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Cited by 259Social and Intergroup PsychologySocial Power and Status DynamicsDeath Anxiety and Social Exclusion

Inaccurate group meta-perceptions drive negative out-group attributions in competitive contexts

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Lees, Jeffrey, Cikara, Mina·2019·Nature Human Behaviour
DOI 10.1038/s41562-019-0766-4

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Abstract

Across seven experiments and one survey (n = 4,282), people consistently overestimated out-group negativity towards the collective behaviour of their in-group. This negativity bias in group meta-perception was present across multiple competitive (but not cooperative) intergroup contexts and appears to be yoked to group psychology more generally; we observed negativity bias for estimation of out-group, anonymized-group and even fellow in-group members' perceptions. Importantly, in the context of US politics, greater inaccuracy was associated with increased belief that the out-group is motivated by purposeful obstructionism. However, an intervention that informed participants of the inaccuracy of their beliefs reduced negative out-group attributions, and was more effective for those whose group meta-perceptions were more inaccurate. In sum, we highlight a pernicious bias in social judgements of how we believe 'they' see 'our' behaviour, demonstrate how such inaccurate beliefs can exacerbate intergroup conflict and provide an avenue for reducing the negative effects of inaccuracy.

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Crossref · 10.1038/s41562-019-0766-4

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  • No experimental evidence is available on the effect of factual beliefs about political issues on affective polarization.

    “Moreover, no experimental evidence is available on the effect of factual beliefs about political issues on affective polarization.”

    From Factual belief polarization between Democrats and Republicans: source or epiphenomenon of ideological and affective polarization? (2024) · cites this paper as Lees and Cikara, 2020

  • Experimental research revealed that corrective information about the views and characteristics of political opponents can decrease affective polarization.

    “experimental research revealed that corrective information about the views and characteristics of political opponents (as opposed to political issues) can decrease affective polarization (e.g., Ahler and Sood, 2018;Lees and Cikara, 2020).”

    From Factual belief polarization between Democrats and Republicans: source or epiphenomenon of ideological and affective polarization? (2024) · cites this paper as Lees and Cikara, 2020

  • Once categorical boundaries between 'us and them' are drawn, destructive social psychological processes may kick in, including stereotyping, prejudice, in-group favouritism, out-group derogation and even dehumanization.

    “Once categorical boundaries between ‘us and them’ are drawn, a whole host of destructive social psychological processes may kick in, including stereotyping, prejudice, in-group favouritism, out-group derogation and even dehumanization3,55,93–95.”

    From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [95]

  • Partisans might represent their adversaries as more obstructionist, more ideologically extreme, more prejudiced against the in-group, or more violent than they actually are.

    “Partisans might also represent their adversaries as more obstructionist95, more ideologically extreme122,151–153, more prejudiced against the in-group55, or more violent154 than they actually are.”

    From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [95]

  • Distorting images of the out-group as deviant, hostile, stubborn, extreme and unreasonable serves to justify treating the out-group unfavourably.

    “Presumably, distorting images of the out-group as deviant, hostile, stubborn, extreme and unreasonable serves to justify treating the out-group unfavourably55,89,95,155.”

    From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [95]

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Authors
Lees, J., & Cikara, M.
Affiliations
Harvard University (US)
Corresponding author
  • Lees, Jeffrey
  • Cikara, Mina
ORCID
Venue
Nature Human Behaviour
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2019-11-11
Volume
4
Issue
3
Pages
279-286
ISSN
2397-3374 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1038/s41562-019-0766-4
OpenAlex
W2969496492
Cited by
259
References
42
Citations by year
2026: 38 · 2025: 34 · 2024: 54 · 2023: 55 · 2022: 34 · 2021: 28 · 2020: 15 · 2019: 1
FWCI
39.18
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Nature Human Behaviour (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
  • PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
Funders
National Science Foundation (BCS-1551559)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social Power and Status Dynamics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Death Anxiety and Social Exclusion
Keywords
negativity bias, intergroup conflict, competitive environment, social judgment, intergroup perception
MeSH terms
Adult, Attitude, Competitive Behavior, Conflict, Psychological, Cooperative Behavior, Group Processes, Humans, Persuasive Communication, Politics, Social Perception, United States

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