (Université Libre de Bruxelles) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- VUBIR (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (UID/CEC/50021/2013, EXPL/EEI-SII/2556/2013)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- intent classification, costly commitment, cooperation, prisoner's dilemma, evolutionary game theory, mutual cooperation
- MeSH terms
- Cooperative Behavior, Humans, Reward
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