The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Observation Reconsidered
Abstract
Several arguments are considered which purport to demonstrate the impossibility of theory-neutral observation. The most important of these infers the continuity of observation with theory from the presumed continuity of perception with cognition, a doctrine widely espoused in recent cognitive psychology. An alternative psychological account of the relation between cognition and perception is proposed and its epistemological consequences for the observation/theory distinction are then explored.
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Citations
Cites
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
MCGUIRE, J. E. (1963) · Philosophical Books · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.1963.tb00813.x · Cited by 8,424
Fodor, J. A. (1983) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4737.001.0001 · Cited by 7,734
Self-citationGoodman, N. (1981) · Leonardo · doi:10.2307/1574670 · Cited by 3,125
Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind
Churchland, P. M. (1979) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625435 · Cited by 1,427
(2025) · Epistemic Ecology · doi:10.7551/mitpress/15707.003.0011 · Cited by 585
Cited by
Goldman, A. I. (1999) · doi:10.1093/0198238207.001.0001 · Cited by 2,166
Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for “top-down” effects
Firestone, C., & Scholl, B. J. (2016) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x15000965 · Cited by 1,200
How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality
Gopnik, A. (1993) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00028636 · Cited by 967
The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions
Kitcher, P. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0195096533.001.0001 · Cited by 780
Précis of The Modularity of Mind
Fodor, J. A. (1985) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x0001921x · Cited by 646
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fodor, J.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1984-03
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 23-43
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W4300006473
- Cited by
- 420
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 86.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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