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How Autocrats Manipulate Economic News: Evidence from Russia’s State-Controlled Television

Open access
Rozenas, Arturas, Stukal, Denis · 2019 · The Journal of Politics
Cited by 237

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Conventional wisdom says that autocrats manipulate news through censorship. But when it comes to economic affairs—a highly sensitive topic for modern autocrats—the government’s ability to censor information effectively is limited, because citizens can benchmark the official news against their incomes, market prices, and other observables. We propose that instead of censoring economic facts, the media tactically frames those facts to make the government appear as a competent manager. Using a corpus of daily news reports from Russia’s largest state-owned television network, we document extensive evidence supporting this prediction. Bad news is not censored, but it is systematically blamed on external factors, whereas good news is systematically attributed to domestic politicians. Such selective attribution is used more intensely in politically sensitive times (elections and protests) and when the leadership is already enjoying high popular support—consistent with the existing theories of information manipulation.

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Crossref · 10.1086/703208

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Metadata

Authors
Rozenas, A., & Stukal, D.
Venue
The Journal of Politics
Published
2019-07
Volume
81
Issue
3
Pages
982-996
ISSN
  • 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-2508
OpenAlex
W2897545131
Cited by
237
References
8
FWCI
27.26
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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