Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation
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Abstract
Significance: The role of intuition versus deliberation in human cooperation has received widespread attention from experimentalists across the behavioral sciences in recent years. Yet a formal theoretical framework for addressing this question has been absent. Here, we introduce an evolutionary game-theoretic model of dual-process agents playing prisoner’s dilemma games. We find that, across many types of environments, evolution only ever favors agents who ( i ) always intuitively defect, or ( ii ) are intuitively predisposed to cooperate but who, when deliberating, switch to defection if it is in their self-interest to do so. Our model offers a clear explanation for why we should expect deliberation to promote selfishness rather than cooperation and unifies apparently contradictory empirical results regarding intuition and cooperation.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bear, A., & Rand, D. G.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2016-01-11
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 936-941
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2236311326
- Cited by
- 298
- References
- 60
- FWCI
- 145.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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