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Cited by 602Media Influence and PoliticsChina's Socioeconomic Reforms and GovernanceMedia Studies and Communication

China's Strategic Censorship

Lorentzen, Peter·2014·American Journal of Political Science
DOI 10.1111/ajps.12065
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Abstract

While it is often assumed that authoritarian regimes inevitably fear and restrict media independence, permitting watchdog journalism can actually help such regimes maintain power by improving governance. Yet such a strategy risks facilitating a coordinated uprising if discontent is revealed to be widespread. A formal model shows that under some conditions, a regime optimally permits investigative reporting on lower‐level officialdom, adjusting how much reporting is allowed depending on the level of underlying social tensions. This strategy yields many of the benefits of free media without risking overthrow. An extension shows why an increase in uncontrollable information, such as from the Internet, may result in a reduction in media freedom. The model sheds light on important aspects of China's media policy and its evolution and on authoritarian media control more broadly.

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Crossref · 10.1111/ajps.12065

Cites

63 of 63 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • E-governance innovations mitigate principal-agent problems between rulers and local officials when citizens help detect corruption, which in turn is expected to alleviate grievances.

    “These innovations further mitigate principal-agent problems between rulers and local officials when citizens help to detect corruption, which in turn is expected to alleviate grievances (Chen etal., 2016; Lorentzen, 2014).”

    From How Dictators Control the Internet: A Review Essay (2020) · cites this paper as Lorentzen, 2014

  • Authoritarian, and sometimes democratic, governments have sought to control conventional media through censorship, state-based media systems, synergy between censorship and state media, and cooperation with or pressure on private media producers.

    “Authoritarian, and sometimes democratic (112), governments have sought to control conventional media, including through censorship (113, 114), state-based media systems (115, 116), the synergy between censorship and state media (117, 118), and cooperation with (or pressure on) private media producers (119, 120).”

    From Physical and virtual repertoires of contention (2022) · cites this paper as [114]

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Authors
Lorentzen, P.
Affiliations
University of California, Berkeley (US)
Corresponding author
Lorentzen, Peter
ORCID
Lorentzen, Peter
Venue
American Journal of Political Science
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2013-10-08
Volume
58
Issue
2
Pages
402-414
ISSN
  • 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-5907
DOI
10.1111/ajps.12065
OpenAlex
W1825225513
Cited by
602
References
63
Citations by year
2026: 38 · 2025: 78 · 2024: 74 · 2023: 66 · 2022: 90 · 2021: 39 · 2020: 49 · 2019: 38 · 2018: 42 · 2017: 33 · 2016: 25 · 2015: 22 · 2014: 7 · 2012: 1
FWCI
55.55
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor (vor)
Locations
American Journal of Political Science (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Communication › Media Studies and Communication
Keywords
media censorship, authoritarian regimes, investigative journalism, freedom of the press, regime stability, social unrest, media policy, China

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