Values in Science beyond Underdetermination and Inductive Risk
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Proponents of the value ladenness of science rely primarily on arguments from underdetermination or inductive risk, which share the premise that we should only consider values where the evidence runs out or leaves uncertainty; they adopt a criterion of lexical priority of evidence over values. The motivation behind lexical priority is to avoid reaching conclusions on the basis of wishful thinking rather than good evidence. This is a real concern, however, that giving lexical priority to evidential considerations over values is a mistake and unnecessary for avoiding the wishful thinking. Values have a deeper role to play in science.
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Citations
Cites
Toulmin, S. E. (2003) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511840005 · Cited by 7,101
Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry
Longino, H. E. (1990) · doi:10.1515/9780691209753 · Cited by 3,092
Longino, H. E. (2002) · doi:10.1515/9780691187013 · Cited by 1,622
Inductive Risk and Values in Science
Douglas, H. (2000) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/392855 · Cited by 885
Is a Little Pollution Good for You?
Elliott, K. (2011) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199755622.001.0001 · Cited by 193
Cited by
Value-entanglement and the integrity of scientific research
Resnik, D. B., & Elliott, K. C. (2019) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A · doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.12.011 · Cited by 49
Science, Values, and the New Demarcation Problem
Resnik, D. B., & Elliott, K. C. (2023) · Journal for General Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s10838-022-09633-2 · Cited by 49
Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science
Peters, U. (2021) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axy079 · Cited by 45
Wishful Thinking and Values in Science
Steel, D. (2018) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/699714 · Cited by 13
“Choice-supportive bias” in science: Explanation and mitigation
Kafaee, M., Marhamati, H., & Gharibzadeh, S. (2021) · Accountability in Research · doi:10.1080/08989621.2021.1872377 · Cited by 12
Metadata
- Authors
- Brown, M. J.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2013-12
- Volume
- 80
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 829-839
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W2037406964
- Cited by
- 151
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 52.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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