The objectivity illusion and voter polarization in the 2016 presidential election
Open accessAbstract
Significance: Political polarization increasingly threatens democratic institutions. The belief that “my side” sees the world objectively while the “other side” sees it through the lens of its biases contributes to this political polarization and accompanying animus and distrust. This conviction, known as the “objectivity illusion,” was strong and persistent among Trump and Clinton supporters in the weeks before the 2016 presidential election. We show that the objectivity illusion predicts subsequent bias and polarization, including heightened partisanship over the presidential debates. A follow-up study showed that both groups impugned the objectivity of a putative blog author supporting the opposition candidate and saw supporters of that opposing candidate as evil.
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Individuals assume, in a self-serving manner, that they process information in a more rational, impartial and accurate way than others do (naive realism and objectivity illusion).
“Closely related to the phenomenon of myside bias are ‘naive realism’ and the objectivity illusion, whereby individuals assume, in a self-serving manner, that they process information in a more rational, impartial and accurate way than others do120.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [120]
People may evaluate the same information more favourably when it supports (versus contradicts) the beliefs, opinions and values of one's political in-group.
“For example, people may evaluate the same information more favourably when it supports (versus contradicts) the beliefs, opinions and values of one’s political in-group103,115,120.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [120]
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Cites
Iyengar, S., Sood, G., & Lelkes, Y. (2012) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfs038 · Cited by 2,748 · see citing works
Fear and loathing across party lines: New evidence on group polarization
Iyengar, S., & Westwood, S. J. (2015) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12152 · Cited by 2,452 · see citing works
Hastorf, A. H., & Cantril, H. (1954) · The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0057880 · Cited by 882 · see citing works
Valuing thoughts, ignoring behavior: The introspection illusion as a source of the bias blind spot
Pronin, E., & Kugler, M. B. (2007) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2006.05.011 · Cited by 366 · see citing works
Is the Internet Causing Political Polarization? Evidence from Demographics
Boxell, L., Gentzkow, M., & Shapiro, J. (2017) · doi:10.3386/w23258 · Cited by 226 · cited 1× · see citing works
“This downward spiral of bias and polarization was captured in our mediational and path analysis models of their relationship to the objectivity illusion, and it may help to explain both growing polarization and the tendency for political attitudes to strengthen through middle age (47, 48).”
Background
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 23
- [1]Fiske S. T., Social cognition and social perception. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 44, 155– 194 (1993). 8434891
- [2]Berlin I., Concepts and Categories: Philosophical Essays, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2013).
- [3]Sapolsky R. M., Behave: The Biology of Humans at Our Best and Worst, (Penguin, New York, NY, 2017).
- [10]Abramowitz A. I., Saunders K. L., Is polarization a myth? J. Polit. 70, 542– 555 (2008).
- [12]Hochschild A. R., Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right, (The New Press, New York, NY, 2016).
- [13]McCarty N., Poole K. T., Rosenthal H., Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches, (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006).
- [14]Sunstein C. R., Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2018).
- [18]Ehrlinger J., Gilovich T., Ross L., Peering into the bias blind spot: People’s assessments of bias in themselves and others. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 31, 680– 692 (2005). 15802662
- [24]Chambers J. R., Melnyk D., Why do I hate thee? Conflict misperceptions and intergroup mistrust. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 32, 1295– 1311 (2006). 16963602
- [25]Reeder G. D., Pryor J. B., Wohl M. J. A., Griswell M. L., On attributing negative motives to others who disagree with our opinions. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 31, 1498– 1510 (2005). 16207769
- [27]Pronin E., Gilovich T., Ross L., Objectivity in the eye of the beholder: Divergent perceptions of bias in self versus others. Psychol. Rev. 111, 781– 799 (2004). 15250784
- [28]Cohen G. L., Party over policy: The dominating impact of group influence on political beliefs. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 85, 808– 822 (2003). 14599246
- [29]Kennedy K. A., Pronin E., When disagreement gets ugly: Perceptions of bias and the escalation of conflict. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 34, 833– 848 (2008). 18469154
- [30]Kenworthy J. B., Miller N., Attributional biases about the origins of attitudes: Externality, emotionality, and rationality. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 82, 693– 707 (2002). 12003471
- [31]Van Boven L., Ehret P. J., Sherman D. K., Psychological barriers to bipartisan public support for climate policy. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 13, 492– 507 (2018). 29961412
- [32]Inglehart R. F., Norris P., Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: Economic have-nots and cultural backlash. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2818659. Accessed 14 July 2020.
- [34]Mutz D. C., Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 115, E4330– E4339 (2018). 29686081 PMC5948965
- [36]Tucker P. D., Torres M., Sinclair B., Smith S. S., Pathways to trump: Republican voters in 2016. Electoral Studies 61, 102035 (2019).
- [42]Ross L., Ward A., “ Naive realism in everyday life: Implications for social conflict and misunderstanding” in Values and Knowledge, Brown T., Reed E. S., Turiel E., Eds. (The Jean Piaget Symposium Series, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ, 1996), pp. 103– 135.
- [45]Peterson E., Goel S., Iyengar S., Partisan selective exposure in online news consumption: Evidence from the 2016 presidential campaign. Political Sci. Res. Methods, 10.1017/psrm.2019.55 (2019). · DOI
- [48]Visser P. S., Krosnick J. A., Development of attitude strength over the life cycle: Surge and decline. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 75, 1389– 1410 (1998). 9914661
- [49]Berlin I., “ Notes on prejudice” in Liberty: Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty, Hardy H., Ed. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2002), pp. 345– 348.
- [50]Schwalbe M. C., Cohen G. L., Ross L. D., The objectivity illusion and voter polarization in the 2016 presidential election. Open Science Framework. https://osf.io/w48f5/. Deposited 21 July 2020. PMC7474588 32817537
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts
Jost, J. T., Baldassarri, D. S., & Druckman, J. N. (2022) · Nature Reviews Psychology · doi:10.1038/s44159-022-00093-5 · Cited by 276 · see citing works
“Supporters of Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton believed that the other ‘side’ was more biased than their own; they were also more likely to conclude that their preferred candidate had won each of the presidential debates in 2016 (reF.(120)).”
BackgroundBrüggemann, M., & Meyer, H. (2023) · Communication Theory · doi:10.1093/ct/qtad012 · Cited by 60 · see citing works
- Authors
- Schwalbe, M. C., Cohen, G. L., & Ross, L. D.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Schwalbe, Michael C.
- Ross, Lee D.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Publisher
- National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2020-08-17
- Volume
- 117
- Issue
- 35
- Pages
- 21218-21229
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- PMC
- PMC7474588
- OpenAlex
- W3053985705
- Cited by
- 54
- References
- 5
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 24 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 2
- FWCI
- 13.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Keywords
- voter polarization, 2016 US presidential election, partisanship, presidential debates, perceived bias, closed-mindedness, political attitudes, terrorism stereotypes, political division
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Attitude, Female, Goals, Humans, Illusions, Longitudinal Studies, Male, Middle Aged, Politics, Social Behavior, Social Perception
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review