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Cited by 39Feminist Epistemology and Gender StudiesRace, Genetics, and SocietyAcademic Freedom and Politics

Should Some Knowledge Be Forbidden? The Case of Cognitive Differences Research

Kourany, Janet A.·2016·Philosophy of Science
DOI 10.1086/687863
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Abstract

For centuries scientists have claimed that women are intellectually inferior to men and blacks are inferior to whites. Although these claims have been contested and corrected for centuries, they still continue to be made. Meanwhile, scientists have documented the harm done to women and blacks by the publication of such claims. Can anything be done to improve this situation? Freedom of research is universally recognized to be of first-rate importance. Yet, constraints on that freedom are also universally recognized. I consider three of these constraints and argue for tighter restrictions on race- and gender-related cognitive differences research on their basis.

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Crossref · 10.1086/687863

Cites

24 of 24 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Kourany concentrates primarily on research and testimony related to cognitive differences between gender and race groups.

    “Kourany ([2016], p. 779) concentrates primarily on research and testimony related to cognitive differences between gender and race groups.”

    From Science Communication and the Problematic Impact of Descriptive Norms (2023) · cites this paper as Kourany [2016]

  • Some public scientific testimony might trigger stereotype threat and thereby cause pernicious self-fulfilment effects.

    “As Fine and Kourany rightly emphasize, some PST might trigger stereotype threat and so cause pernicious self-fulfilment effects.”

    From Science Communication and the Problematic Impact of Descriptive Norms (2023) · cites this paper as Kourany [2016]

  • Neither Fine nor Kourany consider empirical data specifically on descriptive norms but rely on results from studies on stereotype threat.

    “Moreover, neither Fine nor Kourany consider empirical data specifically on descriptive norms but rely on results from studies pertaining to, for instance, 'stereotype threat'”

    From Science Communication and the Problematic Impact of Descriptive Norms (2023) · cites this paper as Kourany [2016]

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Authors
Kourany, J. A.
Corresponding author
Kourany, Janet A.
ORCID
Kourany, Janet A.
Venue
Philosophy of Science
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
2016-12
Volume
83
Issue
5
Pages
779-790
ISSN
  • 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
  • 1539-767X
DOI
10.1086/687863
OpenAlex
W2423869693
Cited by
39
References
24
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 1
FWCI
9.53
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 1857 d)
Locations
Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
  • Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Race, Genetics, and Society
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Academic Freedom and Politics
Keywords
racial differences, gender differences, scientific freedom

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