CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 499Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesClimate Change Policy and EconomicsGame Theory and Voting Systems

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 50 of the 51 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Inequality, communication, and the avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game

Open access
Tavoni, Alessandro, Dannenberg, Astrid, Kallis, Giorgos, Löschel, Andreas·2011·Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
DOI 10.1073/pnas.1102493108PMC PMC3141931
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

International efforts to provide global public goods often face the challenges of coordinating national contributions and distributing costs equitably in the face of uncertainty, inequality, and free-riding incentives. In an experimental setting, we distribute endowments unequally among a group of people who can reach a fixed target sum through successive money contributions, knowing that if they fail, they will lose all their remaining money with 50% probability. In some treatments, we give players the option to communicate intended contributions. We find that inequality reduces the prospects of reaching the target but that communication increases success dramatically. Successful groups tend to eliminate inequality over the course of the game, with rich players signaling willingness to redistribute early on. Our results suggest that coordination-promoting institutions and early redistribution from richer to poorer nations are both decisive for the avoidance of global calamities, such as disruptive climate change.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1073/pnas.1102493108

Cites

50 of 50 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 51 references

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Items 301–400 of 499

Related

See all

Metadata

Authors
Tavoni, A., Dannenberg, A., Kallis, G., & Löschel, A.
Affiliations
  • London School of Economics and Political Science (GB)
  • Centre for European Economic Research (DE)
  • Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats (ES)
  • Australian National University (AU)
ORCID
Venue
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Publisher
National Academy of Sciences
Published
2011-07-05
Volume
108
Issue
29
Pages
11825-11829
ISSN
  • 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
  • 1091-6490
DOI
10.1073/pnas.1102493108
PMC
PMC3141931
OpenAlex
W2145126889
Cited by
497
References
51
Citations by year
2026: 24 · 2025: 55 · 2024: 40 · 2023: 55 · 2022: 34 · 2021: 47 · 2020: 42 · 2019: 28 · 2018: 32 · 2017: 34 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 28 · 2014: 23 · 2013: 14 · 2012: 12
FWCI
45.19
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • London School of Economics and Political Science Theses Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (acceptedVersion)
  • Archivio istituzionale della ricerca (Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna) (submittedVersion)
  • ANU Open Research (Australian National University) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Universität Hannover
  • Economic and Social Research Council (ES/G021694/1)
  • Leibniz-Gemeinschaft
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Climate Change Policy and Economics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
Keywords
inequality, communication, public goods game, climate change mitigation, free-riding, coordination, redistribution, signaling, global public goods, experimental economics
MeSH terms
Communication, Game Theory, Games, Experimental, Humans, International Cooperation, Surveys and Questionnaires, Socioeconomic Factors, Global Warming

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review