Mechanisms and natural kinds
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
It is common to defend the Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) view as a third way between conventionalism and essentialism about natural kinds (Boyd, 1989, 1991, 1997, 1999; Griffiths, 1997, 1999; Keil, 2003; Kornblith, 1993; Wilson, 1999, 2005; Wilson, Barker, & Brigandt, forthcoming). According to the HPC view, property clusters are not merely conventionally clustered together; the co-occurrence of properties in the cluster is sustained by a similarity generating (or homeostatic) mechanism. I argue that conventional elements are involved partly but ineliminably in deciding which mechanisms define kinds, for deciding when two mechanisms are mechanisms of the same type, and for deciding where one particular mechanism ends and another begins. This intrusion of conventional perspective into the idea of a mechanism raises doubts as to whether the HPC view is sufficiently free of conventional elements to serve as an objective arbiter in scientific disputes about what the kinds of the special sciences should be.
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Citations
Cites
Fodor, J. A. (1983) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4737.001.0001 · Cited by 7,734
PINKER, S. (1999) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.1999.tb08538.x · Cited by 3,738
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Self-citationChurchland, P. S., & Sejnowski, T. J. (1992) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2010.001.0001 · Cited by 1,757
Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation
Woodward, J. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0195155270.001.0001 · Cited by 1,302
Mechanisms and the nature of causation
Glennan, S. (1996) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/bf00172853 · Cited by 894
Psychiatric disorders: a conceptual taxonomy
Zachar, P., & Kendler, K. S. (2007) · American Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1176/ajp.2007.164.4.557 · Cited by 236
Cited by
Comorbidity: a network perspective
Cramer, A. O. J., Waldorp, L. J., van der Maas, H. L. J., & Borsboom, D. (2010) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09991567 · Cited by 1,575
Cognitive ontology and the search for neural mechanisms: Three foundational problems
Francken, J. C., Slors, M., & Craver, C. F. (2022) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03701-2 · Cited by 39
“Craver (2009; 2013) defends the view that the boundaries of mechanisms are in many cases driven by pragmatic decisions of the sort discussed in this section.”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationDisagreement & classification in comparative cognitive science
Boyle, A. (2024) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12480 · Cited by 23
“AlphaGo uses Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS) to construct a ‘search tree’ of possible moves, informed and constrained by its training, selecting the one with the highest expected value.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Craver, C. F.
- Venue
- Philosophical Psychology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2009-10
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 575-594
- ISSN
- 0951-5089 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-394X
- OpenAlex
- W1995248272
- Cited by
- 241
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 33.12
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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