Beyond Desire? Agency, Choice, and the Predictive Mind
Open accessAbstract
‘Predictive Processing’ (PP) is an emerging paradigm in cognitive neuroscience that depicts the human mind as an uncertainty management system that constructs probabilistic predictions of sensory signals. Such accounts apply very naturally to perception and have plausible extensions to motor control. But desires and motivations can seem to pose a much greater puzzle, appearing especially resistant to reconstruction by a processing story that appeals to predictions alone. I examine several versions of this worry and show that it is fundamentally misplaced. Desires and motivations are fluently accommodated within the unifying PP schema, where they emerge as webs of prior ‘beliefs’ that sculpt probabilistic predictions, some of which become positioned (as we shall see) so as to bring about actions. Importantly, a single construct here plays the role of belief and desire. But what results is, perhaps surprisingly, a potentially richer landscape within which to think about agency, control, and choice.
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Traditional theories of perceptual processing have failed to adequately explain why sensory cortices are infused with masses of descending connections.
“Traditional theories of perceptual processing have failed to adequately explain why sensory cortices are infused with masses of descending connections.”
From Evaluating the neurophysiological evidence for predictive processing as a model of perception (2020) · cites this paper as [32]
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Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924 · cited 1× · see citing works
“‘Predictive processing’ (PP) has been positioned as a new paradigm for understanding perception, reason, and action [Friston 2005; Hohwy 2013; Clark 2013, 2016; Pezzulo, Rigoli, and Friston: 2018].”
BackgroundSelf-citationDaselaar, S. M. (2009) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/neuro.09.013.2009 · Cited by 1,501 · see citing works
Action and behavior: a free-energy formulation
Friston, K. J., Daunizeau, J., Kilner, J., & Kiebel, S. J. (2010) · Biological Cybernetics · doi:10.1007/s00422-010-0364-z · Cited by 866 · see citing works
Active Inference, homeostatic regulation and adaptive behavioural control
Pezzulo, G., Rigoli, F., & Friston, K. (2015) · Progress in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.pneurobio.2015.09.001 · Cited by 650 · cited 3× · see citing works
“These are fully fledged exercises of agency, and they involve what has sometimes been described [Pezzulo et al. 2015; Seth 2015] as ‘counterfactual prediction’.”
BackgroundMethodBruineberg, J., Kiverstein, J., & Rietveld, E. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1239-1 · Cited by 383 · see citing works
Hierarchical active inference: A theory of motivated control
Pezzulo, G., Rigoli, F., & Friston, K. J. (2018) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2018.01.009 · Cited by 334 · see citing works
Emotional Valence and the Free-Energy Principle
Joffily, M., & Coricelli, G. (2013) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003094 · Cited by 322 · see citing works
The anatomy of choice: dopamine and decision-making.
Friston, K., Schwartenbeck, P., FitzGerald, T., Moutoussis, M., Behrens, T., & Dolan, R. J. (2014) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2013.0481 · Cited by 289 · see citing works
Am i self-conscious? (or does self-organization entail self-consciousness?)
Friston, K. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00579 · Cited by 197 · see citing works
Loss of sensory attenuation in patients with functional (psychogenic) movement disorders
Pareés, I., Brown, H., Nuruki, A., Adams, R. A., Davare, M., Bhatia, K. P., Friston, K., & Edwards, M. J. (2014) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awu237 · Cited by 155 · see citing works
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What are the contents of representations in predictive processing?
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Evaluating the neurophysiological evidence for predictive processing as a model of perception
Walsh, K. S., McGovern, D. P., Clark, A., & O'Connell, R. G. (2020) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/nyas.14321 · Cited by 333 · see citing works
Self-citationPredictive processing in cognitive robotics: A review
Ciria, A., Schillaci, G., Pezzulo, G., Hafner, V. V., & Lara, B. (2021) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_01383 · Cited by 51 · see citing works
Expecting some action: predictive processing and the construction of conscious experience
Nave, K., Deane, G., Miller, M., & Clark, A. (2022) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-022-00644-y · Cited by 50 · see citing works
Self-citationMental distress through the prism of predictive processing theory
Van de Cruys, S., & Van Dessel, P. (2021) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.07.006 · Cited by 28 · see citing works
Cultivating creativity: predictive brains and the enlightened room problem
Constant, A., Friston, K. J., & Clark, A. (2024) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2022.0415 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
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- Authors
- Clark, A.
- Affiliations
- University of Sussex (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Clark, Andy
- ORCID
- Clark, Andy
- Venue
- Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2019-04-16
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-15
- ISSN
- 0004-8402 (ISSN-L)
- 1471-6828
- OpenAlex
- W2936416517
- Cited by
- 78
- References
- 12
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 1
- FWCI
- 4.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- sro.sussex.ac.uk
- Licence
- cc-by-nc
- Locations
- Australasian Journal of Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Sussex Research Online (University of Sussex) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Sussex Research Online (University of Sussex) (submittedVersion)
- Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Funders
- ERC (XSPECT—DLV—692739)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- predictive processing, agency, choice, desire, motivation, probabilistic forecasting, uncertainty management, action, free will
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