The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation
Open accessAbstract
Significance: The role of intuition versus deliberation in human cooperation has received widespread attention from experimentalists across the behavioral sciences in recent years. Yet a formal theoretical framework for addressing this question has been absent. Here, we introduce an evolutionary game-theoretic model of dual-process agents playing prisoner’s dilemma games. We find that, across many types of environments, evolution only ever favors agents who ( i ) always intuitively defect, or ( ii ) are intuitively predisposed to cooperate but who, when deliberating, switch to defection if it is in their self-interest to do so. Our model offers a clear explanation for why we should expect deliberation to promote selfishness rather than cooperation and unifies apparently contradictory empirical results regarding intuition and cooperation.
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Cites
A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.
Kahneman, D. (2003) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.58.9.697 · Cited by 5,540
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 · Cited by 5,137
Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. (2001) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00394-9 · Cited by 2,780
Spontaneous giving and calculated greed
Rand, D. G., Greene, J. D., & Nowak, M. A. (2012) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature11467 · Cited by 1,334
Self-citationDecision making and the avoidance of cognitive demand
Kool, W., McGuire, J. T., Rosen, Z. B., & Botvinick, M. M. (2010) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/a0020198 · Cited by 1,141
Two Key Steps in the Evolution of Human Cooperation: The Interdependence Hypothesis
Tomasello, M., Melis, A. P., Tennie, C., Wyman, E., & Herrmann, E. (2012) · Current Anthropology · doi:10.1086/668207 · Cited by 738
The evolution of antisocial punishment in optional public goods games
Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2011) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms1442 · Cited by 350
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Semantics derived automatically from language corpora contain human-like biases
Caliskan, A., Bryson, J. J., & Narayanan, A. (2017) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aal4230 · Cited by 2,887
Statistical physics of human cooperation
Perc, M., Jordan, J. J., Rand, D. G., Wang, Z., Boccaletti, S., & Szolnoki, A. (2017) · Physics Reports · doi:10.1016/j.physrep.2017.05.004 · Cited by 1,590
Self-citationTask-Dependent Algorithm Aversion
Castelo, N., Bos, M. W., Bos, M. W., Lehmann, D. R., & Lehmann, D. R. (2019) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-88067-4_21 · Cited by 1,441
Muthukrishna, M., & Henrich, J. (2019) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0522-1 · Cited by 638
Third-party punishment as a costly signal of trustworthiness
Jordan, J. J., Hoffman, M., Bloom, P., & Rand, D. G. (2016) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature16981 · Cited by 508
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bear, A., & Rand, D. G.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2016-01-11
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 936-941
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2236311326
- Cited by
- 298
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 145.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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