Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
La creciente alineación entre identidades partidistas e identidades sociales intensifica la lógica de «nosotros frente a ellos», reforzando dinámicas de hostilidad afectiva y debilitando la deliberación pública.
“Autores como Mason (2018) sostienen que la creciente alineación entre identidades partidistas e identidades sociales intensifica la lógica de «nosotros frente a ellos», reforzando dinámicas de hostilidad afectiva y debilitando la deliberación pública.”
From Polarización política y afectiva en España: una revisión sistemática exploratoria (2026) · cites this paper as Mason (2018)
Growing sorting of social identities and ideological positions within party groups reduces cross-cutting identities, increases intragroup homogeneity, and exacerbates the sensation of intergroup estrangement.
“a) the grow-ing sorting of social identities and ideological positions within party groups, which reduces cross-cutting identities, increases intragroup homogeneity, and exacerbates the sensation of intergroup estrangement (Mason, 2018;Harteveld, 2021)”
From ¿Demasiado lejos? Cómo la polarización mal percibida alimenta la polarización afectiva en España (2025) · cites this paper as Mason, 2018
The observations about mutual amplification of polarization types are consistent with social identity theory, which emphasizes the tendency for people to sort themselves into distinct groups that compete for symbolic and material resources.
“These observations about the ways in which different types of political polarization amplify others are consistent with social identity theory, which emphasizes the tendency for people to sort themselves into distinct groups that compete for symbolic and material resources88–92.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [91]
The correlation between partisanship and ideology has risen from roughly r = 0.4 in 1988 to r = 0.6 in 2012.
“Consequently, the correlation between partisanship and ideology has risen from roughly r = 0.4 in 1988 to r = 0.6 in 2012 (refs.47,91).”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [91]
Group-justifying mechanisms involve group-serving tendencies to advance and maintain the interests and assumptions of the in-group against one or more out-groups.
“Group-justifying mechanisms, which are central to social identity theory88,90,91,94, involve group-serving tendencies to advance and maintain the interests and assumptions of the in-group against one or more out-groups (‘us versus them’).”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [91]
Processes such as self-categorization, in-group favouritism and out-group derogation contribute to political polarization by encouraging partisans to engage in various forms of motivated reasoning on behalf of their political party or ideological group.
“Processes such as self-categorization, in-group favouritism and out-group derogation contribute to political polarization by encouraging partisans to engage in various forms of motivated reasoning — including selective information exposure or avoidance and confirmation or disconfirmation biases — on behalf of their political party or ideological group3,39,91,94,141–144.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [91]
The American public has become more polarized over the past few decades.
“A growing body of research suggests that the American public has become more polarized over the past few decades (1, 2).”
From Troll and divide: the language of online polarization (2022) · cites this paper as [2]
Cited by
Sorted by citations
The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States
Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N., & Westwood, S. J. (2019) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-073034 · Cited by 3,317 · see citing works
Exposure to opposing views on social media can increase political polarization
Bail, C. A., Argyle, L. P., Brown, T. W., Bumpus, J. P., Chen, H., Hunzaker, M. B. F., Lee, J., Mann, M., Merhout, F., & Volfovsky, A. (2018) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1804840115 · Cited by 1,863 · see citing works
Jardina, A. E. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108645157 · Cited by 1,207 · see citing works
Political Sectarianism in America
Finkel, E. J., Bail, C. A., Cikara, M., Ditto, P. H., Iyengar, S., Klar, S., Mason, L., McGrath, M. C., Nyhan, B., Rand, D. G., et al. (2020) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.abe1715 · Cited by 931 · see citing works
Self-citationOut of One, Many: Using Language Models to Simulate Human Samples
Argyle, L. P., Busby, E. C., Fulda, N., Gubler, J. R., Rytting, C., & Wingate, D. (2023) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1017/pan.2023.2 · Cited by 783 · see citing works
“Further, people often talk about their own political party in more positive ways than the other party, in line with other research [29, 30].”
ResultPartisanship, health behavior, and policy attitudes in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic
Gadarian, S. K., Goodman, S. W., & Pepinsky, T. B. (2021) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0249596 · Cited by 744 · see citing works
Gollwitzer, A., Martel, C., Brady, W. J., Pärnamets, P., Freedman, I. G., Knowles, E. D., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2020) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-020-00977-7 · Cited by 609 · see citing works
The role of (social) media in political polarization: A systematic review
Kubin, E., & von Sikorski, C. (2021) · Annals of the International Communication Association · doi:10.1080/23808985.2021.1976070 · Cited by 610 · see citing works
“The second is affective polarization, which is based on work considering the role of identity in politics (Mason, 2018), and how identity salience within groups (e.g. political parties) can exacerbate out-group animosity (e.g. Gaertner et al., 1993; Iyengar et al., 2012).”
BackgroundOne Tribe to Bind Them All: How Our Social Group Attachments Strengthen Partisanship
Mason, L., & Wronski, J. (2018) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12485 · Cited by 521 · see citing works
Self-citationDivided by the vote: Affective polarization in the wake of the Brexit referendum
Hobolt, S. B., Leeper, T. J., & Tilley, J. (2021) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123420000125 · Cited by 496 · see citing works
“This has been shown to function as a social identity that is separable from issue positions (Kinder and Kalmoe 2017; Malka and Lelkes 2010; Mason 2018).”
BackgroundInfluentialAmerican Affective Polarization in Comparative Perspective
Gidron, N., Adams, J., & Horne, W. (2020) · doi:10.1017/9781108914123 · Cited by 481 · see citing works
Affective polarization, local contexts and public opinion in America
Druckman, J. N., Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., Levendusky, M., & Ryan, J. B. (2020) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-020-01012-5 · Cited by 463 · see citing works
Echo chambers and viral misinformation: Modeling fake news as complex contagion
Törnberg, P. (2018) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0203958 · Cited by 430 · see citing works
“This majority effect becomes especially clear if we think of political discussions and online interaction not as much as a spread of information, but as having elements of group identity and belonging, an understanding that is becoming increasingly prevalent throughout the social sciences [48, 49].”
BackgroundElusive consensus: Polarization in elite communication on the COVID-19 pandemic
Green, J., Edgerton, J. F., Naftel, D., Shoub, K., & Cranmer, S. (2020) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.abc2717 · Cited by 378 · see citing works
Cross-Country Trends in Affective Polarization
Boxell, L., Gentzkow, M., & Shapiro, J. M. (2024) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_01160 · Cited by 457 · see citing works
Frenemies: How Social Media Polarizes America
Settle, J. E. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108560573 · Cited by 377 · see citing works
Social Media, Echo Chambers, and Political Polarization
Barberá, P. (2020) · Social Media and Democracy · doi:10.1017/9781108890960.004 · Cited by 373 · see citing works
“…distance between partisan groups is large, debates are won based on identities and not on substantive arguments and empirical evidence, which in turn can have negative economic consequences such as increased inequality and unemployment (Enns and McAvoy 2012 ; Bonica et al. 2013 ; Mason 2018 ).”
InfluentialThe Nature of Affective Polarization: Disentangling Policy Disagreement from Partisan Identity
Dias, N., & Lelkes, Y. (2022) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12628 · Cited by 338 · see citing works
Persily, N., Tucker, J. A., Guess, A. M., Lyons, B. A., Barberá, P., Siegel, A. A., Woolley, S., Fowler, E. F., Franz, M. M., Ridout, T. N., et al. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108890960 · Cited by 464 · see citing works
How digital media drive affective polarization through partisan sorting
Törnberg, P. (2022) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2207159119 · Cited by 288 · see citing works
“According to scholars such as Mason (18), sorting results in the broadening and deepening in society of a sense of fundamental difference and a mutual questioning—or even denial—of the other side’s legitimacy.”
BackgroundCognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts
Jost, J. T., Baldassarri, D. S., & Druckman, J. N. (2022) · Nature Reviews Psychology · doi:10.1038/s44159-022-00093-5 · Cited by 276 · see citing works
Partisanship as a Social Identity: Implications for Polarization
West, E. A., & Iyengar, S. (2020) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-020-09637-y · Cited by 265 · see citing works
“Democrats and Republicans differ not only in their politics, but also in their ethnicity, gender, age, and place of residence (Mason 2018a).”
BackgroundMisinformation, Disinformation, and Online Propaganda
Guess, A. M., & Lyons, B. A. (2020) · Social Media and Democracy · doi:10.1017/9781108890960.003 · Cited by 284 · see citing works
Interventions reducing affective polarization do not necessarily improve anti-democratic attitudes
Voelkel, J. G., Chu, J., Stagnaro, M. N., Mernyk, J. S., Redekopp, C., Pink, S. L., Druckman, J. N., Rand, D. G., & Willer, R. (2022) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-022-01466-9 · Cited by 255 · see citing works
Peterson, E., & Iyengar, S. (2019) · doi:10.31235/osf.io/pmn7h · Cited by 241 · see citing works
Identity as Dependent Variable: How Americans Shift Their Identities to Align with Their Politics
Egan, P. J. (2019) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12496 · Cited by 234 · see citing works
Clinton, J., Cohen, J., Lapinski, J., & Trussler, M. (2020) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.abd7204 · Cited by 195 · see citing works
Wojcieszak, M., & Warner, B. R. (2020) · Political Communication · doi:10.1080/10584609.2020.1760406 · Cited by 232 · see citing works
Kim, J. W., Guess, A. M., Nyhan, B. J., & Reifler, J. (2021) · Journal of Communication · doi:10.1093/joc/jqab034 · Cited by 221 · see citing works
“Although Americans report overwhelming agreement that the public is sharply divided along partisan lines (Pew Research Center 2019), the best available evidence suggests that partisans exaggerate the extremism of the other side (Ahler 2014; Levendusky & Malhotra 2015; Mason 2018).”
BackgroundPluralistic Collapse: The “Oil Spill” Model of Mass Opinion Polarization
DellaPosta, D. (2020) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.1177/0003122420922989 · Cited by 219 · see citing works
“…and Brewer 2002) suggest such a collapse of previously cross-cutting identities will likely reduce outgroup tolerance and might thereby account for the increasingly harsh tenor of political disagreement perceived by scholars of affective polarization (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Mason 2018).”
BackgroundUscinski, J. E., Enders, A. M., Seelig, M. I., Klofstad, C. A., Funchion, J. R., Everett, C., Wuchty, S., Premaratne, K., & Murthi, M. N. (2021) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12616 · Cited by 205 · see citing works
From 'having' to 'being': self-worth and the current crisis of American society.
Lamont, M. (2019) · British Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1111/1468-4446.12667 · Cited by 134 · see citing works
“There is urgency in fostering inclusion at a time when the American public is experiencing a high degree of political polarization: in Uncivil Agreement, Lilliana Mason (2018) demonstrates increased antagonism across the political spectrum in recent decades and finds that oppositions are more grounded in identities an…”
BackgroundPersonal experiences bridge moral and political divides better than facts
Kubin, E., Puryear, C., Schein, C., & Gray, K. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2008389118 · Cited by 209 · see citing works
Populism and nationalism in a comparative perspective: a scholarly exchange
Bonikowski, B., Halikiopoulou, D., Kaufmann, E., & Rooduijn, M. (2018) · Nations and Nationalism · doi:10.1111/nana.12480 · Cited by 198 · see citing works
Party Animals? Extreme Partisan Polarization and Dehumanization
Martherus, J., Martinez, A. G., Piff, P. K., & Theodoridis, A. G. (2019) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-019-09559-4 · Cited by 185 · see citing works
“…polarization” has coincided with increased social and ideological sorting (Bishop 2009; Hetherington and Rudolph 2015; Levendusky 2013, 2009; Mason 2016, 2018; Mason and Wronski 2018), elite polarization (Hetherington 2001; Hetherington and Rudolph 2015), greater access to partisan news…”
BackgroundCarey, J., Clayton, K., Helmke, G., Nyhan, B., Sanders, M. S., & Stokes, S. (2019) · Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties · doi:10.1080/17457289.2020.1790577 · Cited by 135 · see citing works
“Though these fi ndings are contested (e.g. Voeten 2016), there is little doubt that Americans are becoming more partisan (e.g. Pew Research Center 2017) and are more likely to have strong feelings of in-group loyalty and out-group rivalry (Mason 2018).”
Labor Unions and White Racial Politics
Frymer, P., & Grumbach, J. M. (2020) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12537 · Cited by 185 · see citing works
“Party identification is a dominant predictor of vote choice and policy attitudes (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004; Mason 2018), and candidates and other party elites strongly influence the attitudes of their bases (Broockman and Butler 2017; Lenz 2013).”
BackgroundRationalizing Democracy: The Perceptual Bias and (Un)Democratic Behavior
Krishnarajan, S. (2022) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055422000806 · Cited by 177 · see citing works
“…focus on how policy preferences induce citizens to rationalize their democracy perceptions leaves questions about whether the dynamics are similar with respect to partisan identities (see e.g., Dias and Lelkes 2022; Mason 2018; Tappin, Pennycook, and Rand 2020a; 2020b; Webster and Abramowitz 2017).”
BackgroundStecula, D. A., & Pickup, M. A. (2021) · Research & Politics · doi:10.1177/2053168021993979 · Cited by 178 · see citing works
Interventions to reduce partisan animosity
Hartman, R., Blakey, W., Womick, J., Bail, C., Finkel, E. J., Han, H., Sarrouf, J., Schroeder, J., Sheeran, P., Van Bavel, J. J., et al. (2022) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-022-01442-3 · Cited by 171 · see citing works
Krupnikov, Y., & Ryan, J. B. (2022) · doi:10.1017/9781108923323 · Cited by 175 · see citing works
Us Over Here Versus Them Over There…Literally: Measuring Place Resentment in American Politics
Munis, B. K. (2020) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-020-09641-2 · Cited by 163 · see citing works
“…on animus between partisans, JohnsonGrey’s (2018) measure focusing on animus between ideological identities (liberal v conservative) is applicable to studying affective polarization given the degree to which the parties are now sorted in terms of ideological identity (Levendusky 2009; Mason 2018).”
BackgroundInfluentialWho Dislikes Whom? Affective Polarization between Pairs of Parties in Western Democracies
Gidron, N., Adams, J., & Horne, W. (2022) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123422000394 · Cited by 170 · see citing works
Partisan selective exposure in online news consumption: evidence from the 2016 presidential campaign
Peterson, E., Goel, S., & Iyengar, S. (2019) · Political Science Research and Methods · doi:10.1017/psrm.2019.55 · Cited by 156 · see citing works
Partisan Dehumanization in American Politics
Cassese, E. C. (2019) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-019-09545-w · Cited by 148 · see citing works
A review and provocation: On polarization and platforms
Kreiss, D., & McGregor, S. C. (2024) · New Media & Society · doi:10.1177/14614448231161880 · Cited by 151 · see citing works
“…science research, but a spate of recent work argues for understanding democracy primarily through identity-based frameworks (Achen and Bartels, 2016; Egan, 2020; Jardina, 2019; Kreiss et al., 2020; Kuo and Marwick, 2021; Lane et al., 2021; Mason, 2018; Reddi et al., 2021; Sides et al., 2018).”
BackgroundInfluentialPoland: A Case of Top-Down Polarization
Tworzecki, H. (2019) · The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science · doi:10.1177/0002716218809322 · Cited by 143 · see citing works
Activating Animus: The Uniquely Social Roots of Trump Support
Mason, L., Wronski, J., & Kane, J. (2021) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055421000563 · Cited by 143 · see citing works
Self-citationPhoenix, D. L. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108641906 · Cited by 144 · see citing works
Elites, masses, and democratic decline in Indonesia
Aspinall, E., Fossati, D., Muhtadi, B., & Warburton, E. A. (2019) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2019.1680971 · Cited by 139 · see citing works
Madison's Constitution Under Stress: A Developmental Analysis of Political Polarization
Pierson, P., & Schickler, E. (2020) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-033629 · Cited by 135 · see citing works
Carlson, M., Robinson, S., & Lewis, S. C. (2020) · Digital Journalism · doi:10.1080/21670811.2020.1836981 · Cited by 139 · see citing works
“These developments align with increasing polarization among the electorate (Mason 2018).”
BackgroundCollege and the “Culture War”: Assessing Higher Education’s Influence on Moral Attitudes
Broćić, M., & Miles, A. (2021) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.1177/00031224211041094 · Cited by 141 · see citing works
“…even without extreme public polarization, meaningful political differences exist that affect how people vote, who they are friends with, and even how they feel about those on the opposite side of the political spectrum (Iyengar and Krupenkin 2018; Mason 2018; for a review, see Iyengar et al. 2019).”
BackgroundAmerican Religion in the Era of Increasing Polarization
Perry, S. L. (2022) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev-soc-031021-114239 · Cited by 140 · see citing works
Affective Polarization in Comparative and Longitudinal Perspective
Garzia, D., Ferreira da Silva, F., & Maye, S. (2023) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfad004 · Cited by 137 · see citing works
Cleavage Identities in Voters’ Own Words: Harnessing Open‐Ended Survey Responses
Zollinger, D. (2022) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12743 · Cited by 136 · see citing works
Motivated Reasoning, Public Opinion, and Presidential Approval
Donovan, K. M., Kellstedt, P. M., Key, E. M., & Lebo, M. J. (2020) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-019-09539-8 · Cited by 122 · see citing works
Reducing affective polarization: Warm group relations or policy compromise?
Huddy, L., & Yair, O. (2021) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12699 · Cited by 124 · see citing works
Opting Out of Political Discussions
Settle, J. E., & Carlson, T. N. (2019) · Political Communication · doi:10.1080/10584609.2018.1561563 · Cited by 122 · see citing works
“…findings suggest that even when talking about topics that should not by definition align with partisan cleavages, it appears that people prefer to interact with their copartisans, a finding that we think can be explained as a consequence of social sorting (Mason, 2018) and affective polarization.”
BackgroundPolicy over party: comparing the effects of candidate ideology and party on affective polarization
Yphtach Lelkes, B. (2019) · Political Science Research and Methods · doi:10.1017/psrm.2019.18 · Cited by 118 · see citing works
“…perspectives have largely developed in parallel: Some studies have examined whether partisan identity is related to affective polarization (e.g., Mason 2018), while other studies have examined whether policy preferences matter (e.g., Rogowski and Sutherland 2016; Webster and Abramowitz 2017).”
BackgroundIdeology, Not Affect: What Americans Want from Political Representation
Costa, M. (2021) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12571 · Cited by 118 · see citing works
Modeling the emergence of affective polarization in the social media society
Törnberg, P., Andersson, C., Lindgren, K., & Banisch, S. (2021) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0258259 · Cited by 118 · see citing works
Elites in the Making and Breaking of Foreign Policy
Saunders, E. N. (2021) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-041719-103330 · Cited by 121 · see citing works
Roberts, K. M. (2022) · Government and Opposition · doi:10.1017/gov.2021.14 · Cited by 116 · see citing works
“…the parties further apart in their ideological worldviews and policy platforms, made them more internally cohesive and sorted their electorates into mutually antagonistic partisan camps divided along racial, ethnic, religious and geographic lines (Grossman and Hopkins 2016; Lee 2016; Mason 2018).”
BackgroundInfluentialCastle, J. J. (2018) · American Politics Research · doi:10.1177/1532673x18818169 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
“…that it impacts perceptions of the opposing party’s ideologies (Pew Research Center, 2016), affect toward opposing partisans (Iyengar et al., 2012; Mason, 2013, 2015, 2018), and even the religious behavior of identifiers (Hout & Fischer, 2002; Margolis, 2018a, 2018b; Patrikios, 2008; Putnam &…”
BackgroundThe Social Dimension of Political Values
Connors, E. C. (2020) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-019-09530-3 · Cited by 113 · see citing works
Religion and Brazilian Democracy
Smith, A. E. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108699655 · Cited by 192 · see citing works
The nonlinear feedback dynamics of asymmetric political polarization
Leonard, N. E., Lipsitz, K., Bizyaeva, A., Franci, A., & Yphtach Lelkes, B. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2102149118 · Cited by 107 · see citing works
Hate Trumps Love: The Impact of Political Polarization on Social Preferences
Dimant, E. (2023) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4701 · Cited by 112 · see citing works
Incivility is rising among American politicians on twitter
Frimer, J. A., Aujla, H., Feinberg, M., Skitka, L. J., Aquino, K., Eichstaedt, J. C., & Willer, R. (2023) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/19485506221083811 · Cited by 110 · see citing works
“Incivility may at times be of strategic value to politicians seeking to communicate moral clarity, signal their loyalty, fundraise, draw attention to issues, or mobilize their supporters to action (Brooks & Geer, 2007; Mason, 2018).”
BackgroundEmotion and Politics: Noncognitive Psychological Biases in Public Opinion
Webster, S. W., & Albertson, B. L. (2022) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051120-105353 · Cited by 114 · see citing works
The Inseparability of Race and Partisanship in the United States
Westwood, S. J., & Peterson, E. (2022) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-020-09648-9 · Cited by 108 · see citing works
“In an era of elevated out-party hostility, attention has turned towards how the intersection of multiple identities influences partisanship (Mason 2018; Klar 2018; Levendusky 2018).”
BackgroundInfluentialPickup, M. A., Stecula, D. A., & van der Linden, C. (2020) · Canadian Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0008423920000463 · Cited by 107 · see citing works
“Canadian Journal of Political Science (2020), 1–8 doi:10.1017/S0008423920000463 partisan identities are very salient (Mason, 2018), and, as a result, when trusted political leaders engage on a prominent issue, the public tends to follow.”
BackgroundInfluentialFowler, A., Hill, S. J., Lewis, J. B., Tausanovitch, C., Vavreck, L., & Warshaw, C. (2022) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055422000818 · Cited by 50 · see citing works
A Psychology of Ideology: Unpacking the Psychological Structure of Ideological Thinking
Zmigrod, L. (2022) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/17456916211044140 · Cited by 127 · see citing works
“These two components map onto roughly (but not exactly) a distinction made in political science between issue-based (operational) political ideology and identity-based (symbolic) ideology (Ellis & Stimson, 2012; Mason, 2018).”
BackgroundTorcal, M., & Comellas, J. M. (2022) · South European Society and Politics · doi:10.1080/13608746.2022.2044236 · Cited by 101 · see citing works
“…with identitybased ideology, rather than issue-based ideology, which is in line with the argument that affective polarisation is mainly produced by ideological and other social identities increasingly sorted along partisan lines (and not so much by divergences on policy issues) (Mason 2018b).”
BackgroundSiegel, A. A. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108890960.005 · Cited by 117 · see citing works
#MaskOn! #MaskOff! Digital polarization of mask-wearing in the United States during COVID-19
Lang, J., Erickson, W. W., & Jing-Schmidt, Z. (2021) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0250817 · Cited by 104 · see citing works
No Polarization From Partisan News: Over-Time Evidence From Trace Data
Wojcieszak, M., de Leeuw, S., Menchen-Trevino, E., Lee, S., Huang-Isherwood, K. M., & Weeks, B. E. (2021) · The International Journal of Press/Politics · doi:10.1177/19401612211047194 · Cited by 98 · see citing works
“There are various reasons for rising polarization, such as more ideologically consistent elites, the growing alignment of partisanship with other social identities (Mason 2018), or mere demographic changes in the American electorate (Boxell 2020).”
BackgroundJacobs, N. F., & Munis, B. K. (2022) · Political Research Quarterly · doi:10.1177/10659129221124864 · Cited by 101 · see citing works
“First, it should be noted that our findings buttress recent research on the nationalization of American politics (Hopkins 2018) as well as the mass social sorting of America’s political parties (Mason 2018).”
BackgroundResultThe Polarizing Effect of Partisan Echo Chambers
HOBOLT, S. B., Lawall, K., & Tilley, J. R. (2023) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055423001211 · Cited by 108 · see citing works
“Numerous studies have shown that the U.S. public has become more divided along partisan and ideological lines in recent years (Hetherington 2009; Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006; Mason 2018).”
BackgroundInfluentialRacial Attitudes Through a Partisan Lens
Engelhardt, A. (2020) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123419000437 · Cited by 97 · see citing works
“…partisanship over other lines of conflict, partisan biases in information seeking and processing become more likely (Henderson and Theodoridis 2018; Mason 2018), giving people few incentives to change their party loyalties and more cause to adopt party-consistent attitudes (Highton and Kam 2011).”
BackgroundDjupe, P. A., Lewis, A. R., & Sokhey, A. E. (2023) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009234078 · Cited by 95 · see citing works
Arceneaux, K., Gravelle, T. B., Osmundsen, M., Petersen, M. B., Reifler, J., & Scotto, T. J. (2021) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2020.0147 · Cited by 93 · see citing works
Levy, N. L. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02653-9 · Cited by 96 · see citing works
“Moreover, while there has indeed been an increase in affective polarization, there has been no corresponding increase in polarization of policy positions (Iyengar et al. 2012; Mason 2018).”
BackgroundPolitical Identity Ownership: Symbolic Contests to Represent Members of the Public
Kreiss, D., Lawrence, R. G., & McGregor, S. C. (2020) · Social Media + Society · doi:10.1177/2056305120926495 · Cited by 94 · see citing works
“For example, Lilianna Mason (2018) demonstrates that the two main US political parties have come to represent distinctly different groups of people, what she calls “social sorting,” and citizens choose between them accordingly based on their own social identities: Today, Democrats and Republicans…”
BackgroundPolarized information ecosystems can reorganize social networks via information cascades
Tokita, C. K., Guess, A. M., & Tarnita, C. E. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2102147118 · Cited by 92 · see citing works
Partisanship, White Racial Resentment, and State Support for Higher Education
Taylor, B. J., Cantwell, B., Watts, K., & Wood, O. (2020) · The Journal of Higher Education · doi:10.1080/00221546.2019.1706016 · Cited by 60 · see citing works
The Growing Rural-Urban Political Divide and Democratic Vulnerability
Mettler, S. B., & Brown, T. E. (2022) · The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science · doi:10.1177/00027162211070061 · Cited by 92 · see citing works
“Lilliana Mason argues that as people sort themselves out politically and socially as if they are two separate tribes, without overlapping affiliations, they tend to acquire more negative and stereotypical views of each other (Mason 2018).”
BackgroundWojcieszak, M., Casas, A., Yu, X., Nagler, J., & Tucker, J. A. (2022) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.abn9418 · Cited by 90 · see citing works
Myrick, R. (2021) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818321000175 · Cited by 91 · see citing works
“Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Mason 2018.”
BackgroundBartels, B. L., & Johnston, C. D. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316979754 · Cited by 89 · see citing works
Identity propaganda: Racial narratives and disinformation
Reddi, M., Kuo, R., & Kreiss, D. (2021) · New Media & Society · doi:10.1177/14614448211029293 · Cited by 99 · see citing works
“This follows other work that has found identity-based differences and structural antagonisms to be at the forefront of political and social life, particularly in information processes (Flores- Yeffa et al., 2011; Hesse, 2016 Mason, 2018; Murthy and Sharma, 2019).”
BackgroundThe marketplace of rationalizations
Williams, D. (2022) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0266267121000389 · Cited by 57 · see citing works
“…to hold – many of which appear to be lightly held and easily revised – but rather the kinds of beliefs that social identities generate preferences for, such as pro-ingroup beliefs, antioutgroup beliefs, and the belief that one’s group deserves power and status (see Benkler et al. 2018; Mason 2018).”
BackgroundHomophily and Segregation in Cooperative Networks
Melamed, D., Simpson, B., Harrell, A., Munn, C. W., Abernathy, J., & Sweitzer, M. D. (2020) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/708142 · Cited by 85 · see citing works
Bonikowski, B., Feinstein, Y., & Bock, S. (2021) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/717103 · Cited by 88 · see citing works
Troll and divide: the language of online polarization
Simchon, A., Brady, W. J., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2022) · PNAS Nexus · doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgac019 · Cited by 85 · see citing works
Dynamics of Polarizing Rhetoric in Congressional Tweets
Ballard, A. M. O., DeTamble, R., Dorsey, S., Heseltine, M., & Johnson, M. (2022) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/lsq.12374 · Cited by 83 · see citing works
Who Do You Loathe? Feelings toward Politicians vs. Ordinary People in the Opposing Party
Kingzette, J. (2020) · Journal of Experimental Political Science · doi:10.1017/xps.2020.9 · Cited by 80 · see citing works
“One alternative is to use the social distance measures used by Mason (2018) and Ahler and Sood (2018), though Druckman and Levendusky (2019) find that these measures do not correlate highly with other measures of affective polarization.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialMoral polarization and out-party hostility in the US political context
Tappin, B. M., & McKay, R. T. (2019) · Journal of Social and Political Psychology · doi:10.5964/jspp.v7i1.1090 · Cited by 79 · see citing works
“Mason (2016, 2018), for example, documents that party identity in the US is increasingly in alignment with various other group identities, including race-, ideological-, and religious-based identities.”
Background
- Authors
- Mason, L.
- Corresponding author
- Mason, Lilliana
- ORCID
- Mason, Lilliana
- Venue
- University of Chicago Press eBooks
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2018
- OpenAlex
- W4241842642
- Cited by
- 1,985
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 347 · 2025: 315 · 2024: 238 · 2023: 202 · 2022: 220 · 2021: 226 · 2020: 225 · 2019: 158 · 2018: 50 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 2
- FWCI
- 200.00
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- University of Chicago Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Law › Legal principles and applications
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Literature and Literary Theory › Literature: history, themes, analysis
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
