When debates break apart: discursive polarization as a multi-dimensional divergence emerging in and through communication
Open accessAbstract
“Polarization” is a common diagnosis of the state of contemporary societies. Yet, few studies theorize or systematically analyze how polarization evolves in media content. To guide future empirical studies, we introduce a public sphere perspective on polarization. Discursive Polarization, defined as divergence emerging in public communication, may disrupt the public sphere if left untamed. Its analysis should combine the study of ideological polarization (increasing disagreement about issues) and affective polarization (growing disaffection between groups) as evolving in communication. Both processes may be measured in media content. We propose a framework combining the study of journalism and digital communication networks, investigating (1) content and (2) networked interactions regarding both political issues and social identity formation. The exploration of how the public sphere is disrupted in the process of Discursive Polarization may help us to understand the wider social phenomenon of polarization: before societies break apart, debates break apart.
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
The paper argues that polarization should be studied as "discursive polarization"—a multi-dimensional divergence that emerges in and through public communication—and proposes a framework for measuring it in media content. It contends that before societies break apart, debates break apart, so analyzing how ideological and affective polarization unfold in journalism and digital networks can illuminate wider social polarization.
Key findings
- The authors define discursive polarization as divergence emerging in public communication and argue its analysis must combine ideological polarization (increasing disagreement about issues) with affective polarization (growing disaffection between groups), both measured in media content.
- They propose a four-fold framework crossing two dimensions (issues vs. groups) with two communicative practices (statements/content vs. interactions/networks): polarized framing of issues and polarized issue networks (ideological), and polarized group-related content and polarized group-related networks (affective).
- Reviewing prior work, they note that two-thirds of studies systematically reviewed by Kubin & Sikorski (2021) lacked an explicit definition of polarization, and that most polarization studies do not actually study media content.
- They cite evidence that in political discussions in the English-speaking Twittersphere, 10% of users are responsible for 80% of the content distributed (Wojcik & Hughes, 2019), and that echo-chamber research is challenged—digital networks tend toward homophily but hardly constitute closed-off echo chambers.
Methods
- Conceptual/theoretical paper: it develops an analytical framework and research agenda rather than presenting original empirical data.
- Draws on a selective (not comprehensive) review of empirical studies that explicitly relate polarization to media content, focused on automated approaches that could be combined with manual quantitative and qualitative analysis.
- Framework is grounded in a public sphere perspective (Habermas, Hallin's three spheres of debate) and prior work on ideological and affective polarization.
Limitations
- Stated: the framework covers relevant but not all plausible indicators of discursive polarization; it identifies degrees and patterns of polarization but does not say how to normatively evaluate them; and it leaves open where the tipping point lies between healthy contestation and destructive conflict.
- Stated: the review is not a comprehensive meta-analysis but engages with studies the authors found particularly helpful.
- Evident from the text: the paper presents no original empirical measurement, so the proposed indicators remain untested; the authors also note that few studies measure polarization on multiple dimensions, meaning the integrative claims rest on limited prior evidence.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
15 of 56 cited sources checked · 4 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
- Interpretationcitation
The effect of journalists selecting to quote more extreme voices is further amplified by partisan social media users re-distributing extreme voices from the press on social media networks.
“The effect of journalists selecting to quote more extreme voices is then further amplified by partisan social media users re-distributing extreme voices from the press on social media networks (Narayanan et al., 2018).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Narayanan et al., 2018 source
The Abstract (p. 1) reports that Trump-supporter networks and extreme hard-right Facebook pages circulated junk news from sources publishing extremist content. But the paper does not establish that journalists selected extreme voices to quote, that users redistributed those quoted voices from the press, or that this amplified a journalist-selection effect. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Most polarization studies do not actually study media content.
“Surprisingly, most polarization studies do not actually study media content (Kubin & Sikorski, 2021;Wojcieszak et al., 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Kubin & Sikorski, 2021 source
The available Results passage (page unavailable) lists a “Media contents” section but gives no finding about how many polarization studies examine media content. Searches for studies analyzing media content and for content-analysis frequency returned only headings, not evidence for the claim. (LLM, conf=0.72)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Wojcieszak et al., 2018 source
- Premisecitation
Experimental approaches show distorted meta-representations of outgroups on digital platforms can result in disaffection across ideological groups.
“Experimental approaches show e.g., how distorted meta-representations of outgroups on digital platforms can result in disaffection across ideological groups (Bail et al. 2018, Banks et al. 2021).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Bail et al. 2018 source
The Results report that exposure to opposing political views on Twitter significantly increased conservatism among Republicans, while the change among Democrats was not statistically significant. The Discussion and Conclusion says the study could not identify the mechanism behind the Republican backfire effect. It therefore supports an experimental finding of increased polarization, but not the claim that distorted representations of outgroups caused disaffection across ideological groups. (LLM, conf=0.87)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Banks et al. 2021 source
- Premisecitation
Cross-cutting interactions with opposing groups exist, particularly in political discourses and between politically-interested users.
“Cross-cutting interactions with opposing groups exist, particularly in political discourses and between politically-interested users (An et al., 2019;Wu & Resnick, 2021).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites An et al., 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Wu & Resnick, 2021 source
- Premisecitation
In political debates, high-centrality accounts often are partisan media, politicians, and political organizations.
“In political debates, such accounts often are partisan media, politicians, and political organizations (Gallagher et al., 2021).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Gallagher et al., 2021 source
The Sustained Amplification of COVID-19 Elites section (p. 5) finds that journalists and media outlets, followed by left- and right-leaning political accounts, were prominent in US Twitter discussions of COVID-19. The Scientific Expertise and COVID-19 Elites section (p. 7) includes elected officials among those political sources. The paper does not establish that these accounts are typically partisan media or political organizations across political debates generally, and it ranks sustained amplification rather than network centrality. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Interaction sequences with well-reasoned argumentation and deliberation often engendered uncivil conversations.
“van Eck et al. (2020) explored blogs, finding that "interaction sequences with well-reasoned argumentation and deliberation (issue framing) often engendered uncivil conversations (negative identity and relationship framing)" (p.474).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites van Eck et al., 2020 source
- Premisecitation
Interactions with out-groups in polarized networks are primarily of a dismissive and hostile nature.
“Interactions with out-groups in polarized networks are primarily of a dismissive and hostile nature.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checked- cites van Eck et al., 2020 source
The Discussion and Conclusion (p. 20) reports that climate-change blog commenters often dismissed conflicting frames and that shifts to identity framing predominantly cast the other person negatively. The Interaction Strategies section (p. 16) also describes accusations made during frame polarization. But the study concerns climate-change blog comments, not polarized networks generally, and does not establish that out-group interactions overall are primarily dismissive and hostile. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Bru ¨ggemann et al., 2020
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Tyagi et al., 2020
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
Users block, unfollow, and unfriend those on social media who appear to conflict with their own position.
“Other research also illustrates this type of dynamic that users block, unfollow, and unfriend those on social media who appear to conflict with their own position (Bozdag, 2020;Kaiser et al., 2022).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 2 sources checked- cites Bozdag, 2020 source
- cites Kaiser et al., 2022 source
The Discussion says politically dissimilar friends who share misinformation are more likely to be blocked or unfollowed, and the Conclusion also describes unfriending in this context. The claim omits that condition and suggests political disagreement alone prompts these actions. The Limitations section says blocking or unfriending is unlikely to be a regular response to all political news from dissimilar users. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Polarized networks are often dominated by actors with a high degree of centrality ('super-amplifiers').
“Polarized networks are often dominated by actors with a high degree of centrality: "super-amplifiers" (Yoon et al., 2022).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Yoon et al., 2022 source
The Introduction says a small number of “super-amplifiers” play an outsized role in spreading candidate messages, and the Results describe the observed networks as highly polarized. But the Super-amplifiers section defines these actors by retweeting behavior, not high degree centrality; the paper also does not establish that polarized networks are often dominated by them generally. Page numbers were not provided in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
There are comparatively few studies exploring how polarization evolves in media content, particularly with regards to news media.
“Among the wealth of research on polarization, there are comparatively few studies which explore how polarization evolves in media content, particularly with regards to news media (Kubin & Sikorski, 2021;Wojcieszak et al., 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Kubin & Sikorski, 2021 source
The Results passage lists “Media contents” as a topic, but it does not say how many studies examine polarization in media content or news media. Searches for the claimed scarcity and for “Media contents” found no passage in our copy that establishes the comparison. (LLM, conf=0.72)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Wojcieszak et al., 2018 source
- Interpretationreasoning
The climate change debate in the US provides an example of how the lack of shared problem definitions fuels division.
“The climate change debate in the US provides one example of how the lack of shared problem definitions fuels division.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Media content may fuel a self-fulfilling prophecy of polarization.
“Media content may thus fuel a self-fulfilling prophecy of polarization.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
In political discussions within the English-speaking Twittersphere, 10% of users are responsible for 80% of the content distributed.
“In political discussions within the (English-speaking) Twittersphere, 10% of users are responsible for 80% of the content distributed (Wojcik and Hughes, 2019).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Wojcik and Hughes, 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
In the US, extreme advocacy groups received more visibility in newspapers than moderate groups.
“There is evidence for this in the US: extreme advocacy groups received more visibility in newspapers than moderate groups (McCluskey & Kim, 2012)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites McCluskey & Kim, 2012 source
- Premisecitation
Incivility on Fox News polarized mostly the Democrats viewing the channel in a survey experiment.
“Fox News also triggered polarization on the other side: incivility on Fox News polarized mostly the Democrats viewing the channel in a survey experiment (Druckman et al., 2018).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Druckman et al., 2018 source
- Interpretationcitation
Statements about groups and interactions with other users and their statements interact to fuel processes of discursive polarization.
“This also provides a good example of how statements about groups (this section) and interactions with other users and their statements (next section) interact to fuel processes of discursive polarization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
Journalism first reflects polarization by giving social actors a voice that they might use in polarized and polarizing ways.
“Journalism, just like social media networks, first reflects polarization by giving social actors a voice that they might use in polarized and polarizing ways.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
There is a commercial incentive to feed the confirmation bias of partisan audiences.
“Thus, there is a commercial incentive to feed the confirmation bias of partisan audiences.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Changes to single indicators are not sufficient to diagnose the polarization of media debates.
“Changes to single indicators (such as diverging problem definitions) are not sufficient to diagnose the polarization of media debates.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
In contrast to face-to-face social interaction, intergroup contact through digital media networks often fosters polarization, at least in the context of political debates.
“Yet, in contrast to face-to-face social interaction (Balietti et al., 2021;Brankovi c et al., 2020), intergroup-contact through digital media networks often fosters polarization, at least in the context of political debates (Banks et al., 2021;Barbera ´, 2020;Zhang et al., 2022).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Interpretationreasoning
Interactive dynamics of polarization emerge or are contained in the network of communication.
“It is in this network of communication where interactive dynamics of polarization emerge or are contained.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The polarizing logics of journalistic and social media may enhance each other.
“Thus, the polarizing logics of journalistic and social media may enhance each other.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Digital networks sometimes feature intensive intergroup contact.
“and sometimes even feature intensive intergroup contact (van Eck et al., 2021;Walter et al., 2017;Yarchi et al., 2020).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
Extreme conservative members of Congress received more visibility in The New York Times.
“as did extreme (conservative) members of Congress in The New York Times (Wagner & Gruszczynski, 2018).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Wagner & Gruszczynski, 2018 source
- Interpretationreasoning
Even forum media might polarize their audiences through emphasis on extreme voices and conflict as important news factors.
“However, even this type of news outlet might polarize their audiences through emphasis on extreme voices and conflict as important news factors”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Mediated interactions across ideological camps do not necessarily have the beneficial effects hoped for by Sunstein.
“Therefore, mediated interactions across ideological camps do not necessarily have the beneficial effects hoped for by Sunstein (2017).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Sunstein (2017) source
- Premisecitation
Negative affective group perceptions can be identified within large text corpora using machine learning classifiers.
“Yu et al. (2021) demonstrate how negative affective group perceptions can be identified within large text corpora.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Yu et al., 2021
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
Digital networks tend towards homophily.
“Studies find that digital networks do tend towards homophily (Landoli et al., 2021)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Landoli et al., 2021 source
- Premisecitation
Digital networks hardly constitute closed off echo chambers.
“but that they hardly constitute closed off echo chambers (Barbera ´, 2020)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Barbera ´, 2020 source
- Premisecitation
There is mutual group polarization between deniers and mainstream actors in the English-speaking blogosphere.
“While Bru ¨ggemann et al. (2020) find "mutual group polarization" between both deniers and mainstream actors in the English-speaking blogosphere”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bru ¨ggemann et al., 2020
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
To delimit one's own frame from a discursive climate mainstream frame, users allied with other anti-mainstream sources that did not fit their ideological beliefs, forming an 'alliance of antagonism' with other groups.
“Their work also showed that, to delimit one's own frame from a discursive climate mainstream frame, users allied with other anti-mainstream sources that did not fit their ideological beliefs-except from being against a certain mainstream.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kaiser & Puschmann 2017 source
- Interpretationreasoning
Both types of media content enable users to form ideologically homogenous groups, often centered around extreme voices that are nonetheless visible to the outgroup.
“Both types of media content enable users to form ideologically homogenous groups, often centered around extreme voices that are nonetheless visible to the outgroup.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The findings from the specific platforms and cases reviewed (Twitter, Facebook, blogs, climate change debates) can be generalized to discursive polarization in public spheres more broadly.
- Premisecitation
The more a user retweeted ideologically slanted information, the more he or she lost followers from the other ideological camp, sliding into a highly ideologically biased network.
“The more a user retweeted ideologically slanted information, the more he or she was losing followers from the other ideological camp and, thus, unintentionally, sliding into a highly ideologically biased network.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Tokita et al., 2021 source
- Premisecitation
Attacking the other side on Twitter is more common among contrarians.
“Tyagi et al. (2020) find that attacking the other side on Twitter is more common among contrarians.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Tyagi et al., 2020
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
Ideological networks evolve by following (or linking to, in the case of blogs) like-minded people and unfollowing dissenters.
“Ideological networks evolve by following (or linking to, in the case of blogs) like-minded people and unfollowing dissenters.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Tokita et al., 2021 source
- Interpretationreasoning
A high degree of centrality of a few ideologically extreme actors, while lacking connections to other communities that circulate different content, can serve as a proxy of ideological homogeneity of a user's network.
“A high degree of centrality of a few ideologically extreme actors-while simultaneously lacking connections to other communities that circulate different content-can then serve as a proxy of ideological homogeneity of a user's network.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- May combine two claims. 21
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 30
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationVery active partisan users are responsible for perceived dominance of misinformation and incivility and the polarization of social media networks.
“It is precisely these very active partisan users that are found to be responsible for the perceived dominance of misinformation and incivility (Dourado & Salgado, 2021) and the polarization of social media networks (Kaiser et al., 2022).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 2 sources checked- cites Dourado & Salgado, 2021 source
The Spread section says influential users confer visibility on fake content and that public figures helped disseminate several fake-news items. The Discussion also links more engaged conservative networks to the fake-news stories that thrive. Neither section establishes that very active partisan users are responsible for the perceived dominance of misinformation or for incivility. The separate polarization claim is attributed to Kaiser et al., not to this source. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Kaiser et al., 2022 source
The Abstract says partisan blocking of people who share misinformation is likely to contribute to polarization of social media networks. It does not identify very active partisan users as responsible, and presents network polarization as a likely consequence rather than an established outcome. The incivility claim is attributed to a different citation in the citing sentence. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationOn platforms like Twitter, Reddit, or YouTube, polarization dynamics are not primarily ideological disagreements about issues, but dismissive interactions with out-groups.
“Scholars such as Barbera ´(2020) made a strong case that especially on platforms like Twitter, Reddit, or YouTube (An et al., 2019;Wu & Resnick, 2021), polarization dynamics are not primarily ideological disagreements about issues, but dismissive interactions with out-groups.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checked- cites Barbera ´(2020) source
- cites An et al., 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Wu & Resnick, 2021 source
Section 7, “Toxicity as a Measure of Quality” (page not provided), reports that YouTube replies to people of opposing ideologies were much more frequently toxic, supporting the point about dismissive out-group interactions on YouTube. The paper does not establish that such interactions are the primary driver of polarization rather than disagreements about issues. (LLM, conf=0.87)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationMainstream climate change discourses on Twitter call for action, criticize governments, and are discussed within relatively homogenous communities, while climate change denialists interact disproportionately with the mainstream and potentially aim to hijack these debates.
“Meyer et al. (2023) show that, while mainstream discourses about climate change on Twitter call for action, criticize governments, and are discussed within relatively homogenous communities, climate change denialists are trying to interact to a disproportionately high degree with the mainstream and potentially aim to highjack these debates.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Meyer et al., 2023 source
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningBoth ideological and affective polarization dimensions are reflected in discourse as people formulate statements about issues or groups and interact with other participants in a debate.
“Both dimensions are also reflected in discourse as people formulate statements about issues or groups, and interact with other participants in a debate.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenWhether these dynamics occur depends on the type of media content that is circulating in journalistic and social media.
“However, whether these dynamics occur depends on the type of media content that is circulating in journalistic and social media.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationMere exposure to EU news does not polarize everyone, but amplifies extreme views among those media users who already held somewhat extreme views prior to exposure.
“They find that it does not polarize everyone, but that it amplifies extreme views among those media users who already held somewhat extreme views prior to exposure.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Wojcieszak et al. (2018) source
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningDiscursive polarization is rooted in social processes beyond mediated communication and affects society beyond mediated communication.
“Just as this process of discursive polarization is rooted in social processes and contexts beyond mediated communication, it also affects society beyond mediated communication.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationOther countries feature more forum media than the US: outlets consumed by audiences from diverse political backgrounds, preserving relatively neutral arenas of exchange in the public sphere.
“As Fletcher et al. (2020) show, other countries feature more forum media than the US: outlets that are consumed by audiences from diverse political backgrounds, thus preserving relatively neutral arenas of exchange in the public sphere.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Fletcher et al. (2020) source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningWhether polarization harms society and democracy depends on its degree.
“Whether polarization harms society and democracy depends on its degree: if limited in time and social reach, and to certain topics, divergence and contention may just be part of the democratic process.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningIf within a debate the elements of problem definitions, epistemic assumptions, and evaluations diverge starkly between different groups, we would find polarized frames.
“If, within a debate, these elements diverge starkly between different groups, we would find polarized frames.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningAdding affective polarization to Hallin's model results in groups that no longer regard each other as adversaries but as lunatics or enemies.
“Going beyond the model of Dan Hallin and adding the dimension of affective polarization to the picture, this would result in different groups that no longer regard each other as adversaries in a common debate but as lunatics that are not worth talking to or enemies that need to be defeated.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationJournalism may provide extra visibility to extreme voices and crowd out the moderates.
“Mirroring the social media prism mentioned above, journalism may thus provide extra visibility to extreme voices and crowd out the moderates.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningDifferent problem definitions are the core element that distinguishes different frames in a debate.
“These different problem definitions are the core element that distinguishes different frames in a debate.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationFrequent use of the right-wing Fox News channel predicted stronger opposition to the Green New Deal among the Republican audience.
“Frequent use of the right-wing Fox News channel predicted stronger opposition to the Green New Deal among the Republican audience.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gustafson et al. (2019) source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningOffline news media content does not allow for much interaction, so the interactive side of the framework applies to digital media content.
“Offline news media content (e.g., printed newspapers) does not allow for much interaction, so the interactive (right column) side of the framework applies to digital media content.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationnone givenIf left untamed, polarization may ultimately break the democratic public sphere apart.
“If left untamed, however, polarization may ultimately break the democratic public sphere apart.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationPoliticians focus on positive Tweets about their ingroup, while Twitter users tend to retweet negative statements about the outgroup.
“They find that politicians actually focus on positive Tweets about their ingroup, but Twitter users instead tend to retweet negative statements about the outgroup.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Yu et al., 2021
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenIf large groups in society cannot agree on at least some basic facts concerning a contested question, this would be one indicator of polarization.
“If large groups in society cannot agree on at least some basic facts concerning a contested question, this would be one indicator of polarization.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningAt the endpoint of discursive polarization, society would be split into separated communities of communication that regard radically different ideas as consensus, legitimate debate, and beyond legitimate discussion.
“At the endpoint of such a process of discursive polarization, society would be split up into different and largely separated communities of communication that regard radically different ideas as consensus, as part of legitimate debate, and as being beyond legitimate discussion”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningUnlike echo chambers, counter-publics observe and refer to mainstream publics, but these connections are not dialogue.
“Unlike echo chambers, counter-publics observe and refer to mainstream publics, but these connections should not be understood as dialogue taking place.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningDiscursive polarization is a meta-process that combines concepts of divergence on different dimensions of the framework.
“We conceptualize this process as a meta-process that combines concepts of divergence on different -though not necessarily on all -dimensions of our framework.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe Wall Street Journal, compared to other U.S. newspapers, was least likely to discuss the threats and most likely to include negative efficacy information concerning climate change.
“e.g., the Wall Street Journal, compared to other U.S. newspapers, was least likely to discuss the threats and most likely to include negative efficacy information concerning climate change.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Feldman et al. (2015) source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationCounterpublics have few in-links from the mainstream public sphere and few out-links to the mainstream.
“They label this type of network counterpublics, having "few in-links from the mainstream public sphere, while also showing only few out-links to the mainstream."(Kaiser & Puschmann 2017, p. 373).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kaiser & Puschmann 2017 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningConstructive perspectives on social problems may remain invisible if any debate is reduced to two opposing poles.
“Yet, constructive perspectives on social problems may remain invisible if any debate is reduced to two opposing poles.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationTyagi et al. (2020) developed a template to measure affective polarization on Twitter by automatically identifying users' stance on climate change and comparing sentiments in cross-group communications to in-group communication.
“In another paper, Tyagi et al. (2020) develop a useful template on how to measure this type of affective polarization on Twitter.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Tyagi et al., 2020
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenNeither Habermas nor Mouffe have provided a clear answer to the question of the tipping point between a healthy degree of contestation and destructive conflict.
“It seems fair to say that, so far, neither Habermas nor Mouffe (to just mention the most prominent voices) have provided a clear answer to this question.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationEcho chambers, to the extent that they exist, may not echo so much as silence.
“"This suggests that 'echo chambers'-to the extent that they exist-may not echo so much as silence" (Tokita et al. 2021, p. 1).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Tokita et al. 2021 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
PremisecitationNaïve calls for depolarization may actually be harmful to democracy.
“In this case, naı ¨ve calls for depolarization may actually be harmful to democracy (Kreiss & McGregor, 2023).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kreiss & McGregor, 2023
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningProductive debates may not be about a compromise between two extreme positions.
“Productive debates may not be about a compromise between two extreme positions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningMeasuring polarization on different dimensions is necessary to explore the relationship between the ideological and affective dimensions and between polarizing statements and interactions.
“Yet, this is necessary in order to explore the relationship between the ideological and affective dimensions and between polarizing statements and interactions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
PremisecitationTwitter networks are sorted ideologically, but this is not necessarily due to individuals deliberately following others with similar ideologies; instead, networks become sorted as users gradually unfollow ties that distribute dissonant information.
“Studying Twitter networks, Tokita et al. (2021) observed that networks are sorted ideologically, but this is not necessarily due to individuals deliberately following others with similar ideologies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Tokita et al., 2021 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenEncouraging more interactions across diverging ideological groups will not necessarily reduce polarization; it depends on how these interactions occur.
“Encouraging more interactions across diverging ideological groups will not necessarily reduce polarization.It all depends on how these interactions occur.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenPast research shows that both digital networks and journalism foster rather than contain discursive polarization.
“Past research shows how both digital networks and (based on very few studies) journalism foster rather than contain discursive polarization.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The findings from the specific platforms and cases reviewed (Twitter, Facebook, blogs, climate change debates) can be generalized to discursive polarization in public spheres more broadly.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningThe echo chamber has windows, but they mostly provide distorted views of an unpleasant neighbor.
“Thus, the echo chamber has windows, but they mostly provide distorted views of an unpleasant neighbor.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The findings from the specific platforms and cases reviewed (Twitter, Facebook, blogs, climate change debates) can be generalized to discursive polarization in public spheres more broadly.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationClimate-change-related blogs show strong homophily, including the absence of certain frames.
“Kaiser and Puschmann combined hyperlink network analyses of climate-change-related blogs with analyses of the web pages' content and found strong homophily, including the absence of certain frames”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Kaiser, 2017
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Kaiser & Puschmann, 2017 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationPartisan networks were exponentially growing and becoming more politically homogenous during U.S. elections.
“Kearney (2019) showed that partisan networks were exponentially growing and becoming more politically homogenous during U.S. elections.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kearney (2019) source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenThe followership perspective focuses on a structural, and thus more enduring, feature of a network, in contrast to the study of statements amplified by users.
“In contrast to the study of statements amplified (forwarded) by users, the followership perspective focuses on a structural, and thus more enduring, feature of a network.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationHostility can be investigated in big data corpora by training a machine learning classifier to identify uncivil communication styles.
“Theocharis et al. (2016) have shown how hostility can be investigated in big data corpora by training a machine learning classifier to identify uncivil communication styles.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Theocharis et al., 2016 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone givenFew studies measure polarization on different dimensions.
“Few studies measure polarization on different dimensions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningCross-camp hostilities might mostly originate from one camp, but this might still result in increasing levels of affective polarization among both groups.
“While cross-camp hostilities might mostly originate from one camp, this might still result in increasing levels of affective polarization among both groups.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone givenDifferent models agree that there is a degree of polarization, even in an agonist-pluralist model, which is normatively undesirable.
“Yet, different models agree that there is a degree of polarization, even in an agonist-pluralist model, which is normatively undesirable.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationEven rational criticism is perceived as an attack on one's own and responded to with attacks on the other's group identity.
“Even rational criticism is being perceived as an attack on one's own and responded to with attacks on the other's group identity.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
Discursive polarization is an important driver of the polarization of individuals' minds and wider networked interactions in society.
“Nevertheless, we argue that discursive polarization is an important driver of the polarization of the minds of individuals and wider networked interactions in society.”
The paper relies on this without support.
For polarizing dynamics to take place, different actors and publics need to be interconnected through communication.
“In any case, for such polarizing dynamics to take place, different actors and publics need to be interconnected through communication.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Media content feeds into the confirmation bias of audiences who select consonant content, process content selectively, and engage in counterarguing if content contradicts one's convictions.
“Media content feeds into the confirmation bias of audiences who select consonant content, process content selectively, and engage in counterarguing if content contradicts one's convictions.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Polarization ultimately manifests in individuals' diverging attitudes about issues and disaffection towards perceived outgroups.
“Polarization ultimately manifests in individuals' diverging attitudes about issues and disaffection towards perceived outgroups.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The indicators in the proposed framework are relevant and provide a starting point for identifying degrees and patterns of discursive polarization.
“The indicators in our framework are not necessarily comprehensive, but, following from the understanding of polarization developed above, they are relevant and provide a starting point for identifying degrees and patterns of discursive polarization.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The findings from the specific platforms and cases reviewed (Twitter, Facebook, blogs, climate change debates) can be generalized to discursive polarization in public spheres more broadly.
“Past research shows how both digital networks and (based on very few studies) journalism foster rather than contain discursive polarization.”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Cited page range conflicts with the reference
MinorThe cited range runs backward from page 399 to 340; the reference lists the article on pages 394-414, so page 340 is outside it.
“(as summarized in Bru ¨ggemann & Wessler, 2014, pp. 399-340).”
“Bru ¨ggemann, M., & Wessler, H. (2014). Transnational communication as deliberation, ritual, and strategy. Communication Theory, 24(4), 394-414.”
Cited page falls outside the listed Habermas chapter
MinorThe text attributes the observation to page 297, but the cited 2021 chapter is listed as spanning pages 470-500.
“Habermas' (2021) observation of semi-permeable publics ("Halbo ¨ffentlichkeiten," p. 297)”
“Habermas, J. (2021). U ¨berlegungen und Hypothesen zu einem erneuten Strukturwandel der politischen O ¨ffentlichkeit. In M. Seeliger & S. Sevignani (Eds.), Ein neuer Strukturwandel der O ¨ffentlichkeit? Sonderband Leviathan 37. j 2021 (1st ed., pp. 470-500).”
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Between calls for action and narratives of denial: Climate change attention structures on Twitter
Meyer, H., Peach, A. K., Guenther, L., Kedar, H. E., & Brüggemann, M. (2023) · Media and Communication · doi:10.17645/mac.v11i1.6111 · Cited by 33 · see citing works
Self-citationMutual Group Polarization in the Blogosphere: Tracking the Hoax Discourse on Climate Change
Brüggemann, M., Elgesem, D., Bienzeisler, N., et al. (2020) · International journal of communication · Cited by 29 · see citing works
Self-citation‘Time to Wake Up’: Climate change advocacy in a polarized Congress, 1996-2015
Guber, D. L., Bohr, J., & Dunlap, R. E. (2020) · Environmental Politics · doi:10.1080/09644016.2020.1786333 · Cited by 26 · see citing works
Echo chamber effects in the climate change blogosphere
van Eck, C. W., Mulder, B. C., & van der Linden, S. (2021) · Environmental Communication · doi:10.1080/17524032.2020.1861048 · Cited by 25 · see citing works
Dourado, T., & Salgado, S. (2021) · The Communication Review · doi:10.1080/10714421.2021.1981705 · Cited by 23 · see citing works
Super-amplifiers! The role of Twitter extended party networks in political elections
Yoon, N., Hemsley, J., Smith, A., Simpson, E., & Eakins, J. (2022) · Policy & Internet · doi:10.1002/poi3.295 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
Evidence of political moderation over time: Utah’s immigration debate online
Harris, B. D., Morgan, C. V., & Gibbs, B. G. (2013) · New Media & Society · doi:10.1177/1461444813504262 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
Zhang, X., Lin, W.-Y., & Dutton, W. H. (2022) · Social Media + Society · doi:10.1177/20563051221114391 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
Branković, M., Žeželj, I. L., & Turjačanin, V. (2020) · Journal of Theoretical Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/jts5.60 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Framing Food in the News: Still Keeping the Politics out of the Broccoli
Brüggemann, M., Kunert, J., & Sprengelmeyer, L. (2022) · Journalism Practice · doi:10.1080/17512786.2022.2153074 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Self-citationPolitical Opinions of Us and Them and the Influence of Digital Media Usage
Valdez, A. S. C., Burbach, L., & Ziefle, M. (2018) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-91521-0_15 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
The Making of a European Public Sphere: References
Koopmans, R., & Statham, P. (2010) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511761010.018 · Cited by 5
Protestzwitschern. Wie Twitter-Netzwerke zur Eskalation der G20-Proteste in Hamburg 2017 beitrugen
Hartmann, E., & Lang, F. (2020) · sozialpolitik ch · doi:10.18753/2297-8224-151 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Facts and Where to Find Them: Empirical Research on Internet Platforms and Content Moderation
Keller, D., & Leerssen, P. (2020) · Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) · doi:10.1017/9781108890960
Wu, S., & Resnick, P. (2021) · Harvard Dataverse · doi:10.7910/dvn/kf5jc5
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- de Tocqueville, 1997, Democracy in America
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Esau, K., Choucair, T. D. S., Vilkins, S., Svegaard, S. F. K., Bruns, A., O’Connor-Farfan, K. S., & Lubicz-Zaorski, C. (2024) · Information Communication & Society · doi:10.1080/1369118x.2024.2413127 · Cited by 45 · see citing works
“Although some attempts to conceptualize and define polarization in the context of digital communication have been made (see Brüggemann & Meyer, 2023; Yarchi et al., 2021), it often seems that political science concepts of polarization are implicitly assumed, but not explicitly operationalized.”
CSR Communication and the Polarization of Public Discourses: Introduction to the Special Issue
Schoeneborn, D., Golob, U., Trittin‐Ulbrich, H., Wenzel, M., & O’Connor, A. (2024) · Management Communication Quarterly · doi:10.1177/08933189241268503 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
“Polarization threatens Western democracies because it renders the achievement of compromises and consensus through public discourse increasingly dif fi cult (Brüggemann & Meyer, 2023; Habermas, 2022).”
Durrheim, K. L., & Quayle, M. (2025) · European Review of Social Psychology · doi:10.1080/10463283.2025.2499332 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
Esau, K. (2025) · Social Media + Society · doi:10.1177/20563051251332421 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
“However, research on polarization within the field of media and communication studies is still in its early stages, and thus far, there have been limited opportunities for conceptualization through this specific lens (see, for example, Brüggemann & Meyer, 2023; Yarchi et al., 2021).”
Durrheim, K., & Schuld, M. (2025) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.70000 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
“The language people use to express their opinions on social media is arguably even more foundational to polarization than structural divisions in interaction networks (Brüggemann & Meyer, 2023).”
From disruptive protests to disrupted news frames: Comparing German news on climate protests
Meyer, H., Farjam, M., Rauxloh, H., & Brüggemann, M. (2025) · Journalism · doi:10.1177/14648849251372805 · Cited by 12 · see citing works
“Increasing anger in communication — understood as negative affective perceptions — can be detected in large text corpora using machine learning classi fi ers (Brüggemann and Meyer, 2023).”
InfluentialSelf-citationMeyer, H., Niemann-Lenz, J., Rodeck, L., et al. (2025) · Information Communication & Society · doi:10.1080/1369118x.2025.2553016 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
“Algorithmic recommendations promote ideological confirmation among recipients and aid the mobilization of supporters (Krämer, 2017), while triggering the out-group (Brüggemann & Meyer, 2023).”
InfluentialSelf-citationThe digital public sphere, universities and intellectualising the public
Murphy, M. G., & Costa, C. (2025) · Studies in Higher Education · doi:10.1080/03075079.2025.2500694 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“In this scenario, separate communities can ‘regard radically different ideas as consensus, as part of legitimate debate, and as being beyond legitimate discussion’ (Brüggemann and Meyer 2023, 133).”
Kirchmair, T., Koban, K., & Matthes, J. (2024) · Communications · doi:10.1515/commun-2023-0133 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Meyer, H., Pröschel, L., & Brüggemann, M. (2025) · Social Media + Society · doi:10.1177/20563051251337400 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Self-citationEngagement with political videos on TikTok during the 2025 German federal election
Solovev, K., Drolsbach, C., Demirel, E., & Pröllochs, N. (2026) · EPJ Data Science · doi:10.1140/epjds/s13688-026-00632-7 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Matthes, J., Kaskeleviciute, R., Knupfer, H., & Masood, M. (2023) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12950 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Esau, K., Meyer, H., Farjam, M., Bruns, A., Rauxloh, H., & Brüggemann, M. (2025) · Media International Australia · doi:10.1177/1329878x251377504 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Self-citationWeder, F., & Stranzl, J. (2025) · Public Relations Review · doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2025.102614 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Intrastate conflict and transformation of the media system: The case of Afghanistan
Farag, T., Neuberger, C., Kretzschmar, S., et al. (2025) · Media War & Conflict · doi:10.1177/17506352251362600 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Lu, X., Zhao, W., van der Meer, T. G. L. A., & Jin, Y. (2025) · Journal of Communication Management · doi:10.1108/jcom-09-2024-0160 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Meyer, H., Pröschel, L., & Brüggemann, M. (2023) · doi:10.31219/osf.io/nd68z · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Self-citationPamirzad, Q. H., Susyall, G. A., & Hakimi, A. B. (2025) · Journal of Information Communication and Ethics in Society · doi:10.1108/jices-01-2025-0013 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Revers, M., & Coleman, S. (2025) · American Journal of Cultural Sociology · doi:10.1057/s41290-025-00264-w · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“Brüggemann and Meyer (2023) recently suggested an analytical framework for discursive polarization, which links ideological and affective polarization regarding substantive and structural dimensions of communication (see also Yarchi et al. 2021).”
Polarization of Muslim Voters in the 2024 Regional Elections in North Maluku
Deni, A. (2025) · POLITICOS Jurnal Politik dan Pemerintahan · doi:10.22225/politicos.5.1.2025.26-44 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Dynamics of Electoral Polarisation in Climate Policy Discourse: A Temporal Network Analysis
Drecker, P. (2025) · Politics and Governance · doi:10.17645/pag.10004 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“As such, people also tend to avoid interacting with accounts that have different substantive positions than their own or have opposite social identities (Brüggemann & Meyer, 2023).”
Media and power in times of hegemonic crisis: exploring contentious climate politics on Twitter
Tegelberg, M., Kunelius, R., & Pohjonen, M. (2024) · Journal of Political Power · doi:10.1080/2158379x.2024.2349300 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“While complex casual factors evidently demand closer scrutiny (Brüggemann and Meyer 2023), what connects these explanations thus far is mutual recognition of the fragmentation and polarization of public attention in digital social networks.”
BackgroundAndreasen, S. M. (2024) · Journal of Language Aggression and Conflict · doi:10.1075/jlac.00117.and · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Bassolas, A., Massachs, J., Cozzo, E., & Vicens, J. (2025) · Royal Society Open Science · doi:10.1098/rsos.241974 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Who do we trust on climate change, and why?
MacInnes, S., Hornsey, M. J., Bretter, C., Pearson, S. G., Fielding, K. S., & Bersoff, D. M. (2025) · Global Environmental Change · doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2025.103096 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
What Kind of Depolarization Should We Aim For? Making Communication Transformative
Brüggemann, M., van Eck, C. W., Gelovani, S., Meyer, H., Muddiman, A., Pröschel, L., & Weßler, H. (2026) · Political Communication · doi:10.1080/10584609.2026.2617224 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“We focus on discursive polarization (i.e., polarization as emerging in communication, Brüggemann & Meyer, 2023) and address this gap by calling for Democratic Transformative Communication.”
Self-citationMariani, C., Aliaga, E. A., & Mancini, M. (2026) · International Journal of Project Management · doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2026.102847 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Knupfer, H., Kaskeleviciute, R., & Matthes, J. (2023) · Journalism · doi:10.1177/14648849231221922 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“Differences in fear levels between minority and majority group members as a result of exposure to RWE news may exacerbate intergroup con fl icts, ultimately impacting social cohesion and fostering polarization (Brüggemann and Meyer, 2023; Schmuck et al., 2020).”
Nielsen, S. B. (2024) · Journalism · doi:10.1177/14648849241230802 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“Another reason is that it may create a divergence that ultimately breaks the debate between disagreeing voices apart (Brüggemann and Meyer, 2023).”
Inconspicuous Terrorists? Effects of Terrorism News on Attitudes and Stereotypes About Muslims
Kaskeleviciute, R., Knupfer, H., & Matthes, J. (2024) · Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly · doi:10.1177/10776990241271111 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“There is a strong concern that such reporting may contain or perpetuate preju-dices, especially after terrorist attacks (Ahmed & Matthes, 2017) and in platformized (Schneiders et al., 2023) as well as polarized public spheres (Brüggemann & Meyer, 2023).”
Hanusch, F., & Katsman, A. (2024) · The new · doi:10.14361/9783839469439 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Shoai, A. (2025) · International Journal of Public Opinion Research · doi:10.1093/ijpor/edaf044 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Revers, M., & Coleman, S. R. (2023) · doi:10.31235/osf.io/czn3a
Delving deeper into OpIndia.com’s representation of Hindus and Muslims
K., J. E., & Majumder, S. (2024) · Discourse & Society · doi:10.1177/09579265241287560
Tackling Discoursive Polarization: Welcome Radical Ideas but not Aggression
Brüggemann, M. (2024) · The new · doi:10.1515/9783839469439-008
Self-citationAffective polarization in a word: Open-ended and self-coded evaluations of partisan affect
Kiesel, S., & Amlani, S. (2025) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0310772
Vier Perspektiven auf den Zusammenhang von Polarisierung und Online-Medien – Ein Literaturüberblick
Krämer, S. (2025) · Politische Vierteljahresschrift · doi:10.1007/s11615-025-00599-6
Weßler, H., Esau, K., & Gelovani, S. (2025) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-18017-1_24-1
Matthes, J., Nguyen, G., Koban, K., Meerson, R., Khaleghipour, M., Garner, D. S., Bührer, S., & Kirchmair, T. (2025) · Computers in Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.chb.2025.108704 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
1Discourse and polarisation: An introduction
Belmonte, I. A., Porto, M. D., & Romano, M. (2025) · De Gruyter eBooks · doi:10.1515/9783111556246-001
Shoai, A., Suárez-Álvarez, R., & Dvoskin, G. (2025) · Perspectivas de la comunicación · doi:10.56754/0718-4867.2025.3755
The entangled dynamics leading to the sedimentation of polarisation on political Reddit
Dehghan, E., Carlon, D., Kasianenko, K., Nagappa, A., & Suresh, V. P. (2026) · Information, Communication & Society · doi:10.1080/1369118x.2026.2623523
“…logic that underpins the manifestation of various dynamics, types, or forms of polarisation, whether affective (Iyengar et al., 2019; Yarchi et al., 2021), discursive (Brüggemann & Meyer, 2023), destructive (Esau et al., 2024), interactional or positional (Yarchi et al., 2021), or otherwise.”
What to do about polarization? Evaluating the evidence base of recommendations for depolarization
van Eck, C. W., Meyer, H., & Brüggemann, M. (2026) · Annals of the International Communication Association · doi:10.1093/anncom/wlag012
Self-citationManaging Dissent: Institutional Control and Political Discourse Polarisation in Uganda
walusimbi, A., Giuranno, M. G., & Ravenda, D. (2026) · The Journal of Development Studies · doi:10.1080/00220388.2026.2658549
Polarization in Online Communication
Erdoğan, E. (2026) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-52643-5_193-1
Entscheidungsfindung der Politik in der Coronapandemie: State of the art?
Wiedemann, P. M. (2026) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-47239-9_26-1
Media Systems and Violent Conflicts: A Theoretical Framework and Patterns of Transformation
Farag, T., Neuberger, C., Kretzschmar, S., & Sehl, A. (2026) · The International Journal of Press/Politics · doi:10.1177/19401612261452109
Lv, M., & Yang, G. (2026) · Digital Scholarship in the Humanities · doi:10.1093/llc/fqag085 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Kim, A. E., Kim, J., & Connolly, D. (2026) · Religions · doi:10.3390/rel17070765
How language divides: Asymmetries in the differentiating power of opinion discourse
Durrheim, K. L., Morselli, D., Schuld, M., Mafunda, M. C., Torres, A. M., Beramendi, M., Quayle, M., Sepahpour‐Fard, M., & Ohamadike, N. (2026) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.70171
“Here, we redirect attention to the externalized expression of opinion—how beliefs are made public in language and interaction (cf. Brüggemann & Meyer, 2023).”
A Human-Centered Approach to Understanding Citizens’ Responses to Public Communication Challenges
Balčytienė, A., Bunevičienė, I., Krakovsky, C., & Lindmeyer, M. S. (2026) · Communications · doi:10.1515/commun-2026-0012
“…and deliberation (Camicia, 2020), the abundance of ongoing disputes and conflicts in the public sphere needs heightened attention: Too much disa-greement threatens to destabilize the common ground required to build a community (Brüggemann and Meyer, 2023; Röllicke, 2023; Kish Bar-On et al., 2024).”
Intraparty polarization on climate change in Republican Party discourse, 1987–2016
Bryant, J. C. (2026) · Environmental Politics · doi:10.1080/09644016.2026.2701573
Measuring polarization in epistemic social networks: The case of the US 2024 presidential elections
Zaytsev, D., Kuskova, V. V., Khvatsky, G. S., & Chawla, N. V. (2026) · Network Science · doi:10.1017/nws.2026.10039
“Discursive polarization highlights divergences in the language, narratives, and frames through which issues are articulated (Meyer and Brüggemann, 2023, 2025).”
When hype polarises: the polarisation of moral evaluations around hyped innovations
Gualtieri, G., Dalpiaz, E., & Hampel, C. E. (2026) · Innovation · doi:10.1080/14479338.2026.2710603
From Antagonistic Talk to Cooperative Acts: The Effect of Polarization Cues on Newspaper Audiences
Farjam, M., & Meyer, H. (2026) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-026-10197-w · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Self-citationFarjam, M., Meyer, H., Segesten, A. D., & Brüggemann, M. (2026) · Journalism · doi:10.1177/14648849261491026
Self-citationSkovgaard, J., Zelli, F., Wyatt, S. W., Hickmann, T., Johansson, M., Krause, T., Smith, H. G., Terskaia, A., & Wallin, I. (2026) · Forest Policy and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.forpol.2026.103904
Johansson, K., Berglez, P., & Grubbström, A. (2026) · Forest Policy and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.forpol.2026.103924
Meyer, H. (2026) · Information Communication & Society · doi:10.1080/1369118x.2026.2737399
Self-citation
- Authors
- Brüggemann, M., & Meyer, H.
- Affiliations
- Universität Hamburg (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Brüggemann, Michael
- Venue
- Communication Theory
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2023-06-29
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 2-3
- Pages
- 132-142
- ISSN
- 1050-3293 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2885
- OpenAlex
- W4382517501
- Semantic Scholar
- b42b4225283fe2ae470c73b14b9145f00cb62fa4
- Cited by
- 60
- References
- 109
- Citations by year
- 2026: 22 · 2025: 24 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 4
- FWCI
- 29.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Communication Theory (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Communication › Media Studies and Communication
- Social Sciences › Communication › Social Media and Politics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Keywords
- ideological polarization, affective polarization, public sphere, media content analysis, journalism, digital communication networks, social identity construction, political conflict, networked interaction
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