Cited by 60Media Studies and CommunicationSocial Media and PoliticsMedia Influence and Politics

When debates break apart: discursive polarization as a multi-dimensional divergence emerging in and through communication

Open access
Brüggemann, Michael, Meyer, Hendrik·2023·Communication Theory

Abstract

“Polarization” is a common diagnosis of the state of contemporary societies. Yet, few studies theorize or systematically analyze how polarization evolves in media content. To guide future empirical studies, we introduce a public sphere perspective on polarization. Discursive Polarization, defined as divergence emerging in public communication, may disrupt the public sphere if left untamed. Its analysis should combine the study of ideological polarization (increasing disagreement about issues) and affective polarization (growing disaffection between groups) as evolving in communication. Both processes may be measured in media content. We propose a framework combining the study of journalism and digital communication networks, investigating (1) content and (2) networked interactions regarding both political issues and social identity formation. The exploration of how the public sphere is disrupted in the process of Discursive Polarization may help us to understand the wider social phenomenon of polarization: before societies break apart, debates break apart.

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

The paper argues that polarization should be studied as "discursive polarization"—a multi-dimensional divergence that emerges in and through public communication—and proposes a framework for measuring it in media content. It contends that before societies break apart, debates break apart, so analyzing how ideological and affective polarization unfold in journalism and digital networks can illuminate wider social polarization.

Key findings

  • The authors define discursive polarization as divergence emerging in public communication and argue its analysis must combine ideological polarization (increasing disagreement about issues) with affective polarization (growing disaffection between groups), both measured in media content.
  • They propose a four-fold framework crossing two dimensions (issues vs. groups) with two communicative practices (statements/content vs. interactions/networks): polarized framing of issues and polarized issue networks (ideological), and polarized group-related content and polarized group-related networks (affective).
  • Reviewing prior work, they note that two-thirds of studies systematically reviewed by Kubin & Sikorski (2021) lacked an explicit definition of polarization, and that most polarization studies do not actually study media content.
  • They cite evidence that in political discussions in the English-speaking Twittersphere, 10% of users are responsible for 80% of the content distributed (Wojcik & Hughes, 2019), and that echo-chamber research is challenged—digital networks tend toward homophily but hardly constitute closed-off echo chambers.

Methods

  • Conceptual/theoretical paper: it develops an analytical framework and research agenda rather than presenting original empirical data.
  • Draws on a selective (not comprehensive) review of empirical studies that explicitly relate polarization to media content, focused on automated approaches that could be combined with manual quantitative and qualitative analysis.
  • Framework is grounded in a public sphere perspective (Habermas, Hallin's three spheres of debate) and prior work on ideological and affective polarization.

Limitations

  • Stated: the framework covers relevant but not all plausible indicators of discursive polarization; it identifies degrees and patterns of polarization but does not say how to normatively evaluate them; and it leaves open where the tipping point lies between healthy contestation and destructive conflict.
  • Stated: the review is not a comprehensive meta-analysis but engages with studies the authors found particularly helpful.
  • Evident from the text: the paper presents no original empirical measurement, so the proposed indicators remain untested; the authors also note that few studies measure polarization on multiple dimensions, meaning the integrative claims rest on limited prior evidence.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/ct/qtad012

Cites

112 of 112 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

15 of 56 cited sources checked · 4 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured

  • Interpretationcitation

    The effect of journalists selecting to quote more extreme voices is further amplified by partisan social media users re-distributing extreme voices from the press on social media networks.

    “The effect of journalists selecting to quote more extreme voices is then further amplified by partisan social media users re-distributing extreme voices from the press on social media networks (Narayanan et al., 2018).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Narayanan et al., 2018 source

      The Abstract (p. 1) reports that Trump-supporter networks and extreme hard-right Facebook pages circulated junk news from sources publishing extremist content. But the paper does not establish that journalists selected extreme voices to quote, that users redistributed those quoted voices from the press, or that this amplified a journalist-selection effect. (LLM, conf=0.86)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Premisecitation

    Most polarization studies do not actually study media content.

    “Surprisingly, most polarization studies do not actually study media content (Kubin & Sikorski, 2021;Wojcieszak et al., 2018).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Kubin & Sikorski, 2021 source

      The available Results passage (page unavailable) lists a “Media contents” section but gives no finding about how many polarization studies examine media content. Searches for studies analyzing media content and for content-analysis frequency returned only headings, not evidence for the claim. (LLM, conf=0.72)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites Wojcieszak et al., 2018 source
  • Premisecitation

    Experimental approaches show distorted meta-representations of outgroups on digital platforms can result in disaffection across ideological groups.

    “Experimental approaches show e.g., how distorted meta-representations of outgroups on digital platforms can result in disaffection across ideological groups (Bail et al. 2018, Banks et al. 2021).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Bail et al. 2018 source

      The Results report that exposure to opposing political views on Twitter significantly increased conservatism among Republicans, while the change among Democrats was not statistically significant. The Discussion and Conclusion says the study could not identify the mechanism behind the Republican backfire effect. It therefore supports an experimental finding of increased polarization, but not the claim that distorted representations of outgroups caused disaffection across ideological groups. (LLM, conf=0.87)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites Banks et al. 2021 source
  • Premisecitation

    Cross-cutting interactions with opposing groups exist, particularly in political discourses and between politically-interested users.

    “Cross-cutting interactions with opposing groups exist, particularly in political discourses and between politically-interested users (An et al., 2019;Wu & Resnick, 2021).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked
    • cites An et al., 2019

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Wu & Resnick, 2021 source
  • Premisecitation

    In political debates, high-centrality accounts often are partisan media, politicians, and political organizations.

    “In political debates, such accounts often are partisan media, politicians, and political organizations (Gallagher et al., 2021).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Gallagher et al., 2021 source

      The Sustained Amplification of COVID-19 Elites section (p. 5) finds that journalists and media outlets, followed by left- and right-leaning political accounts, were prominent in US Twitter discussions of COVID-19. The Scientific Expertise and COVID-19 Elites section (p. 7) includes elected officials among those political sources. The paper does not establish that these accounts are typically partisan media or political organizations across political debates generally, and it ranks sustained amplification rather than network centrality. (LLM, conf=0.85)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • May combine two claims. 21
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 30
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 1
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Very active partisan users are responsible for perceived dominance of misinformation and incivility and the polarization of social media networks.

    “It is precisely these very active partisan users that are found to be responsible for the perceived dominance of misinformation and incivility (Dourado & Salgado, 2021) and the polarization of social media networks (Kaiser et al., 2022).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Dourado & Salgado, 2021 source

      The Spread section says influential users confer visibility on fake content and that public figures helped disseminate several fake-news items. The Discussion also links more engaged conservative networks to the fake-news stories that thrive. Neither section establishes that very active partisan users are responsible for the perceived dominance of misinformation or for incivility. The separate polarization claim is attributed to Kaiser et al., not to this source. (LLM, conf=0.86)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites Kaiser et al., 2022 source

      The Abstract says partisan blocking of people who share misinformation is likely to contribute to polarization of social media networks. It does not identify very active partisan users as responsible, and presents network polarization as a likely consequence rather than an established outcome. The incivility claim is attributed to a different citation in the citing sentence. (LLM, conf=0.86)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    On platforms like Twitter, Reddit, or YouTube, polarization dynamics are not primarily ideological disagreements about issues, but dismissive interactions with out-groups.

    “Scholars such as Barbera ´(2020) made a strong case that especially on platforms like Twitter, Reddit, or YouTube (An et al., 2019;Wu & Resnick, 2021), polarization dynamics are not primarily ideological disagreements about issues, but dismissive interactions with out-groups.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Barbera ´(2020) source
    • cites An et al., 2019

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Wu & Resnick, 2021 source

      Section 7, “Toxicity as a Measure of Quality” (page not provided), reports that YouTube replies to people of opposing ideologies were much more frequently toxic, supporting the point about dismissive out-group interactions on YouTube. The paper does not establish that such interactions are the primary driver of polarization rather than disagreements about issues. (LLM, conf=0.87)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Mainstream climate change discourses on Twitter call for action, criticize governments, and are discussed within relatively homogenous communities, while climate change denialists interact disproportionately with the mainstream and potentially aim to hijack these debates.

    “Meyer et al. (2023) show that, while mainstream discourses about climate change on Twitter call for action, criticize governments, and are discussed within relatively homogenous communities, climate change denialists are trying to interact to a disproportionately high degree with the mainstream and potentially aim to highjack these debates.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Meyer et al., 2023 source
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Both ideological and affective polarization dimensions are reflected in discourse as people formulate statements about issues or groups and interact with other participants in a debate.

    “Both dimensions are also reflected in discourse as people formulate statements about issues or groups, and interact with other participants in a debate.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    Whether these dynamics occur depends on the type of media content that is circulating in journalistic and social media.

    “However, whether these dynamics occur depends on the type of media content that is circulating in journalistic and social media.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Mere exposure to EU news does not polarize everyone, but amplifies extreme views among those media users who already held somewhat extreme views prior to exposure.

    “They find that it does not polarize everyone, but that it amplifies extreme views among those media users who already held somewhat extreme views prior to exposure.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Wojcieszak et al. (2018) source
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Discursive polarization is rooted in social processes beyond mediated communication and affects society beyond mediated communication.

    “Just as this process of discursive polarization is rooted in social processes and contexts beyond mediated communication, it also affects society beyond mediated communication.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Other countries feature more forum media than the US: outlets consumed by audiences from diverse political backgrounds, preserving relatively neutral arenas of exchange in the public sphere.

    “As Fletcher et al. (2020) show, other countries feature more forum media than the US: outlets that are consumed by audiences from diverse political backgrounds, thus preserving relatively neutral arenas of exchange in the public sphere.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Fletcher et al. (2020) source
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Whether polarization harms society and democracy depends on its degree.

    “Whether polarization harms society and democracy depends on its degree: if limited in time and social reach, and to certain topics, divergence and contention may just be part of the democratic process.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning

    If within a debate the elements of problem definitions, epistemic assumptions, and evaluations diverge starkly between different groups, we would find polarized frames.

    “If, within a debate, these elements diverge starkly between different groups, we would find polarized frames.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Adding affective polarization to Hallin's model results in groups that no longer regard each other as adversaries but as lunatics or enemies.

    “Going beyond the model of Dan Hallin and adding the dimension of affective polarization to the picture, this would result in different groups that no longer regard each other as adversaries in a common debate but as lunatics that are not worth talking to or enemies that need to be defeated.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Journalism may provide extra visibility to extreme voices and crowd out the moderates.

    “Mirroring the social media prism mentioned above, journalism may thus provide extra visibility to extreme voices and crowd out the moderates.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Different problem definitions are the core element that distinguishes different frames in a debate.

    “These different problem definitions are the core element that distinguishes different frames in a debate.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Frequent use of the right-wing Fox News channel predicted stronger opposition to the Green New Deal among the Republican audience.

    “Frequent use of the right-wing Fox News channel predicted stronger opposition to the Green New Deal among the Republican audience.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Gustafson et al. (2019) source
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Offline news media content does not allow for much interaction, so the interactive side of the framework applies to digital media content.

    “Offline news media content (e.g., printed newspapers) does not allow for much interaction, so the interactive (right column) side of the framework applies to digital media content.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationnone given

    If left untamed, polarization may ultimately break the democratic public sphere apart.

    “If left untamed, however, polarization may ultimately break the democratic public sphere apart.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Politicians focus on positive Tweets about their ingroup, while Twitter users tend to retweet negative statements about the outgroup.

    “They find that politicians actually focus on positive Tweets about their ingroup, but Twitter users instead tend to retweet negative statements about the outgroup.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Yu et al., 2021

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    If large groups in society cannot agree on at least some basic facts concerning a contested question, this would be one indicator of polarization.

    “If large groups in society cannot agree on at least some basic facts concerning a contested question, this would be one indicator of polarization.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    At the endpoint of discursive polarization, society would be split into separated communities of communication that regard radically different ideas as consensus, legitimate debate, and beyond legitimate discussion.

    “At the endpoint of such a process of discursive polarization, society would be split up into different and largely separated communities of communication that regard radically different ideas as consensus, as part of legitimate debate, and as being beyond legitimate discussion”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Unlike echo chambers, counter-publics observe and refer to mainstream publics, but these connections are not dialogue.

    “Unlike echo chambers, counter-publics observe and refer to mainstream publics, but these connections should not be understood as dialogue taking place.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Discursive polarization is a meta-process that combines concepts of divergence on different dimensions of the framework.

    “We conceptualize this process as a meta-process that combines concepts of divergence on different -though not necessarily on all -dimensions of our framework.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The Wall Street Journal, compared to other U.S. newspapers, was least likely to discuss the threats and most likely to include negative efficacy information concerning climate change.

    “e.g., the Wall Street Journal, compared to other U.S. newspapers, was least likely to discuss the threats and most likely to include negative efficacy information concerning climate change.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Feldman et al. (2015) source
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Counterpublics have few in-links from the mainstream public sphere and few out-links to the mainstream.

    “They label this type of network counterpublics, having "few in-links from the mainstream public sphere, while also showing only few out-links to the mainstream."(Kaiser & Puschmann 2017, p. 373).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Kaiser & Puschmann 2017 source
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Constructive perspectives on social problems may remain invisible if any debate is reduced to two opposing poles.

    “Yet, constructive perspectives on social problems may remain invisible if any debate is reduced to two opposing poles.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Tyagi et al. (2020) developed a template to measure affective polarization on Twitter by automatically identifying users' stance on climate change and comparing sentiments in cross-group communications to in-group communication.

    “In another paper, Tyagi et al. (2020) develop a useful template on how to measure this type of affective polarization on Twitter.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Tyagi et al., 2020

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    Neither Habermas nor Mouffe have provided a clear answer to the question of the tipping point between a healthy degree of contestation and destructive conflict.

    “It seems fair to say that, so far, neither Habermas nor Mouffe (to just mention the most prominent voices) have provided a clear answer to this question.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Echo chambers, to the extent that they exist, may not echo so much as silence.

    “"This suggests that 'echo chambers'-to the extent that they exist-may not echo so much as silence" (Tokita et al. 2021, p. 1).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Tokita et al. 2021 source
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Premisecitation

    Naïve calls for depolarization may actually be harmful to democracy.

    “In this case, naı ¨ve calls for depolarization may actually be harmful to democracy (Kreiss & McGregor, 2023).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Kreiss & McGregor, 2023

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Productive debates may not be about a compromise between two extreme positions.

    “Productive debates may not be about a compromise between two extreme positions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Measuring polarization on different dimensions is necessary to explore the relationship between the ideological and affective dimensions and between polarizing statements and interactions.

    “Yet, this is necessary in order to explore the relationship between the ideological and affective dimensions and between polarizing statements and interactions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

    Premisecitation

    Twitter networks are sorted ideologically, but this is not necessarily due to individuals deliberately following others with similar ideologies; instead, networks become sorted as users gradually unfollow ties that distribute dissonant information.

    “Studying Twitter networks, Tokita et al. (2021) observed that networks are sorted ideologically, but this is not necessarily due to individuals deliberately following others with similar ideologies.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Tokita et al., 2021 source
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    Encouraging more interactions across diverging ideological groups will not necessarily reduce polarization; it depends on how these interactions occur.

    “Encouraging more interactions across diverging ideological groups will not necessarily reduce polarization.It all depends on how these interactions occur.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    Past research shows that both digital networks and journalism foster rather than contain discursive polarization.

    “Past research shows how both digital networks and (based on very few studies) journalism foster rather than contain discursive polarization.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The findings from the specific platforms and cases reviewed (Twitter, Facebook, blogs, climate change debates) can be generalized to discursive polarization in public spheres more broadly.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning

    The echo chamber has windows, but they mostly provide distorted views of an unpleasant neighbor.

    “Thus, the echo chamber has windows, but they mostly provide distorted views of an unpleasant neighbor.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The findings from the specific platforms and cases reviewed (Twitter, Facebook, blogs, climate change debates) can be generalized to discursive polarization in public spheres more broadly.
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Climate-change-related blogs show strong homophily, including the absence of certain frames.

    “Kaiser and Puschmann combined hyperlink network analyses of climate-change-related blogs with analyses of the web pages' content and found strong homophily, including the absence of certain frames”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Kaiser, 2017

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Kaiser & Puschmann, 2017 source
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Partisan networks were exponentially growing and becoming more politically homogenous during U.S. elections.

    “Kearney (2019) showed that partisan networks were exponentially growing and becoming more politically homogenous during U.S. elections.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Kearney (2019) source
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    The followership perspective focuses on a structural, and thus more enduring, feature of a network, in contrast to the study of statements amplified by users.

    “In contrast to the study of statements amplified (forwarded) by users, the followership perspective focuses on a structural, and thus more enduring, feature of a network.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Hostility can be investigated in big data corpora by training a machine learning classifier to identify uncivil communication styles.

    “Theocharis et al. (2016) have shown how hostility can be investigated in big data corpora by training a machine learning classifier to identify uncivil communication styles.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Theocharis et al., 2016 source
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    Few studies measure polarization on different dimensions.

    “Few studies measure polarization on different dimensions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Cross-camp hostilities might mostly originate from one camp, but this might still result in increasing levels of affective polarization among both groups.

    “While cross-camp hostilities might mostly originate from one camp, this might still result in increasing levels of affective polarization among both groups.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    Different models agree that there is a degree of polarization, even in an agonist-pluralist model, which is normatively undesirable.

    “Yet, different models agree that there is a degree of polarization, even in an agonist-pluralist model, which is normatively undesirable.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Even rational criticism is perceived as an attack on one's own and responded to with attacks on the other's group identity.

    “Even rational criticism is being perceived as an attack on one's own and responded to with attacks on the other's group identity.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
42 of 42
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Discursive polarization is an important driver of the polarization of individuals' minds and wider networked interactions in society.

    “Nevertheless, we argue that discursive polarization is an important driver of the polarization of the minds of individuals and wider networked interactions in society.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    For polarizing dynamics to take place, different actors and publics need to be interconnected through communication.

    “In any case, for such polarizing dynamics to take place, different actors and publics need to be interconnected through communication.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Media content feeds into the confirmation bias of audiences who select consonant content, process content selectively, and engage in counterarguing if content contradicts one's convictions.

    “Media content feeds into the confirmation bias of audiences who select consonant content, process content selectively, and engage in counterarguing if content contradicts one's convictions.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Polarization ultimately manifests in individuals' diverging attitudes about issues and disaffection towards perceived outgroups.

    “Polarization ultimately manifests in individuals' diverging attitudes about issues and disaffection towards perceived outgroups.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The indicators in the proposed framework are relevant and provide a starting point for identifying degrees and patterns of discursive polarization.

    “The indicators in our framework are not necessarily comprehensive, but, following from the understanding of polarization developed above, they are relevant and provide a starting point for identifying degrees and patterns of discursive polarization.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The findings from the specific platforms and cases reviewed (Twitter, Facebook, blogs, climate change debates) can be generalized to discursive polarization in public spheres more broadly.

    “Past research shows how both digital networks and (based on very few studies) journalism foster rather than contain discursive polarization.”
6 of 6

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

  • Cited page range conflicts with the reference

    Minor

    The cited range runs backward from page 399 to 340; the reference lists the article on pages 394-414, so page 340 is outside it.

  • Cited page falls outside the listed Habermas chapter

    Minor

    The text attributes the observation to page 297, but the cited 2021 chapter is listed as spanning pages 470-500.

2 of 2

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. de Tocqueville, 1997, Democracy in America
  2. Wessler, 2018, Habermas and the media

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Brüggemann, M., & Meyer, H.
Affiliations
Universität Hamburg (DE)
Corresponding author
Brüggemann, Michael
Venue
Communication Theory
Published
2023-06-29
Volume
33
Issue
2-3
Pages
132-142
ISSN
  • 1050-3293 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-2885
OpenAlex
W4382517501
Cited by
60
References
109
Citations by year
2026: 22 · 2025: 24 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 4
FWCI
29.06
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
Communication Theory (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Communication › Media Studies and Communication
  • Social Sciences › Communication › Social Media and Politics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
Keywords
ideological polarization, affective polarization, public sphere, media content analysis, journalism, digital communication networks, social identity construction, political conflict, networked interaction

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-13.

Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-13.

Cited sources are checked by gpt-6-sol.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review