The Politics of Intellectual Self-trust
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Just as testimony is affected by unjust social relations, so too is intellectual self-trust. I defend an account of intellectual self-trust that explains both why it is properly thought of as trust and why it is directed at the self, and explore its relationship to social power. Intellectual self-trust is neither a matter of having dispositions to rely on one’s epistemic methods and mechanisms, nor having a set of beliefs about which ones are reliable. Instead, it is a stance that an agent takes towards her own cognitive methods and mechanisms, comprising both cognitive and affective elements. Our intellectual self-trust is created and sustained socially and is thus porous to social power. Unjust social relations cause epistemic injustice, which undermines self-trust among the underprivileged; unjust social relations cause excessive self-trust among the privileged, which perpetuates epistemic injustice, which further undermines the self-trust of the disadvantaged in a vicious feedback loop. I conclude by exploring ways in which socially distorted intellectual self-trust can become better calibrated.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing
Fricker, M. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001 · Cited by 9,198
Trust: making and breaking cooperative relations
(1989) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.26-3664 · Cited by 4,014
Korsgaard, C. M., & O'Neill, O. (1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511554476 · Cited by 4,013
SCANLON, T. M. (2000) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctv134vmrn · Cited by 3,041
Baier, A. (1986) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/292745 · Cited by 2,567 · cited 1×
“It is defended by Baier (1986), Holton (1994), and Jones (1996), although each offers slightly different formulations of what occupies the third place, with Baier preferring the formulation “A trusts B with valued thing C,” Holton preferring “A trusts B to do Z” and Jones adopting “A trusts B in…”
Background(2002) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.40-1460 · Cited by 1,617
Why So Slow?: The Advancement of Women
Valian, V. (1999) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/7235.001.0001 · Cited by 1,252
Trust as an Affective Attitude
Jones, K. (1996) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/233694 · Cited by 1,227
Self-citationZimmermann, U. (2003) · Public Integrity · doi:10.1080/15580989.2003.11770952 · Cited by 1,146
The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions
D'Arms, J., & Jacobson, D. (2000) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2653403 · Cited by 1,068
Deciding to trust, coming to believe
Holton, R. (1994) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048409412345881 · Cited by 734
Why so Slow? The Advancement of Women
Chafetz, J. S., & Valian, V. (1999) · Contemporary Sociology · doi:10.2307/2653855 · Cited by 581
Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge
Burge, T., & Peacocke, C. (1996) · Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) · doi:10.1093/aristotelian/96.1.91 · Cited by 414
Getting Told and Being Believed
Moran, R. (2006) · The Epistemology of Testimony · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276011.003.0013 · Cited by 402
HINCHMAN, E. S. (2005) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00415.x · Cited by 387 · cited 1×
“[12] For a useful discussion of the difference between testifying and other speech acts of asserting, see Hinchman (2005) and Moran (2005).”
BackgroundMcGeer, V. (2008) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048400801886413 · Cited by 357
Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by Reason (Alone)
Haslanger, S. (2008) · Hypatia · doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.2008.tb01195.x · Cited by 286 · cited 2×
“For a discussion of bias within philosophy specifically, see Haslanger (2008).”
BackgroundIntellectual Trust in Oneself and Others
Foley, R. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498923 · Cited by 274
Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge
Burge, T., & Peacocke, C. (1996) · Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society · doi:10.1093/aristotelian/96.1.117 · Cited by 270
Epistemic Trust and Social Location
Daukas, N. (2006) · Episteme · doi:10.3366/epi.2006.3.1-2.109 · Cited by 179 · cited 2×
“However, she also notes that “the role of second-order beliefs here should not be over-intellectualized” (Daukas 2006, 112) and emphasizes behavioral dispositions ahead of cognitive representations of one’s epistemic competences.”
BackgroundThree decades of lay epistemics: The why, how, and who of knowledge formation
Kruglanski, A. W., Dechesne, M., Orehek, E., & Pierro, A. (2009) · European Review of Social Psychology · doi:10.1080/10463280902860037 · Cited by 160 · cited 1×
“…attention and interpretation, including by the pervasive use of schemas and stereotypes that shape how we interpret others.9 It is also influenced by emotions such as anxiety, depression, or hopefulness and confidence, as well as by perceived need to come to a conclusion (Kruglanski et al. 2009).”
BackgroundPettit, P. N. (1992) · Cited by 155
Lehrer, K. (1997) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236658.001.0001 · Cited by 129
Jones, K. J. (2018) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780429502682-8 · Cited by 101 · cited 2×
“It is non-accidental, however, that those with social privilege should experience epistemic privilege where it matters; that is to say, where epistemic privilege can reinforce social privilege (see Jones 2002).”
BackgroundSelf-citationA Mind of One's Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity.
Jones, K., Antony, L., & Witt, C. (1995) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2186000 · Cited by 95
Self-citationXI. Emotion, Weakness of Will, and the Normative Conception of Agency
Jones, K. (2003) · Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement · doi:10.1017/s1358246100007967 · Cited by 81
Self-citationJones, K. (2015) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-08-097086-8.63088-x · Cited by 15 · cited 1×
“There is reason to think this is an impoverished and theoretically unhelpful conception of trust, so that this is only loosely describable as a model of self-trust (Jones 2001).”
BackgroundSelf-citationJones, K. (2001) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b0-08-043076-7/01049-4 · Cited by 10
Self-citation
Cited by
Sauer, H. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108529181 · Cited by 72
Rini, R., & Cohen, L. (2022) · Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy · doi:10.26556/jesp.v22i2.1628 · Cited by 55
Metadata
- Authors
- Jones, K.
- Venue
- Social Epistemology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2012-04
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 237-251
- ISSN
- 0269-1728 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-5297
- OpenAlex
- W1980380917
- Cited by
- 168
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 3.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.