Consequence-Cause Matching: Looking to the Consequences of Events to Infer Their Causes
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article documents a bias in people’s causal inferences, showing that people non-normatively consider an event’s consequences when inferring its causes. Across experiments, participants’ inferences about event causes were systematically affected by how similar (in both size and valence) those causes were to event consequences, even when the consequences were objectively uninformative about the causes. For example, people inferred that a product failure (computer crash) had a large cause (widespread computer virus) if it had a large consequence (job loss), but that the identical failure was more likely to have a smaller cause (cooling fan malfunction) if the consequence was small—even though the consequences gave no new information about what caused the crash. This “consequence-cause matching,” which can affect product attitudes, may arise because people are motivated to see the world as predictable and because matching is an accessible schema that helps them to fulfill this motivation.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The processes of causal attribution.
Kelley, H. H. (1973) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/h0034225 · Cited by 4,025
From acts to dispositions the attribution process in person perception
Jones, E. E., & Davis, K. E. (1965) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60107-0 · Cited by 3,424
Individual differences in need for cognitive closure.
Webster, D. M., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1994) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.67.6.1049 · Cited by 2,494
The Meaning Maintenance Model: On the Coherence of Social Motivations
Heine, S. J., Proulx, T., & Vohs, K. D. (2006) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr1002_1 · Cited by 1,437 · cited 1×
“Thus, although prior research suggests that consequences of an event may influence perceptions of that event (see also Baron and Hershey 1988; Hoch and Loewenstein 1989; Rozin and Stellar 2009), still unknown is whether people allow incidental, arbitrarily determined consequences of an event to…”
BackgroundLacking control increases illusory pattern perception
Whitson, J. A., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1159845 · Cited by 1,119
Observer's reaction to the "innocent victim": Compassion or rejection?
Lerner, M. J., & Simmons, C. H. (1966) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0023562 · Cited by 921
Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation
Baron, J., & Hershey, J. C. (1988) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.54.4.569 · Cited by 873
God and the government: Testing a compensatory control mechanism for the support of external systems
Kay, A. C., Gaucher, D., Napier, J. L., Callan, M. J., & Laurin, K. (2008) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.95.1.18 · Cited by 809
The popularity of conspiracy theories of presidential assassination: A Bayesian analysis.
McCauley, C., & Jacques, S. (1979) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.37.5.637 · Cited by 135 · cited 1×
“Research has suggested that assassinations are more often attributed to conspiracies than are failed assassination attempts (Jarudi and Keil 2006; McCauley and Jacques 1979), but our results suggest that even when an attempt succeeds, events following it continue to influence beliefs about its…”
Result
Cited by
Conspiracy theories as part of history: The role of societal crisis situations
van Prooijen, J.-W., & Douglas, K. M. (2017) · Memory Studies · doi:10.1177/1750698017701615 · Cited by 764
Belief in Conspiracy Theories and Susceptibility to the Conjunction Fallacy
Brotherton, R., & French, C. C. (2014) · Applied Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1002/acp.2995 · Cited by 291
“Given evidence that the representativeness heuristic may influence the adoption of conspiracist explanations in other ways (Douglas & Sutton, 2011; LeBoeuf & Norton, 2012; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007), the conjunction fallacy seems a likely candidate in the search for cognitive correlates of…”
BackgroundConviction Narrative Theory: A theory of choice under radical uncertainty
Johnson, S. G. B., Bilovich, A., & Tuckett, D. (2023) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x22001157 · Cited by 131
How social identity shapes conspiratorial belief
Robertson, C. E., Pretus, C., Rathje, S., Harris, E. A., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2022) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2022.101423 · Cited by 57
Metadata
- Authors
- LeBoeuf, R. A., & Norton, M. I.
- Venue
- Journal of Consumer Research
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2012-06-01
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 128-141
- ISSN
- 0093-5301 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5277
- OpenAlex
- W2121641340
- Cited by
- 85
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 4.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.