Great apes use self-experience to anticipate an agent’s action in a false-belief test
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Significance: Many unique features of human communication, cooperation, and culture depend on theory of mind, the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others. But is theory of mind uniquely human? Nonhuman animals, such as humans’ closest ape relatives, have succeeded in some theory-of-mind tasks; however, it remains disputed whether they do so by reading others’ minds or their behavior. Here, we challenged this behavior-rule account using a version of the goggles test, incorporated into an established anticipatory-looking false-belief task with apes. We provide evidence that, in the absence of behavioral cues, apes consulted their own past experience of seeing or not seeing through a novel barrier to determine whether an agent could see through the same barrier.
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“In a study involving chimpanzees, bonobos (Pan paniscus), and orangutans (Pongo genus), only apes who had themselves experienced a barrier as opaque were able to infer that others would not see objects on the other side of it [76].”
From Dimensions of Animal Consciousness (2020) · cites this paper as [76]
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“Such evidence has recently been found in great apes.”
From Dimensions of Animal Consciousness (2020) · cites this paper as [76]
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Citations
Cites
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kano, F., Krupenye, C., Hirata, S., Tomonaga, M., & Call, J.
- Affiliations
- Kyoto University (JP)
- University of St Andrews (GB)
- Wildlife Research Center, Kyoto University (JP)
- Corresponding author
- Kano, Fumihiro
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Publisher
- National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2019-09-30
- Volume
- 116
- Issue
- 42
- Pages
- 20904-20909
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- PMC
- PMC6800361
- OpenAlex
- W2978440183
- Cited by
- 247
- References
- 42
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 26 · 2024: 67 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 37 · 2021: 35 · 2020: 41 · 2019: 2
- FWCI
- 52.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Kyoto University Research Information Repository (Kyoto University) (publishedVersion)
- St Andrews Research Repository (St Andrews Research Repository) (acceptedVersion)
- Institutional Repositories DataBase (IRDB) (submittedVersion)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- MEXT | Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (18H05072, 19H01772, 16H06301, 18H05524, 16H06283)
- European Commission Marie Skłodowska-Curie fellowship (MENTALIZINGORIGINS)
- European Research Council (Synergy grant 609819 SOMICS)
- Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (LDG-U04, GAIN)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Primate Behavior and Ecology
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Face Recognition and Perception
- Keywords
- theory of mind, false belief understanding, great apes, self-experience, anticipatory looking, visual access, mental state attribution, animal cognition, eye tracking
- MeSH terms
- Animals, Behavior, Animal, Cues, Culture, Female, Male, Hominidae, Comprehension, Theory of Mind
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