No watershed for overflow: Recent work on the richness of consciousness
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A familiar and enduring controversy surrounds the question of whether our phenomenal experience “overflows” availability to cognition: do we consciously see more than we can remember and report? Both sides to this debate have long sought to move beyond naïve appeals to introspection by providing empirical evidence for or against overflow. Recently, two notable studies—Bronfman, Brezis, Jacobson, and Usher (2014) and Vandenbroucke, Sligte, Fahrenfort, Ambroziak, and Lamme (2012)—have purported to provide compelling evidence in favor of overflow. Here I explain why the data from both studies are wholly consistent with a “no overflow” interpretation. Importantly, when framed purely in representational or informational terms, this “no overflow” interpretation agrees with the interpretations respectively offered by both Bronfman et al. (2014) and Vandenbroucke et al. (2012). The difference only emerges when additional assumptions are made concerning which representations correspond to elements in conscious experience. The assumptions made by overflow theorists are contentious and poorly motivated. However, challenging them simply reopens the original controversy. The upshot is a sobering moral: we still do not know how to move beyond appeals to naïve introspection in establishing the nature and limits of our ordinary experience.
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Sperling, G. (1960) · Psychological Monographs: General and Applied · doi:10.1037/h0093759 · Cited by 4,042 · cited 1×
“According to many overflow theorists, a crucial advance was made by Sperling (1960).”
BackgroundOn a confusion about a function of consciousness
Block, N. (1995) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00038188 · Cited by 3,364 · cited 11×
“, Baars, 1988; Block, 1995, 2007; Burge, 2007; Dretske, 2006; Tye, 2006). Numerous critics have, however, contested whether this “overflow” interpretation is mandatory. Instead, they contend that Sperling’s data are consistent with a view on which subjects only consciously experience as specific letters those items wh…”
BackgroundInfluentialConsciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience
Block, N. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07002786 · Cited by 1,146
Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness
Lau, H., & Rosenthal, D. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.009 · Cited by 869 · cited 1×
“Bronfman et al. do convincingly demonstrate that color is represented outside of focal attention contra Lau and Rosenthal (2011).”
BackgroundConsciousness cannot be separated from function
Cohen, M. A., & Dennett, D. C. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.06.008 · Cited by 542
On the inter-relatedness of theory and measurement in the study of unconscious processes
REINGOLD, E. M., & MERIKLE, P. M. (1990) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1990.tb00150.x · Cited by 255
Working memory without consciousness
Soto, D., Mäntylä, T., & Silvanto, J. (2011) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2011.09.049 · Cited by 233 · cited 2×
“Thus, Block’s appeal to Soto, Mäntylä, and Silvanto (2011) is unconvincing if there are grounds for thinking that the non-conscious representations in the Amsterdam group’s paradigm are likely to be significantly stronger.”
BackgroundCueing attention after the stimulus is gone can retrospectively trigger conscious perception
Sergent, C., Wyart, V., Babo-Rebelo, M., Cohen, L., Naccache, L., & Tallon-Baudry, C. (2013) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2012.11.047 · Cited by 195
Consciousness science: real progress and lingering misconceptions
Block, N., Carmel, D., Fleming, S. M., Kentridge, R. W., Koch, C., Lamme, V. A. F., Lau, H., & Rosenthal, D. (2014) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2014.09.004 · Cited by 81
Seeing without Knowing: Neural Signatures of Perceptual Inference in the Absence of Report
Vandenbroucke, A. R. E., Fahrenfort, J. J., Sligte, I. G., & Lamme, V. A. F. (2014) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00530 · Cited by 65
Cited by
Seeing without Knowing: Neural Signatures of Perceptual Inference in the Absence of Report
Vandenbroucke, A. R. E., Fahrenfort, J. J., Sligte, I. G., & Lamme, V. A. F. (2014) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00530 · Cited by 65
An embarrassment of richnesses: the PFC isn’t the content NCC
Kozuch, B. (2024) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niae017 · Cited by 9
Neuroscience undermines the higher-order theorists' preferred solution to the targetless HOT problem
Kozuch, B. (2026) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2026.2629514
Metadata
- Authors
- Phillips, I.
- Venue
- Philosophical Psychology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2015-09-24
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 236-249
- ISSN
- 0951-5089 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-394X
- OpenAlex
- W2302390677
- Cited by
- 64
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 8.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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