The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
When Social Norms Overpower Competition: Gift Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets
Abstract
Do competitive markets remove the effect of social norms on market outcomes? Or are norms capable of exerting a persistent influence? In this article we report the results of a series of competitive market and bilateral bargaining experiments. They indicate that the norm of reciprocity gives rise to wages that are persistently above the competitive level. Moreover, wages under bilateral bargaining conditions coincide with wages in competitive markets, indicating that competition has a limited effect when the norm of reciprocity is operative. In addition, the results show that workers' reciprocal behavior increases effort and, hence, the efficiency of trades.
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., Kirchler, E., Weichbold, A., & Gächter, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Labor Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1998-04
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 324-351
- ISSN
- 0734-306X (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5307
- OpenAlex
- W1997743066
- Cited by
- 437
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 27.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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