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Peer Pressure and Partnerships
Abstract
Partnerships and profit sharing are often claimed to motivate workers by giving them a share of the pie. But in organizations of any significant size, the free-rider effects would seem to choke off any motivational forces. This analysis explores how peer pressure operates and how factors such as profit sharing, shame, guilt, norms, mutual monitoring, and empathy interact to create incentives in the firm. The argument that Japanese firms enjoy team spirit because compensation is linked to overall profitability is analyzed. An explanation for the prevalence of partnerships among individuals in similar occupations is provided.
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kandel, E., & Lazear, E. P.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1992-08
- Volume
- 100
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 801-817
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2157125979
- Cited by
- 1,756
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 37.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
