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Inequality, communication, and the avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game
Open accessAbstract
International efforts to provide global public goods often face the challenges of coordinating national contributions and distributing costs equitably in the face of uncertainty, inequality, and free-riding incentives. In an experimental setting, we distribute endowments unequally among a group of people who can reach a fixed target sum through successive money contributions, knowing that if they fail, they will lose all their remaining money with 50% probability. In some treatments, we give players the option to communicate intended contributions. We find that inequality reduces the prospects of reaching the target but that communication increases success dramatically. Successful groups tend to eliminate inequality over the course of the game, with rich players signaling willingness to redistribute early on. Our results suggest that coordination-promoting institutions and early redistribution from richer to poorer nations are both decisive for the avoidance of global calamities, such as disruptive climate change.
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“For example, in collective risk dilemmas and public goods games, individuals’ non-binding pledges in the population can trigger conditional cooperation in subsequent rounds17,65.”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Tavoni, A., Dannenberg, A., Kallis, G., & Löschel, A.
- Affiliations
- London School of Economics and Political Science (GB)
- Centre for European Economic Research (DE)
- Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats (ES)
- Australian National University (AU)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Publisher
- National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2011-07-05
- Volume
- 108
- Issue
- 29
- Pages
- 11825-11829
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- PMC
- PMC3141931
- OpenAlex
- W2145126889
- Cited by
- 497
- References
- 51
- Citations by year
- 2026: 24 · 2025: 55 · 2024: 40 · 2023: 55 · 2022: 34 · 2021: 47 · 2020: 42 · 2019: 28 · 2018: 32 · 2017: 34 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 28 · 2014: 23 · 2013: 14 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 45.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- London School of Economics and Political Science Theses Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (acceptedVersion)
- Archivio istituzionale della ricerca (Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna) (submittedVersion)
- ANU Open Research (Australian National University) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Universität Hannover
- Economic and Social Research Council (ES/G021694/1)
- Leibniz-Gemeinschaft
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Climate Change Policy and Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- inequality, communication, public goods game, climate change mitigation, free-riding, coordination, redistribution, signaling, global public goods, experimental economics
- MeSH terms
- Communication, Game Theory, Games, Experimental, Humans, International Cooperation, Surveys and Questionnaires, Socioeconomic Factors, Global Warming
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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