The Politics of Intellectual Self-trust
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Just as testimony is affected by unjust social relations, so too is intellectual self-trust. I defend an account of intellectual self-trust that explains both why it is properly thought of as trust and why it is directed at the self, and explore its relationship to social power. Intellectual self-trust is neither a matter of having dispositions to rely on one’s epistemic methods and mechanisms, nor having a set of beliefs about which ones are reliable. Instead, it is a stance that an agent takes towards her own cognitive methods and mechanisms, comprising both cognitive and affective elements. Our intellectual self-trust is created and sustained socially and is thus porous to social power. Unjust social relations cause epistemic injustice, which undermines self-trust among the underprivileged; unjust social relations cause excessive self-trust among the privileged, which perpetuates epistemic injustice, which further undermines the self-trust of the disadvantaged in a vicious feedback loop. I conclude by exploring ways in which socially distorted intellectual self-trust can become better calibrated.
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Cites
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing
Fricker, M. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001 · Cited by 9,198
Baier, A. (1986) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/292745 · Cited by 2,567
Why So Slow?: The Advancement of Women
Valian, V. (1999) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/7235.001.0001 · Cited by 1,252
Cited by
Sauer, H. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108529181 · Cited by 72
Rini, R., & Cohen, L. (2022) · Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy · doi:10.26556/jesp.v22i2.1628 · Cited by 55
Metadata
- Authors
- Jones, K.
- Venue
- Social Epistemology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2012-04
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 237-251
- ISSN
- 0269-1728 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-5297
- OpenAlex
- W1980380917
- Cited by
- 168
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 3.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Jones, K. (2012). The Politics of Intellectual Self-trust. Social Epistemology. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652215
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