The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information
Open accessAbstract
Significance: Indirect reciprocity explores how humans act when their reputation is at stake, and which social norms they use to assess the actions of others. A crucial question in indirect reciprocity is which social norms can maintain stable cooperation in a society. Past research has highlighted eight such norms, called “leading-eight” strategies. This past research, however, is based on the assumption that all relevant information about other population members is publicly available and that everyone agrees on who is good or bad. Instead, here we explore the reputation dynamics when information is private and noisy. We show that under these conditions, most leading-eight strategies fail to evolve. Those leading-eight strategies that do evolve are unable to sustain full cooperation.
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Citations
Cites
Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
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Self-citationEvolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173179 · Cited by 5,502
Evolution of indirect reciprocity
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2005) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature04131 · Cited by 2,762 · cited 2×
“Evolutionary game theory explores how good reputations are acquired and how they affect subsequent behaviors, using the framework of indirect reciprocity (14–17).”
BackgroundSelf-citationEvolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/31225 · Cited by 2,700 · cited 1×
“Simple strategies of indirect reciprocity like image scoring (21, 22) have been suspected to be unstable, because players may abstain from punishing defectors to maintain their own good score (27).”
BackgroundSelf-citationRand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003 · Cited by 1,308
Self-citationThe value of reputation on eBay: A controlled experiment
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Leimar, O., & Hammerstein, P. (2001) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2000.1573 · Cited by 673 · cited 1×
“Simple strategies of indirect reciprocity like image scoring (21, 22) have been suspected to be unstable, because players may abstain from punishing defectors to maintain their own good score (27).”
BackgroundThe Dynamics of Indirect Reciprocity
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1006/jtbi.1998.0775 · Cited by 607
Self-citationSigmund, K. (2010) · doi:10.1515/9781400832255 · Cited by 570 · cited 2×
“[2] The entries of α can again take either the value 0 or 1.”
BackgroundHow should we define goodness?—reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
Ohtsuki, H., & Iwasa, Y. (2004) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.06.005 · Cited by 497
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Ohtsuki, H., & Iwasa, Y. (2006) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.08.008 · Cited by 491
A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
Panchanathan, K., & Boyd, R. (2003) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/s0022-5193(03)00154-1 · Cited by 388
Social status and group norms: Indirect reciprocity in a repeated helping experiment
Seinen, I., & Schram, A. (2006) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.10.005 · Cited by 350 · cited 3×
“[7] to obtain estimated payoffs ˆ ⇡ i = 1 By the theory of Markov chains, the estimated payoffs according to [8] converge to the true values [7] if the simulation is iterated for sufficiently many time steps.”
BackgroundCooperation among strangers with limited information about reputation
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“Moreover, assume that the initial image matrix is M (0) = M 0 as defined in [9], and let M ( t ) denote the image matrix at some subsequent time t> 0 according to the process with perfect observation and no noise, q = 1 and " = 0 .”
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Experimental Study of Informal Rewards in Peer Production
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“Subjects often differ in the prior information they have, and even if everyone has access to the same information [as is often the case in online platforms (51, 52)], individuals differ in how much weight they attribute to different pieces of evidence.”
Background
Cited by
Xia, C., Wang, J., Perc, M., & Wang, Z. (2023) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2023.05.002 · Cited by 339
A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity
Schmid, L., Chatterjee, K., Hilbe, C., & Nowak, M. A. (2021) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-021-01114-8 · Cited by 161
Self-citationLiu, L., Chen, X., & Szolnoki, A. (2019) · Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied Sciences · doi:10.1142/s0218202519500428 · Cited by 128
“Particularly, public goods game (PGG), as a standard metaphor of the mentioned social dilemma, has attracted a lot of attention from broad range of research disciplines.(23,25,27,34,57,68) In the PGG, individuals decide whether to contribute to the common pool or not, and the accumulated and enhanced contribution are…”
BackgroundNetworks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review
Takács, K., Gross, J., Testori, M., Letina, S., Kenny, A. R., Power, E. A., & Wittek, R. P. M. (2021) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B · doi:10.1098/rstb.2020.0297 · Cited by 61
Metadata
- Authors
- Hilbe, C., Schmid, L., Tkadlec, J., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2018-11-14
- Volume
- 115
- Issue
- 48
- Pages
- 12241-12246
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2900993709
- Cited by
- 171
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 29.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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