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Synergy between intention recognition and commitments in cooperation dilemmas

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Han, The Anh, Santos, Francisco C., Lenaerts, Tom, Pereira, Luís Moniz · 2015 · Scientific Reports

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 56 of the 56 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Commitments have been shown to promote cooperation if, on the one hand, they can be sufficiently enforced and on the other hand, the cost of arranging them is justified with respect to the benefits of cooperation. When either of these constraints is not met it leads to the prevalence of commitment free-riders, such as those who commit only when someone else pays to arrange the commitments. Here, we show how intention recognition may circumvent such weakness of costly commitments. We describe an evolutionary model, in the context of the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma, showing that if players first predict the intentions of their co-player and propose a commitment only when they are not confident enough about their prediction, the chances of reaching mutual cooperation are largely enhanced. We find that an advantageous synergy between intention recognition and costly commitments depends strongly on the confidence and accuracy of intention recognition. In general, we observe an intermediate level of confidence threshold leading to the highest evolutionary advantage, showing that neither unconditional use of commitment nor intention recognition can perform optimally. Rather, our results show that arranging commitments is not always desirable, but that they may be also unavoidable depending on the strength of the dilemma.

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Crossref · 10.1038/srep09312

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56 of 56 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Figures

Figure 1 (a) Frequency of each strategy as a function of confidence threshold θ. In a population of IRCOM, COMP, C, D, FAKE and FREE individuals, for a sufficiently large θ, IRCOM is most frequent in the population. The performance of IRCOM decreases when θ is too high. It implies that IRCOM should not be too cautious about its intention recognition capacity, i.e. not be too careful to always propose commitment instead of believing in its prediction accuracy; (b) Frequency of IRCOM at the optimal confidence threshold, as a function of the cost of arranging commitment and the compensation cost δ. Interestingly, in contrast to COMP, it is not always the case that the frequency of IRCOM is smaller for larger . IRCOM is actually more frequent when is sufficiently large. (c) Frequency of each strategy as a function of accuracy to confidence ratio, r, at the optimal confidence threshold. When intention recognition accuracy is sufficiently high, IRCOM is prevalent, but when it is small, FREE is most abundant. (d) Transitions probabilities and stationary distributions (θ = 0.28). Note the transitions from COMP to FREE to IRCOM. For clarity, only the transitions that are larger than neutral are shown (ρN = 1/N denotes the neutral transition probability). Parameters: In panels (a), (c) and (d): δ = 4; ; In panels (a), (b) and (d): r = 1; In all cases, b = 4; c = 1; N = 100; β = 0.1.
Figure 1 (a) Frequency of each strategy as a function of confidence threshold θ. In a population of IRCOM, COMP, C, D, FAKE and FREE individuals, for a sufficiently large θ, IRCOM is most frequent in the population. The performance of IRCOM decreases when θ is too high. It implies that IRCOM should not be too cautious about its intention recognition capacity, i.e. not be too careful to always propose commitment instead of believing in its prediction accuracy; (b) Frequency of IRCOM at the optimal confidence threshold, as a function of the cost of arranging commitment and the compensation cost δ. Interestingly, in contrast to COMP, it is not always the case that the frequency of IRCOM is smaller for larger . IRCOM is actually more frequent when is sufficiently large. (c) Frequency of each strategy as a function of accuracy to confidence ratio, r, at the optimal confidence threshold. When intention recognition accuracy is sufficiently high, IRCOM is prevalent, but when it is small, FREE is most abundant. (d) Transitions probabilities and stationary distributions (θ = 0.28). Note the transitions from COMP to FREE to IRCOM. For clarity, only the transitions that are larger than neutral are shown (ρN = 1/N denotes the neutral transition probability). Parameters: In panels (a), (c) and (d): δ = 4; ; In panels (a), (b) and (d): r = 1; In all cases, b = 4; c = 1; N = 100; β = 0.1.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 2 (a) Improvement in cooperation level obtained from IRCOM and COMP compared to the case where there is no IRCOM, as a function of the cost of arranging commitment and the compensation cost δ. Improvement is achieved for a wide range of and δ. It is most significant when is rather high and δ is not too large, i.e. the commitment deal is weak (see Figure S1 in SI for the improvement obtained in percentage, and also for other parameter values). (b) Such improvement as a function of the accuracy-to-confidence ration, r, and for different commitment deals. In general, the larger r, the more significant improvement is obtained. Furthermore, when r is sufficiently high, larger improvement is obtained when it is costly to arrange commitments and/or a high compensation is difficult to enforced. Parameters: b = 4, c = 1, N = 100, and β = 0.1. In panel (a), r = 1.
Figure 2 (a) Improvement in cooperation level obtained from IRCOM and COMP compared to the case where there is no IRCOM, as a function of the cost of arranging commitment and the compensation cost δ. Improvement is achieved for a wide range of and δ. It is most significant when is rather high and δ is not too large, i.e. the commitment deal is weak (see Figure S1 in SI for the improvement obtained in percentage, and also for other parameter values). (b) Such improvement as a function of the accuracy-to-confidence ration, r, and for different commitment deals. In general, the larger r, the more significant improvement is obtained. Furthermore, when r is sufficiently high, larger improvement is obtained when it is costly to arrange commitments and/or a high compensation is difficult to enforced. Parameters: b = 4, c = 1, N = 100, and β = 0.1. In panel (a), r = 1.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 3 Optimal confidence threshold, (a) as a function of r, for different commitment deals, and (b) as a function of and δ. In general, the higher r and the larger , the lower confidence level needs to be attained to rely on intention recognition predictions (i.e. taking higher risk). This confidence level does not significantly depend on δ. We adopt, in both cases, b = 4, c = 1, N = 100, and β = 0.1. In panel (b), r = 1.
Figure 3 Optimal confidence threshold, (a) as a function of r, for different commitment deals, and (b) as a function of and δ. In general, the higher r and the larger , the lower confidence level needs to be attained to rely on intention recognition predictions (i.e. taking higher risk). This confidence level does not significantly depend on δ. We adopt, in both cases, b = 4, c = 1, N = 100, and β = 0.1. In panel (b), r = 1.CC BY · PubMed Central

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Cites

Show all 56 references

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Goodenough O. R. Law and the biology of commitment. In: Nesse, R. M. (ed.) Evolution and the capacity for commitment, 262– 291 (New York: Russell Sage, 2001).
  2. Han T. A. Intention Recognition, Commitments and Their Roles in the Evolution of Cooperation: From Artificial Intelligence Techniques to Evolutionary Game Theory Models, vol. 9 (Springer SAPERE series, 2013).

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Metadata

Authors
Han, T. A., Santos, F. C., Lenaerts, T., & Pereira, L. M.
Affiliations
  • Teesside University (GB)
  • Instituto de Engenharia de Sistemas e Computadores Investigação e Desenvolvimento (PT)
  • Université Libre de Bruxelles (BE)
Corresponding author
Han, The Anh
Venue
Scientific Reports
Published
2015-03-20
Volume
5
Issue
1
Pages
9312-9312
ISSN
2045-2322 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2019593420
Cited by
54
References
55
Citations by year
2025: 4 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 9 · 2015: 2
FWCI
20.96
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Scientific Reports (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Teesside University Research Portal (Teesside University) (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • Dépôt institutionnel de l'Université libre de Bruxelles (Université Libre de Bruxelles) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • VUBIR (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) (submittedVersion)
Funders
Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (UID/CEC/50021/2013, EXPL/EEI-SII/2556/2013)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
Keywords
intent classification, costly commitment, cooperation, prisoner's dilemma, evolutionary game theory, mutual cooperation
MeSH terms
Cooperative Behavior, Humans, Reward

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