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Cited by 23Open Source Software InnovationsDigital Platforms and EconomicsIntellectual Property Rights and Media

Trust and Community in Open Source Software Production

Open access
Osterloh, Margit, Rota, Sandra·2004·Analyse & Kritik
DOI 10.1515/auk-2004-0115
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Abstract

Abstract Open source software production is a successful new innovation model which disproves that only private ownership of intellectual property rights fosters innovations. It is analyzed here under which conditions the open source model may be successful in general. We show that a complex interplay of situational, motivational, and institutional factors have to be taken into account to understand how to manage the ‘tragedy of the commons’ as well as the ‘tragedy of the anticommons’. It is argued that the success of this new innovation model is greatly facilitated by a well balanced portfolio of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, low costs for contributors and governance mechanisms that do not crowd out intrinsic motivation.

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  • Social psychological incentives are most significant for young projects where monetary or reputation incentives are comparatively weak.

    “Osterloh and Rota (2004) and Franck and Jungwirth (2002) argue that social psychological incentives are most significant for young projects where monetary or reputation incentives are comparatively weak.”

    From Open Source Software: The New Intellectual Property Paradigm (2006) · cites this paper as Osterloh and Rota (2004)

    Section 4 says that, especially in a project's beginning phase, success is greatly facilitated by intrinsically motivated participants. This supports the emphasis on nonmonetary motivation in young projects, but the retrieved passages do not say that monetary or reputation incentives are comparatively weak at that stage; §3.3 discusses reputation incentives without making that comparison. No page numbers were provided in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.83)

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  • Social psychology incentives work best when contributors are only asked to contribute small amounts to the public good.

    “Commentators claim that social psychology incentives work best when contributors are only asked to contribute small amounts to the public good (Osterloh and Rota, 2004, Osterloh et al ., 2003b, Baldwin and Clark, 2003).”

    From Open Source Software: The New Intellectual Property Paradigm (2006) · cites this paper as Osterloh and Rota, 2004

  • Signaling is weak for useful tasks such as reporting bugs, submitting comments, suggesting new functionality, preparing documentation, building easy-to-use interfaces, providing technical support, ensuring backwards compatibility, and writing programs for utilitarian tasks like power management or wizards.

    “Signaling is also weak for such useful tasks as reporting bugs, submitting comments, suggesting new functionality, preparing documentation, building easy-touse interfaces, providing technical support, ensuring backwards compatibility, and writing programs for utilitarian tasks like power management or wizards (Rossi, 2004, Osterloh and Rota, 2004, Schmidt and Schnitzer, 2002).”

    From Open Source Software: The New Intellectual Property Paradigm (2006) · cites this paper as Osterloh and Rota, 2004

    Section 3.3 (page unavailable) discusses how open-source contributions can signal programmers’ abilities, but does not say signaling is weak for the tasks listed. Searches for bug reporting, documentation, interfaces, technical support, and backwards compatibility found no passage in our copy making that distinction. (LLM, conf=0.72)

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Cites

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2 of the 84 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 14

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  2. R. Koestner/ R. M. Ryan (1 999), Met a-Ana lytic Review of Experiments: Exam- ining t he Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, in: Psychological Bulletin 125, 62 7-668
  3. D empsey, B. J ./D. W eiss/ P. J ones/J . G reenberg (2002), Who is a n Open Source Soft- ware D eveloper? in: Communications of the ACM 45, 67-72
  4. Fischbacher, U. /S. Gächter/ E . Fehr (2001), Are People Conditionally Coop erative? Eviden ce from Public Good Experiments, in: Economic Letters 71, 397-404
  5. Huizinga, J. (1986), Homo Ludens, Beacon Press
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  8. Kollock, P. (1999), The Economics of Online Cooperation: Gifts and Public Goods in Cyberspace, in: M. A. Smith/P. Kollock (eds.), Communities in Cyberspace, London, 220-242
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  13. Somaya, D. (2003), Strategie Determinants of Decisions not to Settle Patent Litiga- tion, in: Strategie Management Journal 24, 17-38
  14. Stallman, R. (1999), The GNU Operating System and the Free Software Movement, in: C. Dibona/S. Ockman/M. Stone (eds.), Open Sources: Voices from the Open Source Revolution, Sebastopol, 53-70

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Authors
Osterloh, M., & Rota, S.
ORCID
Osterloh, Margit
Venue
Analyse & Kritik
Publisher
Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Published
2004-05-01
Volume
26
Issue
1
Pages
279-301
ISSN
  • 0171-5860 (ISSN-L)
  • 2365-9858
DOI
10.1515/auk-2004-0115
OpenAlex
W2120061485
Cited by
23
References
84
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 1 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 1 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 3
FWCI
2.66
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
Analyse & Kritik (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Science Applications › Open Source Software Innovations
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Intellectual Property Rights and Media
Keywords
open source software, tragedy of the commons, tragedy of the anticommons, intellectual property, innovation models, intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation, governance mechanisms, community management, trust

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