The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Virtue, Vice, and Value
Abstract
What are virtue and vice, and how do they relate to other moral properties such as goodness and rightness? This book defends a perfectionist account of virtue and vice that gives distinctive answers to these questions. The account treats the virtues as higher‐level intrinsic goods, ones that involve morally appropriate attitudes to other, independent goods and evils. Virtue by itself makes a person's life better, but in a way that depends on the goodness of other things. This account was accepted by many early twentieth‐ century consequentialists, including Franz Brentano, G. E. Moore, Hastings Rashdall, and W. D. Ross. The book elaborates it further than has been done before, describing its mathematical structure, connecting it to individual virtues and vices, and applying it to specific issues such as the morality of fantasy and the proper roles of private charity and the welfare state. While doing so, it argues for the account's superiority over rival views of virtue, including those defended under the heading of “virtue ethics.”
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View
Swanton, C. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0199253889.001.0001 · Cited by 741
Practical Intelligence and the Virtues
Russell, D. C. (2009) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565795.001.0001 · Cited by 582
Trust, Distrust and Commitment
Hawley, K. (2014) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12000 · Cited by 535
Virtue ethics as a resource in business
Audi, R. (2012) · Business Ethics Quarterly · doi:10.5840/beq201222220 · Cited by 146
Virtue Ethics and Moral Psychology: The Situationism Debate
Upton, C. L. (2009) · The Journal of Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10892-009-9054-2 · Cited by 62
Metadata
- Authors
- Hurka, T.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2001-01-11
- OpenAlex
- W1551385672
- Cited by
- 547
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 17.19
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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