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Evolution of commitment and level of participation in public goods games

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Han, The Anh, Pereira, Luís Moniz, Lenaerts, Tom · 2017 · Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Cited by 82

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Abstract

Before engaging in a group venture agents may require commitments from other members in the group, and based on the level of acceptance (participation) they can then decide whether it is worthwhile joining the group effort. Here, we show in the context of public goods games and using stochastic evolutionary game theory modelling, which implies imitation and mutation dynamics, that arranging prior commitments while imposing a minimal participation when interacting in groups induces agents to behave cooperatively. Our analytical and numerical results show that if the cost of arranging the commitment is sufficiently small compared to the cost of cooperation, commitment arranging behavior is frequent, leading to a high level of cooperation in the population. Moreover, an optimal participation level emerges depending both on the dilemma at stake and on the cost of arranging the commitment. Namely, the harsher the common good dilemma is, and the costlier it becomes to arrange the commitment, the more participants should explicitly commit to the agreement to ensure the success of the joint venture. Furthermore, considering that commitment deals may last for more than one encounter, we show that commitment proposers can be lenient in case of short-term agreements, yet should be strict in case of long-term interactions.

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Metadata

Authors
Han, T. A., Pereira, L. M., & Lenaerts, T.
Venue
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Published
2016-06-14
Volume
31
Issue
3
Pages
561-583
ISSN
  • 1387-2532 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-7454
OpenAlex
W2416397817
Cited by
82
References
13
FWCI
29.54
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green
Funders
  • FWO Belgium
  • Fonds De La Recherche Scientifique - FNRS
  • URF Teesside University (11200174)
  • FCT Portugal (UID/CEC/ 04516/2013)

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Evolution of commitment and level of participation in public goods games. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s10458-016-9338-4
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Han, T. A., Pereira, L. M., & Lenaerts, T. (2017). Evolution of commitment and level of participation in public goods games. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-016-9338-4

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