Perceived intent motivates people to magnify observed harms
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Significance: This paper examines how detecting harmful intent creates downstream consequences for assessing damage, magnifying its cost. If intentional harms seem worse, society may spend more money on them than on objectively more damaging unintentional harms or on naturally occurring harms. Why might this occur? Various psychological theories identify the cause as motivation; however, the presence of this motivation has been inferred indirectly. Drawing on animal-model research, we present more direct evidence for blame motivation, and discuss how it may help to explain the magnification of intentional harms. This approach acknowledges the nonrational biases in damage estimates and potential policy priorities.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Koch, A., Imhoff, R., Dotsch, R., Unkelbach, C., & Alves, H. (2016) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/pspa0000046 · Cited by 309
Inaccurate group meta-perceptions drive negative out-group attributions in competitive contexts
Lees, J., & Cikara, M. (2019) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-019-0766-4 · Cited by 259
Effron, D. A. (2018) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167217746152 · Cited by 79
Perceived Shared Condemnation Intensifies Punitive Moral Emotions
Konishi, N., Oe, T., Shimizu, H., Tanaka, K., & Ohtsubo, Y. (2017) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-017-07916-z · Cited by 15
Metadata
- Authors
- Ames, D. L., & Fiske, S. T.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2015-03-02
- Volume
- 112
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 3599-3605
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2001764979
- Cited by
- 82
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 3.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Ames, D. L., & Fiske, S. T. (2015). Perceived intent motivates people to magnify observed harms. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1501592112
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