Cited by 150Psychiatry, Mental Health, NeurosciencePhilosophy and Theoretical ScienceCybernetics and Technology in Society

Performance vs. competence in human–machine comparisons

Open access
Firestone, Chaz·2020·Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Abstract

Does the human mind resemble the machines that can behave like it? Biologically inspired machine-learning systems approach “human-level” accuracy in an astounding variety of domains, and even predict human brain activity—raising the exciting possibility that such systems represent the world like we do. However, even seemingly intelligent machines fail in strange and “unhumanlike” ways, threatening their status as models of our minds. How can we know when human–machine behavioral differences reflect deep disparities in their underlying capacities, vs. when such failures are only superficial or peripheral? This article draws on a foundational insight from cognitive science—the distinction between performance and competence —to encourage “species-fair” comparisons between humans and machines. The performance/competence distinction urges us to consider whether the failure of a system to behave as ideally hypothesized, or the failure of one creature to behave like another, arises not because the system lacks the relevant knowledge or internal capacities (“competence”), but instead because of superficial constraints on demonstrating that knowledge (“performance”). I argue that this distinction has been neglected by research comparing human and machine behavior, and that it should be essential to any such comparison. Focusing on the domain of image classification, I identify three factors contributing to the species-fairness of human–machine comparisons, extracted from recent work that equates such constraints. Species-fair comparisons level the playing field between natural and artificial intelligence, so that we can separate more superficial differences from those that may be deep and enduring.

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  • Without representational evidence, behavioral similarities between models and humans remain speculative.

    “Without representational evidence, behavioral similarities between models and humans remain speculative”

    From From Human Cognition to Neural Activations: Probing the Computational Primitives of Spatial Reasoning in LLMs (2026) · cites this paper as Firestone, 2020

    In “What Species-Fair Comparisons Show” (page not supplied), Firestone says humanlike behavior alone is insufficient to establish humanlike underlying processes. But the paper does not require representational evidence: it treats species-fair behavioral comparisons as valuable evidence and says a mixed strategy is likely best. (LLM, conf=0.87)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Without a fair comparison that evaluates humans in the same settings, strong claims cannot be made about whether the properties listed in Table 1 make LLMs qualitatively unlike humans.

    “Without a fair comparison (59–63) that evaluates humans in the same settings, we cannot make strong claims about whether the properties listed in Table 1 make LLMs qualitatively unlike humans.”
  • Similar performance-competence issues apply when assessing the capabilities of machine learning systems and particularly LLMs.

    “More recent work has suggested that similar issues apply when assessing the capabilities of machine learning systems (Firestone, 2020), and particularly LLMs (Lampinen, 2022).”

    From Machine Psychology (2023) · cites this paper as Firestone, 2020

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Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. J. Buolamwini, T. Gebru, "Gender shades" in Proceedings of the First Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency (Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, 2018), pp. 77-91.
  2. M. Crosby, B. Beyret, M. Halina, Animal-AI Olympics. Nat. Mach. Intell. 1, 257 (2019).
  3. S. Dodge, L. Karam, "Human and deep learning recognition performance under visual distortions" in International Conference on Computer Communication and Networks (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2017).

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Authors
Firestone, C.
Affiliations
Johns Hopkins University (US)
Corresponding author
Firestone, Chaz
Venue
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Published
2020-10-13
Volume
117
Issue
43
Pages
26562-26571
ISSN
  • 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
  • 1091-6490
OpenAlex
W3092323704
Cited by
150
References
112
Citations by year
2026: 19 · 2025: 19 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 31 · 2022: 30 · 2021: 26 · 2020: 4
FWCI
8.94
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Psychiatry, Mental Health, Neuroscience
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
Keywords
human-machine comparison, image classification, machine learning, cognitive science, models of mind, knowledge representation
MeSH terms
Machine Learning, Animals, Artificial Intelligence, Brain, Humans, Image Processing, Computer-Assisted, Species Specificity, Visual Perception, Knowledge

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