The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes
Abstract
This paper proposes a new mechanism for combinatorial assignment—for example, assigning schedules of courses to students—based on an approximation to competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) in which incomes are unequal but arbitrarily close together. The main technical result is an existence theorem for approximate CEEI. The mechanism is approximately efficient, satisfies two new criteria of outcome fairness, and is strategyproof in large markets. Its performance is explored on real data, and it is compared to alternatives from theory and practice: all other known mechanisms are either unfair ex post or manipulable even in large markets, and most are both manipulable and unfair.
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Citations
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Self-citation
Cited by
The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare
Caragiannis, I., Kurokawa, D., Moulin, H., Procaccia, A. D., Shah, N., & Wang, J. (2016) · Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation · doi:10.1145/2940716.2940726 · Cited by 342
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Self-citationThe Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare
Caragiannis, I., Kurokawa, D., Moulin, H., Procaccia, A. D., Shah, N., & Wang, J. (2019) · ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · doi:10.1145/3355902 · Cited by 289
School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds
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The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Budish, E.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2011-12
- Volume
- 119
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1061-1103
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2150409561
- Cited by
- 766
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 37.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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