Why humans are (sometimes) less rational than other animals: Cognitive complexity and the axioms of rational choice
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Several formal analyses in decision theory have shown that if people's preferences follow certain logical patterns (the so-called axioms of rational choice) then they are behaving as if they are maximising utility. However, numerous studies in the decision-making literature have indicated that humans often violate the axioms of rational choice. Additionally, studies of nonhuman animals indicate that they are largely rational in an axiomatic sense. It is important to understand why the finding that humans are less rational than other animals is not paradoxical. This paper discusses three reasons why the principles of rational choice are actually easier to follow when the cognitive architecture of the organism is simpler: contextual complexity, symbolic complexity, and the strong evaluator struggle.
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Citations
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Self-citationRegret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty
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Cited by
Motivated numeracy and enlightened self-government
KAHAN, D. M., PETERS, E., DAWSON, E. C., & SLOVIC, P. (2017) · Behavioural Public Policy · doi:10.1017/bpp.2016.2 · Cited by 883
The Bias That Divides Us: The Science and Politics of Myside Thinking
Stanovich, K. E. (2021) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/13367.001.0001 · Cited by 152
Self-citationGlynn, P. D., Voinov, A. A., Shapiro, C. D., & White, P. A. (2017) · Earth's Future · doi:10.1002/2016ef000487 · Cited by 98
“Those remarkable abilities, however, can sometimes result in our being less rational than other animals [Stanovich, 2013].”
BackgroundStanovich, K. E., West, R. F., & Toplak, M. E. (2011) · The Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511977244.040 · Cited by 77
Self-citationSchulze, C., & Hertwig, R. (2021) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104580 · Cited by 36
Metadata
- Authors
- Stanovich, K. E.
- Venue
- Thinking & Reasoning
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2012-09-24
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-26
- ISSN
- 1354-6783 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0708
- OpenAlex
- W2019725494
- Cited by
- 81
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 5.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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