The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Prosocial preferences do not explain human cooperation in public-goods games
Open accessAbstract
It has become an accepted paradigm that humans have “prosocial preferences” that lead to higher levels of cooperation than those that would maximize their personal financial gain. However, the existence of prosocial preferences has been inferred post hoc from the results of economic games, rather than with direct experimental tests. Here, we test how behavior in a public-goods game is influenced by knowledge of the consequences of actions for other players. We found that ( i ) individuals cooperate at similar levels, even when they are not informed that their behavior benefits others; ( ii ) an increased awareness of how cooperation benefits others leads to a reduction, rather than an increase, in the level of cooperation; and ( iii ) cooperation can be either lower or higher than expected, depending on experimental design. Overall, these results contradict the suggested role of the prosocial preferences hypothesis and show how the complexity of human behavior can lead to misleading conclusions from controlled laboratory experiments.
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Cites
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
Trivers, R. L. (1971) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/406755 · Cited by 11,010
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02043 · Cited by 3,475 · cited 1×
“In contrast to this prediction, most individuals do contribute something (typically around 40– 50%), and although contributions go down when play is repeated, groups continue to contribute 10–20% of their resources to the public good (4, 7).”
Background“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R., Alvard, M., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., et al. (2005) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x05000142 · Cited by 1,898
The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation
Burnham, T. C., & Johnson, D. D. P. (2005) · Analyse & Kritik · doi:10.1515/auk-2005-0107 · Cited by 231
Cited by
Silent disco: dancing in synchrony leads to elevated pain thresholds and social closeness
Tarr, B., Launay, J., & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2016) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2016.02.004 · Cited by 341
The Evolution of Altruism in Humans
Kurzban, R., Burton-Chellew, M. N., & West, S. A. (2015) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-015355 · Cited by 306
Self-citationPlaying with Strangers: Which Shared Traits Attract Us Most to New People?
Launay, J., & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2015) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129688 · Cited by 65
Payoff-based learning explains the decline in cooperation in public goods games
Burton-Chellew, M. N., Nax, H. H., & West, S. A. (2015) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2014.2678 · Cited by 63
Self-citationPublic Goods Games on Coevolving Social Network Models
Tomassini, M., & Antonioni, A. (2020) · Frontiers in Physics · doi:10.3389/fphy.2020.00058 · Cited by 21
Metadata
- Authors
- Burton-Chellew, M. N., & West, S. A.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2012-12-17
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 216-221
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2119076486
- Cited by
- 159
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 36.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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