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Default brain functionality in blind people

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Burton, H., Snyder, A. Z., Raichle, M. E. · 2004 · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Cited by 29

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

We studied whether default functionality of the human brain, as revealed by task-independent decreases in activity occurring during goal-directed behaviors, is functionally reorganized by blindness. Three groups of otherwise normal adults were studied: early blind, adventitiously blind, and normally sighted. They were imaged by using functional MRI during performance of a word association task (verb generation to nouns) administered by using auditory stimuli in all groups and Braille reading in blind participants. In sighted people, this task normally produces robust task-independent decreases relative to a baseline of quiet wakefulness with eyes closed. Our functional MRI results indicate that task-independent decreases are qualitatively similar across all participant groups in medial and dorsal prefrontal, lateral parietal, anterior precuneus, and posterior cingulate cortices. Similarities in task-independent decreases are consistent with the hypothesis that functional reorganization resulting from the absence of a particular sensory modality does not qualitatively affect default functionality as revealed by task-independent decreases. More generally, these results support the notion that the brain largely operates intrinsically, with sensory information modulating rather than determining system operations.

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Crossref · 10.1073/pnas.0406676101

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Metadata

Authors
Burton, H., Snyder, A. Z., & Raichle, M. E.
Venue
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Published
2004-10-15
Volume
101
Issue
43
Pages
15500-15505
ISSN
  • 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
  • 1091-6490
OpenAlex
W1993930472
Cited by
29
References
15
FWCI
0.96
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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