The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Suspense and Surprise
Abstract
We model demand for noninstrumental information, drawing on the idea that people derive entertainment utility from suspense and surprise. A period has more suspense if the variance of the next period’s beliefs is greater. A period has more surprise if the current belief is further from the last period’s belief. Under these definitions, we analyze the optimal way to reveal information over time so as to maximize expected suspense or surprise experienced by a Bayesian audience. We apply our results to the design of mystery novels, political primaries, casinos, game shows, auctions, and sports.
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Cited by
Golman, R., Hagmann, D., & Loewenstein, G. (2017) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20151245 · Cited by 831
Information Design: A Unified Perspective
Bergemann, D., & Morris, S. (2019) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20181489 · Cited by 527
Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design
Kamenica, E. (2019) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025739 · Cited by 404
Self-citationLomas, J. D., Koedinger, K., Patel, N., Shodhan, S., Poonwala, N., & Forlizzi, J. L. (2017) · Proceedings of the 2017 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3025453.3025638 · Cited by 74
Matei, S. A., & Hunter, L. (2021) · The Information Society · doi:10.1080/01972243.2021.1951415 · Cited by 47
“This is a basic cinematic formula, which explains the success of a movie (Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica 2015).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Ely, J., Frankel, A., & Kamenica, E.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2015-02
- Volume
- 123
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 215-260
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2171733319
- Cited by
- 291
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 29.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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