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The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas

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Sasaki, Tatsuya, Brännström, Åke, Dieckmann, Ulf, Sigmund, Karl · 2012 · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Cited by 152

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Self-interest frequently causes individuals engaged in joint enterprises to choose actions that are counterproductive. Free-riders can invade a society of cooperators, causing a tragedy of the commons. Such social dilemmas can be overcome by positive or negative incentives. Even though an incentive-providing institution may protect a cooperative society from invasion by free-riders, it cannot always convert a society of free-riders to cooperation. In the latter case, both norms, cooperation and defection, are stable: To avoid a collapse to full defection, cooperators must be sufficiently numerous initially. A society of free-riders is then caught in a social trap, and the institution is unable to provide an escape, except at a high, possibly prohibitive cost. Here, we analyze the interplay of (a) incentives provided by institutions and (b) the effects of voluntary participation. We show that this combination fundamentally improves the efficiency of incentives. In particular, optional participation allows institutions punishing free-riders to overcome the social dilemma at a much lower cost, and to promote a globally stable regime of cooperation. This removes the social trap and implies that whenever a society of cooperators cannot be invaded by free-riders, it will necessarily become established in the long run, through social learning, irrespective of the initial number of cooperators. We also demonstrate that punishing provides a “lighter touch” than rewarding, guaranteeing full cooperation at considerably lower cost.

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Crossref · 10.1073/pnas.1115219109

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Metadata

Authors
Sasaki, T., Brännström, Å., Dieckmann, U., & Sigmund, K.
Venue
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Published
2012-01-09
Volume
109
Issue
4
Pages
1165-1169
ISSN
  • 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
  • 1091-6490
OpenAlex
W2071212584
Cited by
152
References
13
FWCI
45.47
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1073/pnas.1115219109
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Sasaki, T., Brännström, Å., Dieckmann, U., & Sigmund, K. (2012). The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1115219109

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