Cited by 348Embodied and Extended CognitionPhilosophy and Theoretical ScienceMultisensory perception and integration

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 122 of the 122 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

A predictive processing theory of sensorimotor contingencies: explaining the puzzle of perceptual presence and its absence in synesthesia.

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Seth, Anil K.·2014·Cognitive Neuroscience

Abstract

Normal perception involves experiencing objects within perceptual scenes as real, as existing in the world. This property of "perceptual presence" has motivated "sensorimotor theories" which understand perception to involve the mastery of sensorimotor contingencies. However, the mechanistic basis of sensorimotor contingencies and their mastery has remained unclear. Sensorimotor theory also struggles to explain instances of perception, such as synesthesia, that appear to lack perceptual presence and for which relevant sensorimotor contingencies are difficult to identify. On alternative "predictive processing" theories, perceptual content emerges from probabilistic inference on the external causes of sensory signals, however, this view has addressed neither the problem of perceptual presence nor synesthesia. Here, I describe a theory of predictive perception of sensorimotor contingencies which (1) accounts for perceptual presence in normal perception, as well as its absence in synesthesia, and (2) operationalizes the notion of sensorimotor contingencies and their mastery. The core idea is that generative models underlying perception incorporate explicitly counterfactual elements related to how sensory inputs would change on the basis of a broad repertoire of possible actions, even if those actions are not performed. These "counterfactually-rich" generative models encode sensorimotor contingencies related to repertoires of sensorimotor dependencies, with counterfactual richness determining the degree of perceptual presence associated with a stimulus. While the generative models underlying normal perception are typically counterfactually rich (reflecting a large repertoire of possible sensorimotor dependencies), those underlying synesthetic concurrents are hypothesized to be counterfactually poor. In addition to accounting for the phenomenology of synesthesia, the theory naturally accommodates phenomenological differences between a range of experiential states including dreaming, hallucination, and the like. It may also lead to a new view of the (in)determinacy of normal perception.

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Show all 121 references

Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. Bubic A., 2010, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 4, 25
  2. Friston K. J., 2012, Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 151
  3. Kohler I., 1951, Psychological Issues, 3, 1
  4. Luke D. P., 2013, Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 753
  5. Seth A. K., 2011, Frontiers in Psychology, 2, 395

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Metadata

Authors
Seth, A. K.
Affiliations
University of Sussex (GB)
Corresponding author
Seth, Anil K.
Venue
Cognitive Neuroscience
Published
2014-01-21
Volume
5
Issue
2
Pages
97-118
ISSN
  • 1758-8928 (ISSN-L)
  • 1758-8936
OpenAlex
W2080654992
Cited by
346
References
121
Citations by year
2026: 23 · 2025: 38 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 56 · 2022: 25 · 2021: 22 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 29 · 2018: 19 · 2017: 27 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 22 · 2014: 13
FWCI
2.44
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Cognitive Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Sussex Research Online (University of Sussex) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
  • European Commission (258749)
  • Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EP/G007543/1)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Multisensory perception and integration
Keywords
predictive processing, sensorimotor contingencies, perceptual presence, synesthesia, counterfactual reasoning, generative models, dreams, hallucinations, probabilistic inference
MeSH terms
Synesthesia, Bayes Theorem, Humans, Perception, Perceptual Disorders, Photic Stimulation

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