Evolutionary dynamics in set structured populations
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Abstract
Evolutionary dynamics are strongly affected by population structure. The outcome of an evolutionary process in a well-mixed population can be very different from that in a structured population. We introduce a powerful method to study dynamical population structure: evolutionary set theory. The individuals of a population are distributed over sets. Individuals interact with others who are in the same set. Any 2 individuals can have several sets in common. Some sets can be empty, whereas others have many members. Interactions occur in terms of an evolutionary game. The payoff of the game is interpreted as fitness. Both the strategy and the set memberships change under evolutionary updating. Therefore, the population structure itself is a consequence of evolutionary dynamics. We construct a general mathematical approach for studying any evolutionary game in set structured populations. As a particular example, we study the evolution of cooperation and derive precise conditions for cooperators to be selected over defectors.
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Tarnita, C. E., Antal, T., Ohtsuki, H., & Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Mathematics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138; and
- Tokyo Institute of Technology (JP)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Publisher
- National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2009-05-26
- Volume
- 106
- Issue
- 21
- Pages
- 8601-8604
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- PMC
- PMC2689033
- OpenAlex
- W2131305117
- Cited by
- 264
- References
- 41
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 16 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 35 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 23 · 2014: 17 · 2013: 13 · 2012: 19
- FWCI
- 58.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Applied Mathematics › Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models
- Keywords
- evolutionary dynamics, population structure, evolutionary game theory, evolution of cooperation, selection conditions
- MeSH terms
- Computer Simulation, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Population Dynamics
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