The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Health as a Theoretical Concept
Abstract
This paper argues that the medical conception of health as absence of disease is a value-free theoretical notion. Its main elements are biological function and statistical normality, in contrast to various other ideas prominent in the literature on health. Apart from universal environmental injuries, diseases are internal states that depress a functional ability below species-typical levels. Health as freedom from disease is then statistical normality of function, i.e., the ability to perform all typical physiological functions with at least typical efficiency. This conception of health is as value-free as statements of biological function. The view that health is essentially value-laden, held by most writers on the topic, seems to have one of two sources: an assumption that health judgments must be practical judgments about the treatment of patients, or a commitment to “positive” health beyond the absence of disease. I suggest that the assumption is mistaken, the commitment possibly misdescribed.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Nagel, E., & Hawkins, D. (1961) · American Journal of Physics · doi:10.1119/1.1937571 · Cited by 3,667
Szasz, T. (1979) · Biomedical Ethics and the Law · doi:10.1007/978-1-4615-6561-1_9 · Cited by 2,645
Ego psychology and the problem of adaptation.
Hartmann, H. (1958) · doi:10.1037/13180-000 · Cited by 1,389
Current concepts of positive mental health.
Jahoda, M. (1958) · doi:10.1037/11258-000 · Cited by 1,296
An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine
Bernard, C., Wolf, S., & Copley Greene, H. (2018) · Experimental Medicine · doi:10.4324/9781351320764-1 · Cited by 939
On the Distinction between Disease and Illness
Boorse, C. (1999) · Philosophy & Public Affairs · doi:10.4324/9780203823415-4 · Cited by 646
Self-citationAn introduction to the study of experimental medicine
Lasagna, L. (1958) · Journal of Chronic Diseases · doi:10.1016/0021-9681(58)90110-3 · Cited by 505
Boorse, C. (1976) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184255 · Cited by 421
Self-citationCANNON, W. B. (1939) · The American Journal of the Medical Sciences · doi:10.1097/00000441-193907000-00031 · Cited by 330
Teleology and the logical structure of function statements
(1972) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A · doi:10.1016/0039-3681(72)90014-3 · Cited by 320
Cited by
Wakefield, J. C. (1992) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037//0033-295x.99.2.232 · Cited by 782
Development of a self-report measure of capability wellbeing for adults: the ICECAP-A
Al-Janabi, H., N Flynn, T., & Coast, J. (2012) · Quality of Life Research · doi:10.1007/s11136-011-9927-2 · Cited by 666
Bickenbach, J. E., Chatterji, S., Badley, E. M., & Üstün, T. B. (1999) · Social Science & Medicine · doi:10.1016/s0277-9536(98)00441-9 · Cited by 662
On the ethics of algorithmic decision-making in healthcare
Grote, T., & Berens, P. (2020) · Journal of Medical Ethics · doi:10.1136/medethics-2019-105586 · Cited by 551
Boorse, C. (1997) · Biomedical Ethics Reviews · doi:10.1007/978-1-59259-451-1_1 · Cited by 525
Self-citationThe teleological notion of ‘function’
Neander, K. (1991) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048409112344881 · Cited by 508
Biological Autonomy: A Philosophical and Theoretical Enquiry
Moreno, A., & Mossio, M. (2015) · History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences · doi:10.1007/978-94-017-9837-2 · Cited by 397
The concepts of health and illness revisited
Nordenfelt, L. (2007) · Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s11019-006-9017-3 · Cited by 327
Boorse, C. (2014) · Journal of Medicine and Philosophy · doi:10.1093/jmp/jhu035 · Cited by 313
Self-citationPhenomenology and its application in medicine
Carel, H. (2011) · Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics · doi:10.1007/s11017-010-9161-x · Cited by 261
Defining ‘health’ and ‘disease’
Ereshefsky, M. (2009) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.shpsc.2009.06.005 · Cited by 257
On the Triad Disease, Illness and Sickness
Hofmann, B. (2002) · The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy · doi:10.1076/jmep.27.6.651.13793 · Cited by 254
Neurodiversity and the social ecology of mental functions
Chapman, R. (2021) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691620959833 · Cited by 267
Hausman, D. M. (2019) · Perspectives in Biology and Medicine · doi:10.1353/pbm.2019.0046 · Cited by 253
What Biological Functions Are and Why They Matter
Garson, J. (2019) · doi:10.1017/9781108560764 · Cited by 239
Neurodiversity Studies: A New Critical Paradigm
(2020) · doi:10.4324/9780429322297 · Cited by 211
Phenomenology as a Resource for Patients
Carel, H. (2012) · Journal of Medicine and Philosophy · doi:10.1093/jmp/jhs008 · Cited by 147
Defining mental disorder. Exploring the 'natural function' approach
Varga, S. (2011) · Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine · doi:10.1186/1747-5341-6-1 · Cited by 79
Healthcare Practice, Epistemic Injustice, and Naturalism
Kidd, I. J., & Carel, H. (2018) · Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement · doi:10.1017/s1358246118000620 · Cited by 71
Dissecting scientific explanation in AI (sXAI): A case for medicine and healthcare
Durán, J. M. (2021) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2021.103498 · Cited by 62
Psychiatry Beyond the Brain: Externalism, Mental Health, and Autistic Spectrum Disorder
Roberts, T., Krueger, J., & Glackin, S. (2019) · Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology · doi:10.1353/ppp.2019.0030 · Cited by 54
Science, Values, and the New Demarcation Problem
Resnik, D. B., & Elliott, K. C. (2023) · Journal for General Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s10838-022-09633-2 · Cited by 49
Giubilini, A., & Minerva, F. (2019) · The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine · doi:10.1093/jmp/jhz002 · Cited by 16
Brown, R. C. H., Rogers, W. A., Entwistle, V. A., & Bhattacharya, S. (2016) · Public Health Ethics · doi:10.1093/phe/phw005 · Cited by 15
Metadata
- Authors
- Boorse, C.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1977-12
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 542-573
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W2163638841
- Cited by
- 1,780
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 1.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.