Synergy between intention recognition and commitments in cooperation dilemmas
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 56 of the 56 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Commitments have been shown to promote cooperation if, on the one hand, they can be sufficiently enforced and on the other hand, the cost of arranging them is justified with respect to the benefits of cooperation. When either of these constraints is not met it leads to the prevalence of commitment free-riders, such as those who commit only when someone else pays to arrange the commitments. Here, we show how intention recognition may circumvent such weakness of costly commitments. We describe an evolutionary model, in the context of the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma, showing that if players first predict the intentions of their co-player and propose a commitment only when they are not confident enough about their prediction, the chances of reaching mutual cooperation are largely enhanced. We find that an advantageous synergy between intention recognition and costly commitments depends strongly on the confidence and accuracy of intention recognition. In general, we observe an intermediate level of confidence threshold leading to the highest evolutionary advantage, showing that neither unconditional use of commitment nor intention recognition can perform optimally. Rather, our results show that arranging commitments is not always desirable, but that they may be also unavoidable depending on the strength of the dilemma.
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“populations that combine the use of direct punishment with commitment achieve higher proportions of cooperation than if commitment was used alone [35, 47].”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [47]
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“However, there is also evidence that unjust punishment can be restrained by commitment mechanisms [35, 47].”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [47]
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Citations
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Cited by
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Local and global stimuli in reinforcement learning
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“On the other hand, existing models of commitment formation assume that a compensation 4 from a commitment violating player is transferred internally to a commitment compliant coplayer, via institutional enforcement (Han and Lenaerts, 2016, Han et al., 2015a, 2013, MartinezVaquero et al., 2015).”
BackgroundSelf-citationCommitment to Cooperation and Peer Punishment: Its Evolution
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Han, T. A. (2022) · AI Communications · doi:10.3233/aic-220104 · Cited by 65
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Self-citationSharma, G., Guo, H., Shen, C., & Tanimoto, J. (2023) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2023.0301 · Cited by 50
A synergy of costly punishment and commitment in cooperation dilemmas
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Self-citationEvolution of coordination in pairwise and multi-player interactions via prior commitments
Ogbo, N. B., Elragig, A., & Han, T. A. (2021) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712321993166 · Cited by 39
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InfluentialSelf-citationEmergence of Social Punishment and Cooperation through Prior Commitments
Han, T. A. (2016) · Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1609/aaai.v30i1.10120 · Cited by 33
“In fact, commitments can be enforced through several different means, such as legal contracts, pledges, emotion and also the reputation device itself (Nesse 2001; Han, Pereira, and Santos 2012; Han, Pereira, and Lenaerts 2015; Han et al. 2015).”
BackgroundSelf-citationReciprocity-based cooperative phalanx maintained by overconfident players
Szolnoki, A., & Chen, X. (2018) · Physical review. E · doi:10.1103/physreve.98.022309 · Cited by 33
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“Humans and many other creatures, however, have a sophisticated cognitive capacity, such as reinforcement learning [32], behaviour prediction [33], intention recognition [34, 35], and intelligence from social interactions [36].”
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Pereira, L. M., Lenaerts, T., Martínez-Vaquero, L. A., & Han, T. A. (2017) · Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agents Systems · doi:10.65109/fkdk2827 · Cited by 35
“Hence, detecting another’s proclivity to cheat, albeit checked by guilt, allots intention recognition an important role to play even when the intention is not carried out [15, 17, 14].”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Han, T. A., Santos, F. C., Lenaerts, T., & Pereira, L. M.
- Affiliations
- Teesside University (GB)
- Instituto de Engenharia de Sistemas e Computadores Investigação e Desenvolvimento (PT)
- Université Libre de Bruxelles (BE)
- Corresponding author
- Han, The Anh
- Venue
- Scientific Reports
- Published
- 2015-03-20
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 9312-9312
- ISSN
- 2045-2322 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC4366807
- OpenAlex
- W2019593420
- Cited by
- 54
- References
- 55
- Citations by year
- 2025: 4 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 9 · 2015: 2
- FWCI
- 20.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Scientific Reports (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Teesside University Research Portal (Teesside University) (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- Dépôt institutionnel de l'Université libre de Bruxelles (Université Libre de Bruxelles) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- VUBIR (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (UID/CEC/50021/2013, EXPL/EEI-SII/2556/2013)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- intent classification, costly commitment, cooperation, prisoner's dilemma, evolutionary game theory, mutual cooperation
- MeSH terms
- Cooperative Behavior, Humans, Reward
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