The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
When Social Norms Overpower Competition: Gift Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets
Abstract
Do competitive markets remove the effect of social norms on market outcomes? Or are norms capable of exerting a persistent influence? In this article we report the results of a series of competitive market and bilateral bargaining experiments. They indicate that the norm of reciprocity gives rise to wages that are persistently above the competitive level. Moreover, wages under bilateral bargaining conditions coincide with wages in competitive markets, indicating that competition has a limited effect when the norm of reciprocity is operative. In addition, the results show that workers' reciprocal behavior increases effort and, hence, the efficiency of trades.
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Citations
Cites
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
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Self-citationLoss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model.
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Self-citation
Cited by
Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence
Fehr, E., Gachter, S., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1997) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171941 · Cited by 1,169
Self-citationInequality at Work: The Effect of Peer Salaries on Job Satisfaction
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Lab Experiments Are a Major Source of Knowledge in the Social Sciences
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The Handbook of Organizational Economics
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Reciprocity and economics: The economic implications of Homo Reciprocans
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Self-citationFehr, E., Klein, A., & Schmidt, K. M. (2007) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00734.x · Cited by 452
Self-citationReligious Identity and Economic Behavior
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Attribution and Reciprocity in an Experimental Labor Market
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The focusing and informational effects of norms on pro-social behavior
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A Behavioral Account of the Labor Market: The Role of Fairness Concerns
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Self-citationFehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-62745-5_7 · Cited by 303
Self-citationWalrasian Economics in Retrospect
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Leadership: What It Means, What It Does, and What We Want to Know About It
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(2002) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 51
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., Kirchler, E., Weichbold, A., & Gächter, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Labor Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1998-04
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 324-351
- ISSN
- 0734-306X (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5307
- OpenAlex
- W1997743066
- Cited by
- 437
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 27.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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